United States District Court, D. Colorado
SCOTT A. BEEBE, Plaintiff,
v.
STATE OF COLORADO, and COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS AS MOOT
CHRISTINE M. ARGUELLO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
This
matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss as Moot (Doc. # 106). Having reviewed the Motion,
pertinent record, and relevant law, the Court finds that
Plaintiff's claim is moot, which deprives this Court of
subject matter jurisdiction.
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff
was convicted and sentenced to probation for a Colorado sex
offense on April 13, 2002. Probation was revoked on November
30, 2007, and Plaintiff was resentenced to a minimum
mandatory two years to life indeterminate sentence to the
Colorado Department of Corrections (“CDOC”),
which was modified on May 13, 2009, to reflect the
opportunity for discretionary rather than mandatory parole.
Plaintiff is currently an inmate at the Centennial
Correctional Facility within the CDOC. (Doc. # 35 at
¶¶ 5, 10-11.)
At all
times throughout his incarceration, Plaintiff alleges that he
has had “mental impairments of Axis I: 300.02
Generalized Anxiety Disorder, with Panic Disorder; Axis I:
2000.4 Persistent Depressive Disorder, which includes Major
Depressive Disorder, and Axis II: 301.4 Obsessive/Compulsive
Personality Disorder (OCD).” (Id. at ¶
8.) Plaintiff further asserts that such mental impairments
“substantially limit [his] concentration, thinking,
communicating, and brain function.” (Id. at
¶ 9.) Moreover, Plaintiff contends that these mental
impairments cause him to experience “excessive anxiety
and worry, restlessness, and difficulty concentrating,
accompanied by overstimulation of his nervous system,
accelerated heart rate, shortness or irregularity of breath,
muscle tension and dizziness, all of which are exacerbated by
the prospect of and actual taking of a polygraph.”
(Id. at ¶ 22.)
Plaintiff
has been and currently is admitted to and participating in
the Sex Offender Treatment and Monitoring Program
(“SOTMP”). (Id. at ¶¶ 4, 12.)
To qualify for permission to receive parole, Plaintiff must
earn a “Successful Progress” status by meeting
seven treatment criteria, the second of which is central to
this case. (Id. at ¶¶ 15-17.) The second
criterion requires “verification of sexual history
‘through either the . . . polygraph . . .
or other clinical indicators” (“Second
Criterion”). (Id. at ¶ 17 (quoting Colo.
Sex Offender Mgmt. Bd., Standards and Guidelines for the
Assessment, Evaluation, Treatment and Behavioral Monitoring
of Adult Sex Offenders 304, LS 4.210(A) (April 2018))
(emphasis in original).) The Sex Offender Management Board
(“SOMB”) Standards provide that “other
clinical indicators” may include “scores on
dynamic risk assessments” and “behavioral
observations.” (Id. at ¶ 19.)
Plaintiff
alleges that he routinely fails the polygraph component of
the Second Criterion as a result of his alleged disabilities.
(Id. at ¶¶ 18, 22-23.) As such, Plaintiff
requested an Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”) accommodation from Defendants, seeking a
waiver of the polygraph test and the ability to use
“other clinical indicators” so that he can meet
the Second Criterion. (Id. at ¶¶ 24-38);
(Doc. # 62 at 2). Defendants denied Plaintiff's request.
(Doc. # 35 at ¶¶ 25, 32-34.)
On June
1, 2018, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants (Doc. # 1),
and on September 24, 2018, Plaintiff filed his Amended
Complaint (Doc. # 35), wherein he asserted a single claim for
Violation of Title II of the ADA. Specifically, Plaintiff
sought “declaratory judgment and relief against
Defendants in the form of an order enjoining Defendants to
allow Plaintiff's requested reasonable accommodation of
polygraph waiver in sex offender treatment and
supervision.” (Id. at 14.) Although
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint did not so specify, at the
Final Trial Preparation Conference, Plaintiff represented
that he also seeks a polygraph waiver during his time on
parole.[1]
Both
parties moved for summary judgment (Doc. ## 67, 71), which
the Court denied. (Doc. # 105.) At the Final Trial
Preparation Conference on November 21, 2019, Defendants
represented to the Court that, recently, Plaintiff had been
more “open” about his history with his treatment
providers, and this openness permitted his treatment
providers to use “other clinical indicators” to
verify his sexual history. (Doc. # 108 at 13.) As a result,
Plaintiff progressed in treatment and Defendants determined
that he met the listed criteria, including the Second
Criterion, and recommended him for parole. (Id.) In
fact, he is scheduled to appear before the Colorado State
Parole Board (“Parole Board”) on December 9,
2019-the same day that trial in the instant action is to
commence. (Id.)
Given
Plaintiff's successful progression in sex offender
treatment and that Defendants are no longer requiring him to
submit to a polygraph examination, Defendants filed their
Motion to Dismiss as Moot (Doc. # 106) and therein argue that
those recent developments have rendered Plaintiff's claim
as moot. Additionally, Defendants aver that the Court has no
authority to decide whether Plaintiff is entitled to a
polygraph waiver while on parole because whether he will
obtain parole is speculative and, even if he obtains parole,
the Parole Board and private actors, not Defendants, set
conditions, rules, and regulations that govern
Plaintiff's parole. (Doc. # 106 at 9-11; Doc. # 106-1 at
8, ¶ 20, 20.) The instant Motion implicates foundational
principles of Article III-standing and mootness. As such, the
Court considers whether recent developments in the case
divest it of subject matter jurisdiction to resolve
Plaintiff's action for declaratory and injunctive relief.
II.
LEGAL STANDARDS
A.
STANDING
The
United States Constitution limits the jurisdiction of the
federal courts to actual cases or controversies. U.S. Const.
art. III, § 2, cl. 1. At the start of litigation, a
plaintiff must show standing under Article III by
demonstrating: “(1) an injury in fact; (2) a causal
connection between the injury and the challenged action; and
(3) a likelihood that a favorable decision will redress
the injury.” Ind v. Colo. Dep't of
Corr., 801 F.3d 1209, 1214 (10th Cir. 2015) (emphasis in
original) (quoting Jordan v. Sosa, 654 F.3d 1012,
1019 (10th Cir. 2011) (citing Friends of the Earth, Inc.
v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81
(2000)).
The
Supreme Court has defined an “injury in fact” as
“an invasion of a legally protected interest which is
(a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent,
not conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
Although a plaintiff may present evidence of a past injury to
establish standing for retrospective relief, he must
demonstrate a continuing injury to establish standing for
...