United States District Court, D. Colorado
ORDER GRANTING DEFAULT JUDGMENT
D. Domenico United States District Judge
31, 2019, Plaintiff Dish Network, LLC filed this action to
confirm an arbitration award of $92, 730.80 it obtained
against Defendant Albertis, Inc. (Doc. 1.) Albertis has not
participated in this case, and Dish obtained a Clerk's
entry of default on November 7, 2019. (Doc. 13.) That same
day, Dish filed a motion for default judgment (Doc. 14), to
which Albertis has not responded. For the following reasons,
the motion is GRANTED.
may not simply sit out the litigation without consequence.
See Cessna Fin. Corp. v. Bielenberg Masonry Contracting,
Inc., 715 F.2d 1442, 1444-45 (10th Cir. 1983)
(“[A] workable system of justice requires that
litigants not be free to appear at their pleasure. We
therefore must hold parties and their attorneys to a
reasonably high standard of diligence in observing the
courts' rules of procedure. The threat of judgment by
default serves as an incentive to meet this
after default, however, it remains for the court to consider
whether the unchallenged facts constitute a legitimate cause
of action, since a party in default does not admit mere
conclusions of law.” 10A Wright et al., Fed. Prac.
& Proc. § 2688, at 63. Additionally, a court need
not accept conclusory allegations. Moffett v. Halliburton
Energy Servs., Inc., 291 F.3d 1227, 1232 (10th Cir.
2002). Although “[s]pecific facts are not
necessary” in order to state a claim, Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007)), the well-pleaded facts must “permit the court
to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009)
(internal quotation marks and alteration marks omitted). A
party is not entitled to a default judgment as of right.
Rather, the entry of a default judgment is entrusted to the
sound judicial discretion of the court. Tripodi v.
Welch, 810 F.3d 761, 764 (10th Cir. 2016).
a clerk's entry of default, courts follow two steps
before granting default judgment. First, a court must ensure
it has subject matter and personal jurisdiction. Williams
v. Life Sav. & Loan, 802 F.2d 1200, 1203 (10th Cir.
1986); Marcus Food Co. v. DiPanfilo, 671 F.3d 1159,
1166 (10th Cir. 2011) (default judgment against defendant
over whom court has no personal jurisdiction is void).
Second, courts consider whether the well-pleaded allegations
of fact-which are admitted by a defendant upon
default-support a judgment on the claims against the
defaulting defendant. See Tripodi, 810 F.3d at 764.
the complaint states an adequate legal basis for relief
against a party in default, default judgment may be
appropriate. Mrs. Condies Salad Co. v. Colorado Blue
Ribbon Foods, LLC, 858 F.Supp.2d 1212, 1218 (D. Colo.
2012). The Court also accepts as undisputed any facts set
forth by the moving party in affidavits and exhibits.
Purzel Video GmbH v. Biby, 13 F.Supp.3d 1127, 1135
(D. Colo. 2014).
well-pleaded allegations of fact, as supported by Dish's
filings, establish the following. The parties entered into a
contract pursuant to which Albertis would become authorized,
on a non-exclusive basis, to promote and solicit orders for
Dish's services. (See generally Doc. 1-2.) Dish
initiated the underlying arbitration action against Albertis
based upon alleged violations of that contract (the
“Retailer Agreement”), including the fraudulent
submission of false and misleading information to Dish for
the purpose of making current or former Dish customers appear
as if they were “new” customers so Albertis would
qualify for certain incentive payments. On or about December
19, 2018, the JAMS Resolution Center formally appointed the
Honorable James S. Miller (the “Arbitrator”) to
adjudicate the arbitration action between Dish and Albertis.
On February 26, 2019, the Arbitrator entered a “Final
Award” against Albertis, in favor of Dish, for $92,
31, 2019, Dish filed this action to confirm that arbitration
award. On October 9, the application and supporting documents
were served on Carlos Alberti, the registered agent for
Albertis. On October 28, Dish filed the executed proof of
service. Albertis never made any appearance in this action.
On November 7, at Dish's request, the Clerk entered
default against Alebertis. That day, Dish filed the motion
before the Court, which was served by mail to Albertis's
registered agent at two addresses.
Court is satisfied that it has subject matter jurisdiction
over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).
Dish is a Colorado limited liability company whose sole
member is DISH DBS Corporation, a Colorado corporation with a
principle place of business located in Eng-lewood, Colorado.
Albertis is a corporation established under the laws of
Puerto Rico with a principal place of business in Fajardo,
Puerto Rico. (See Doc. 1, at 1-2.) The amount in
controversy, $92, 730.80, exceeds $75, 000. Venue is proper
under 9 U.S.C. § 9, because the governing arbitration
agreement does not specify a federal court in which an action
to enforce the underlying arbitration award should be filed,
and this is the U.S. Court in and for the judicial district
in which the underlying arbitration was filed and the final
award was made. The Retailer Agreement also required any
arbitration between the parties to be conducted in the City
and County of Denver, Colorado. (See Doc. 1-2, at
Court also has personal jurisdiction over Albertis, which
entered into a contract with a Colorado company and-having
entered into an agreement governed by Colorado law and with
an arbitration provision requiring arbitration in
Colorado-should have reasonably anticipated being haled into
court in this state. See, e.g., AST Sports Sci.,
Inc. v. CLF Distribution Ltd., 514 F.3d 1054, 1057 (10th
Cir. 2008). The Court is also empowered to confirm an
arbitration award entered in this state. 9 U.S.C. § 9.
is also adequate legal basis for relief. The parties agreed
to arbitrate any dispute in Denver, Colorado. Dish obtained
an award of $92, 730.80. Dish timely filed this action within
one year of obtaining that award. Finally, the award has not
been vacated, modified, or corrected as prescribed in
Sections 10 and 11 of the Federal ...