Chaffee County District Court No. 18CV30032 Honorable Amanda
Hunter, Magistrate
Marquez & Herrick-Stare, LLC, Randall Herrick-Stare,
Salida, Colorado, for Plaintiffs-Appellees
Cordova Law Firm, LLP, Zachary D. Cordova, Salida, Colorado,
for Defendants-Appellants
OPINION
WEBB
JUDGE
¶
1 This interlocutory appeal arises from a district court
magistrate's denial of a motion to dismiss and compel
arbitration (the Motion) filed by defendants, Mark Miller and
Interior Living Designs LLC (ILD). It requires us to
determine whether the magistrate had jurisdiction under
C.R.M. 6(c)(2) to rule on the Motion, which could be done
only with the consent of the parties. The magistrate
purported to act with consent based on the lack of any
objection to the following statement in a stock order
addressing delay reduction (the Delay Reduction Order):
All parties are hereby notified that a magistrate may perform
any function in this case, with the exception of presiding
over a jury trial. C.R.M. 3(f)(1)(A)(ii).
¶
2 We conclude that because this notice did not inform the
parties that they were required to consent to any particular
function being performed by the magistrate, discussed only
what the magistrate "may" do, and did not mention
"consent," it was insufficient under C.R.M. 5(g).
We also conclude that because the magistrate did not have the
parties' consent, and motions to dismiss are not listed
in C.R.M. 6(c)(1), she lacked jurisdiction to rule on the
Motion under C.R.M. 6(c)(2). For these reasons, we reverse
the magistrate's denial of the Motion and remand for
further proceedings.
I.
Background
¶
3 Plaintiffs, Paul and Terry Andrews, entered into a written
contract with ILD for floor covering materials, which,
according to their complaint, were never fully delivered. The
Andrews pleaded claims for civil theft, for breach of
contract, and to pierce the corporate veil, making Miller,
ILD's president, liable for any judgment obtained against
ILD.
¶
4 After the magistrate entered the Delay Reduction Order,
[1]
defendants filed the Motion based on an arbitration provision
in the contract.[2] After full briefing on the Motion but
without holding a hearing, the magistrate denied it, finding
that the arbitration provision was "void as against
public policy" and "unenforceable." The
magistrate's order said that it was "issued with the
consent of the parties." Following entry of the Delay
Reduction Order, this ruling was the magistrate's only
action in the case.
¶
5 Defendants moved for district court review under C.R.M.
7(a). Citing to the Delay Reduction Order, the magistrate
denied the motion. She explained, "The court presides
over this case with the consent of the parties" and
"any appeal must be taken pursuant to C.R.M. 7(b)"
in the court of appeals.[3] Defendants then filed their notice of
appeal.
II. Law
and Standard of Review
¶
6 A district court magistrate has only those powers provided
by statute or court rule. See § 13-5-201(3),
C.R.S. 2019 ("District court magistrates may hear such
matters as are determined by rule of the supreme court . . .
."); see also In re R.G.B., 98 P.3d 958, 960
(Colo.App. 2004) (a magistrate is a hearing officer who acts
with limited authority). The Colorado Rules for Magistrates
set forth the authority of magistrates to perform particular
functions in different types of cases. Heotis v. Colo.
Dep't of Educ., 2016 COA 6, ¶ 10. C.R.M. 6
distinguishes between functions in cases that a magistrate
can perform only with the consent of the parties and
functions that a magistrate can perform without the
parties' consent.
¶
7 This appeal turns on interpretation of the magistrate
rules, which we review de novo. In re Parental
Responsibilities of M.B.-M., 252 P.3d 506, 509
(Colo.App. 2011). We interpret all court rules, consistent
with principles of statutory construction, looking first to
the plain and ordinary meaning of the words used. Hiner
v. Johnson, 2012 COA 164, ΒΆ 13. If the language is
unambiguous - and we discern no ambiguity in the relevant
...