County District Court No. 18CR1011, Honorable Brian J. Flynn,
P. Rubinstein, District Attorney, George Alan Holley II,
Senior Deputy District Attorney, Grand Junction, Colorado,
A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Elyse Maranjian,
Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for
This prosecution appeal requires us to decide whether the
General Assembly has legislatively overruled People v.
Andrews, 871 P.2d 1199 (Colo. 1994), concerning the
mandatory minimum sentence for the crime of escape (F3), by
its 1995 amendment to section 18-8-208, C.R.S. 2019. Because
we conclude that Andrews is still binding authority,
we affirm the trial courts sentence, which it imposed based
on Andrews .
Under section 16-12-102(1), C.R.S. 2019, the District
Attorney for the 21st Judicial District appeals the four-year
sentence (plus mandatory parole) imposed on defendant, Cody
Jay Scott, following his guilty plea — without a
sentencing concession — to escape, in violation of
section 18-8-208(2). Specifically, the District Attorney
contends the trial court erred as a matter of law in
concluding based on Andrews that the mandatory
minimum sentence was four years, under section
18-1.3-401(1)(a)(V)(A.1), C.R.S. 2019, rather than eight
years under section 18-1.3-401(8)(a)(IV). Scott concedes
Standard of Review
The parties agree that we review interpretation of a
sentencing statute de novo. See, e.g., People v.
Wylie, 260 P.3d 57, 60 (Colo.App. 2010) ("To the
extent defendants argument requires us to interpret
statutory provisions, we do so de novo."). That review
is guided by several familiar principles.
• A courts principal task when construing a statute is
to give effect to the General Assemblys intent, as
determined primarily from the plain language of the statute.
Romero v. People, 179 P.3d 984, 986 (Colo. 2007).
• The court construes the statute as a whole in an
effort to give consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to
all its parts, and reads words and phrases in context and
according to the rules of grammar and common usage.
People v. Banuelos-Landa, 109 P.3d 1039, 1041
• If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous,
the court does not engage in further statutory analysis, much
less consider extrinsic information. Romero, 179
P.3d at 986.
• "The plainness or ambiguity of statutory language
is determined by reference to the language itself, the
specific context in which that language is used, and the
broader context of the statute as a whole." Robinson
v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136
L.Ed.2d 808 (1997); see also Klinger v. Adams
Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 50, 130 P.3d 1027, 1031 (Colo.
• A statutory interpretation leading to an illogical or