The People of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee and Cross-Appellant,
Marshal Douglas Gregory, Defendant-Appellant and Cross-Appellee.
Paso County District Court No. 15CR2254 Honorable G. David
J. Weiser, Attorney General, Christine C. Brady, Assistant
Attorney General, Denver, Colorado; Daniel H. May, District
Attorney, Tanya A. Karimi, Deputy District Attorney, Colorado
Springs, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee and Cross-Appellant
A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Lisa Weisz, Deputy
State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for
Defendant-Appellant and Cross-Appellee
MARTINEZ JUSTICE [*]
1 Defendant, Marshal Douglas Gregory, and the People each
appeal the restitution order entered by the district court.
We decide that the court's authority to decrease
restitution does not carry with it the same limitations
placed on its authority to increase restitution previously
ordered. We also conclude that the comprehensive settlement
agreement in this case - which was intended to cover all
liabilities and indemnified defendant for any further losses
- meets defendant's burden of going forward to show that
he compensated the victims for the same categories of losses
for which restitution could be imposed. Thus, we reverse and
remand for further proceedings.
2 In September 2014, defendant, who was seventeen years old
at the time, drove while intoxicated and crashed his vehicle,
killing two passengers (B.B. and R.P.) and seriously injuring
a third (J.C.). Defendant pleaded guilty, as an adult, to two
counts of vehicular homicide. On October 11, 2015,
defendant's insurance company settled with the two
deceased victims' families and the living victim. Each of
the deceased victims' families received $500, 000 and, in
exchange, released defendant, his parents, and his insurance
company from all claims stemming from the incident.
3 On October 16, 2015, the court sentenced defendant to a
twelve-year suspended prison sentence, conditioned on
completion of four years in the Youthful Offender System.
During sentencing, the court reserved restitution for
ninety-one days. On January 6, 2016, the prosecution
requested restitution of $15, 513.43. The requested
restitution consisted of (1) $3307.33 to R.P.'s family
for travel expenses and psychologist fees for R.P.'s
brother; and (2) $5542 and $6664.10 to the Crime Victim
Compensation Program (CVCP) for payments made to B.B.'s
and R.P.'s families, respectively, for funeral expenses.
4 On May 27, 2016, following a restitution hearing, the court
entered a restitution order for the entire amount requested
by the prosecution. The order stated that defendant had
thirty days to object to the amount of restitution before the
order became final. Defendant filed an objection on June 8,
2016 - within the allotted thirty days - arguing that the
court should "reconsider" its order. The court
issued an amended restitution order on July 11, 2016, in
which it removed the payment that was to be made directly to
R.P.'s family, reasoning that it was set off by the
settlement agreement. The court maintained that defendant was
liable to the CVCP, as the fund was not a party to the
5 Defendant now appeals the amended restitution order,
arguing that the court erred by denying him a setoff for the
CVCP payments. The People filed a cross-appeal in which they
argue that (1) the court did not have authority to change its
May 27, 2016, restitution order; and (2) the court erred by
granting defendant a setoff for the payment to R.P.'s
Court's Authority to Amend the Restitution Order
6 As a threshold matter, the People contend that the district
court did not have authority to change its May 27, 2016,
order. We disagree.
7 We review and interpret statutes de novo. People v.
Padilla-Lopez, 2012 CO 49, ¶ 7. When construing
statutes, we aim to ascertain and give effect to the intent
of the General Assembly. Id. We accord words and
phrases their plain and ordinary meanings. Id.
"Where the language is clear, it is not necessary to
resort to other tools of statutory construction."
Goodman v. Heritage Builders, Inc., 2017 CO 13,
8 The district court must consider restitution in every order
of conviction it enters in a felony case. §
18-1.3-603(1), C.R.S. 2019. Pursuant to section
18-1.3-603(1), an order of conviction must contain: (a) an
order specifying the amount of restitution; (b) an order that
the defendant must pay restitution but that the specific
amount is to be determined within ninety-one days from the
order of conviction, or longer for good cause; (c) an order,
in addition to a specific amount of restitution, that the
defendant cover the cost of a victim's specific future
treatment; or (d) a finding that no victim of the crime
suffered a pecuniary loss and that restitution is not
required. § 18-1.3-603(1).
9 Section 18-1.3-603(3) also states:
order for restitution may be:
(a) Increased if additional victims or additional losses not
known to the judge or the prosecutor at the time the order of
restitution was entered are later discovered and the final
amount of restitution due has not been set by the court; or
(I) With the consent of the prosecuting attorney and the
victim or victims to whom the ...