Mucilli v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration

          ORDER

          KRISTEN L. MIX UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.

         This matter is before the Court^[1] on the Social Security Administrative Record [#11], ^[2] filed January 8, 2019, in support of Plaintiff's Complaint [#1] seeking review of the decision of Defendant Andrew Saul, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, (“Defendant” or “Commissioner”) denying Plaintiff's claim for supplemental security income benefits pursuant to Title XVI of the Social Security Act (the “Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq. On February 19, 2019, Plaintiff filed an Opening Brief [#16] (the “Brief”), and Defendant filed a Response [#17] in opposition. No. reply was filed. The Court has jurisdiction to review the Commissioner's final decision under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c). The Court has reviewed the entire case file and the applicable law and is sufficiently advised in the premises. For the reasons set forth below, the decision of the Commissioner is REVERSED and REMANDED.

         I. Factual and Procedural Background

         Plaintiff alleges that she has been disabled since March 10, 2016. Tr. 14 (discussing amendment of alleged onset date from March 9, 1998).^[3] On March 8, 2016, Plaintiff filed an application for supplemental security income under Title XVI. Tr. 14. On March 8, 2018, an Administrative Law Judge (the “ALJ”) issued an unfavorable decision. Tr. 27.

         The ALJ determined that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity (“SGA”) since March 8, 2016, the application date. Tr. 17. The ALJ found that Plaintiff suffers from three severe impairments: (1) vagal nerve injury with resultant gastroparesis, status-post gastro pacer placement; (2) gastroesophageal reflex disease (“GERD”); and (3) depression. Tr. 17. However, the ALJ also found that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of impairments which meets or medically equals “the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926).” Tr. 17. The ALJ next concluded that Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work with the following abilities and limitations:

[C]an never climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds; should never be exposed to unprotected heights; can understand, remember and carry out tasks of limited complexity consistent with unskilled work; can make simple work-related decisions; can tolerate occasional brief interaction with supervisors and co-workers; and, can have no interaction with the general public.

Tr. 19. Based on the RFC and the testimony of an impartial vocational expert (“VE”), the ALJ found that Plaintiff had no past relevant work, but found that there are jobs which exist in significant numbers in the national economy which Plaintiff can perform, including the representative occupations of mail clerk, routing clerk, and inspector and hand packager. Tr. 25-26. The ALJ therefore found Plaintiff not disabled at step five of the sequential evaluation. Tr. 25. The ALJ's decision has become the final decision of the Commissioner for purposes of judicial review. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1481.

         II. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

         Pursuant to the Act:

[T]he Social Security Administration is authorized to pay disability insurance benefits and Supplemental Security Income to persons who have a “disability.” A person qualifies as disabled, and thereby eligible for such benefits, “only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.”

Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 21-22 (2003) (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B)). Under the applicable legal standard, a claimant is disabled if he or she is unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment . . . which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(a); see also Wall v. Astrue, 561 F.3d 1048, 1051 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 416.905(a)). The existence of a qualifying disabling impairment must be demonstrated by “medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic” findings. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(3), 423(d)(5)(A).

         “When a claimant has one or more severe impairments the Social Security [Act] requires the [Commissioner] to consider the combined effects of the impairments in making a disability determination.” Campbell v. Bowen, 822 F.2d 1518, 1521 (10th Cir. 1987) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(C)). However, the mere existence of a severe impairment or combination of impairments does not require a finding that an individual is disabled within the meaning of the Act. To be disabling, the claimant's condition must be so functionally limiting as to preclude any substantial gainful activity for at least twelve consecutive months. See Kelley v. Chater, 62 F.3d 335, 338 (10th Cir. 1995).

         The Court reviews a final decision by the Commissioner by examining the administrative record and determining “whether the [ALJ's] factual findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record and whether the correct legal standards were applied.” Wilson v. Astrue, 602 F.3d 1136, 1140 (10th Cir. 2010). However, the Court “may neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute [its] judgment for that of the agency.” Harper v. Colvin, 528 Fed.Appx. 887, 890 (10th Cir. 2013) (quoting Barnett v. Apfel, 231 F.3d 687, 689 (10th Cir. 2000)). In other words, the Court does not reexamine the issues de novo. Sisco v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 10 F.3d 739, 741 (10th Cir. 1993). Thus, even when some evidence could support contrary findings, the Court “may not displace the agency's choice between two fairly conflicting views, ” even if the Court may have “made a different choice had the matter been before it de novo.” Oldham v. Astrue, 509 F.3d 1254, 1257-58 (10th Cir. 2007).

         A. Legal Standard

         The Social Security Administration uses a five-step framework to determine whether a claimant meets the necessary conditions to receive Social Security benefits. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through four, and if the claimant fails at any of these steps, consideration of any subsequent step or steps is unnecessary. Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 750 (10th Cir. 1988) (“If a determination can be made at any of the steps that a claimant is or is not disabled, evaluation under a subsequent step is not necessary.”). The Commissioner bears the burden of proof at step five. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987).

         Step one requires the ALJ to determine whether a claimant is “presently engaged in substantial gainful activity.” Wall, 561 F.3d at 1052 (quoting Allen v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1140, 1142 (10th Cir. 2004)). If not, the ALJ considers at step two whether a claimant has “a medically severe impairment or impairments.” Id. “An impairment is severe under the applicable regulations if it significantly limits a claimant's physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities.” Wall, 561 F.3d at 1052 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521). Next, at step three, the ALJ considers whether a claimant's medically severe impairments are equivalent to a condition “listed in the appendix of the relevant disability regulation, ” i.e., the “Listings.” Wall, 561 F.3d at 1052 (quoting Allen, 357 F.3d at 1142). “If a claimant's impairments are not equivalent to a listed impairment, the ALJ must consider, at step four, whether a claimant's impairments prevent [him or her] from performing [his or her] past relevant work.” Wall, 561 F.3d at 1052 (citing Allen, 357 F.3d at 1142). “Even if a claimant is so impaired, the agency considers, at step five, whether [he or she] possesses the sufficient [RFC] to perform other work in the national economy.” Id.

         B. Substantial Evidence

         An ALJ must consider all evidence and explain why he or she finds a claimant not disabled. Clifton v. Chater, 79 F.3d 1007, 1009 (10th Cir. 1996). However, the ALJ need not specifically “reference everything in the administrative record.” Wilson, 602 F.3d at 1148. “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. at 1140 (internal quotation marks omitted). “It requires more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance.” Lax v. Astrue, 489 F.3d 1080, 1084 (10th Cir. 2007). A decision by the ALJ is not based on substantial evidence “if it is overwhelmed by other evidence in the record . . . .” Grogan v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 1257, 1261-62 (10th Cir. 2005). In other words, the Court's determination of whether the ALJ has supported his or her ruling with substantial evidence “must be based upon the record taken as a whole.” Washington v. Shalala, 37 F.3d 1437, 1439 (10th Cir. 1994). Further, evidence is not substantial if it “constitutes mere conclusion.” Musgrave v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1371, 1374 (10th Cir. 1992). In addition, “if the ALJ failed to apply the correct legal test, there is a ground for reversal apart from a lack of substantial evidence.” Thompson v. Sullivan, 987 F.2d 1482, 1487 (10th Cir. 1993).

         III. Analysis

         Plaintiff requests judicial review of the ALJ's decision denying her supplemental security income. Brief [#16]. First, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by concluding “that certain of [Plaintiff's] medical complaints were nonsevere.” Id. at 22-24. Second, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ “erred by failing to take into account the combined nonexertional effects of [Plaintiff's] severe and nonsevere impairments when she assigned the [RFC] limitations.” Id. at 24-28. Third, Plaintiff argues that “the ALJ erred by failing to make adequate findings at step four regarding the functional effects of [Plaintiff's] ...