United States District Court, D. Colorado
ORDER
SCOTT
T. VARHOLAK UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
This
matter is before the Court on Defendant Carlos Buitrago's
Motion to Stay Discovery [#30] (the “Motion”),
which has been referred to this Court [#32]. Plaintiff
responded to the Motion on November 18, 2019. [#41] This
Court has carefully considered the Motion and related
briefing, the entire case file and the applicable case law,
and has determined that oral argument would not materially
assist in the disposition of the instant Motion to Stay. For
the following reasons, the Motion is
GRANTED.
I.
Background
Plaintiff
Zhandy Carey is in custody at the Denver County Jail
(“DCJ”). Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on
September 5, 2019, alleging violations of his Fourth, Eighth,
and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States
Constitution, as well as violations of the Colorado
Constitution. [#23] The claims arise out of Defendants'
response to Plaintiff's attempt to commit suicide while
at the DCJ.
Defendant
Buitrago[1] filed a Motion to Dismiss on October 10,
2019, arguing that the Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims, that
Defendant Buitrago is entitled to qualified immunity on the
federal claims, and that Plaintiff has failed to adequately
plead claims against Defendant Buitrago in his official
capacity. [#27] Defendant Buitrago filed the instant Motion
on November 6, 2019. [#30] In the Motion, Defendant Buitrago
argues that discovery proceedings should be stayed pending
the Court's resolution of the Motion to Dismiss, because
allowing discovery to proceed would undermine the protections
of qualified immunity. [Id.] Plaintiff has responded
to the Motion. [#41]
II.
Analysis
When
considering whether to grant a stay, the Court weighs the
following factors: (1) the interest of the plaintiff in
proceeding expeditiously with discovery and the potential
prejudice to the plaintiff of a delay; (2) the burden on the
defendant of proceeding with discovery; (3) the convenience
to the Court of staying discovery; (4) the interests of
nonparties in either staying or proceeding with discovery;
and (5) the public interest. See String Cheese Incident,
LLC v. Stylus Shows, Inc., No. 1:02-CV-01934- LTB-PA,
2006 WL 894955, at *2 (D. Colo. Mar. 30, 2006). Considering
these factors, the Court concludes that a stay is warranted
pending resolution of the Motion to Dismiss.
First,
although Plaintiff has an interest in proceeding
expeditiously, Plaintiff has failed to identify any specific
prejudice that a delay would cause. Plaintiff simply states
that he seeks to move forward with his case and that
Defendant Buitrago's arguments for dismissal are
meritless. [#41 at 1] Nor is the Court aware of any prejudice
that may result, especially because the factual allegations
in this case are fairly simple and the events giving rise to
Plaintiff's claims occurred relatively recently. Because
Plaintiff has failed to provide any “specific examples
of how [his] ability to conduct discovery might be adversely
affected by a stay, ” the Court finds that
Plaintiff's general interest in proceeding expeditiously
does not overcome the factors discussed below that weigh in
favor of a stay. Stone v. Vail Resorts Dev. Co.,
Civil Action No. 09-cv-02081-WYD-KLM, 2010 WL 148278, at *1
(D. Colo. Jan. 7, 2010).
Second,
the Court finds that proceeding with discovery would impose a
burden upon Defendant Buitrago. A ruling in favor of
Defendant on the Motion to Dismiss would be
dispositive.[2] Thus, staying discovery may relieve the
burdens of discovery for Defendant Buitrago. This fact is
particularly important in this case, where Defendant Buitrago
has asserted a qualified immunity defense. As the Supreme
Court has made clear, “[t]he basic thrust of the
qualified-immunity doctrine is to free officials from the
concerns of litigation, including ‘avoidance of
disruptive discovery.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 685 (2009) (quoting Siegert v. Gilley,
500 U.S. 226, 236 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment)). Accordingly, the second factor supports granting
the Motion.
Third,
the Court considers its own convenience. This District has
recognized that “an ill-advised stay” may
inconvenience the Court because “the resulting delay
makes the Court's docket less predictable and, hence,
less manageable.” Stone, 2010 WL 148278, at
*3. But “[w]here a pending motion may dispose of an
action . . . a stay of proceedings may allow the Court to
avoid expending resources in managing an action that
ultimately will be dismissed.” Id. Here, if
successful, the Motion to Dismiss would entirely dispose of
the action against Defendant Buitrago. Given that this case
is in its very early stages, the Court finds that the
interests of judicial economy weigh in favor of granting the
stay.
The
fourth and fifth factors are either neutral or support
staying this action. Neither party has identified any
nonparty whose interests would be impacted by the requested
stay. Moreover, while the public has an interest in the
speedy resolution of legal disputes, see,
e.g., Waisanen v. Terracon Consultants,
Inc., Civil Action No. 09-cv-01104-MSK-KMT, 2009 WL
5184699, at *2 (D. Colo. Dec. 22, 2009), “there is also
a strong public policy behind the qualified immunity
doctrine. Among other things, this includes avoiding
unnecessary expenditures of public and private resources on
litigation.” Chapman v. Fed. Bureau of
Prisons, No. 15-cv-00279-WYD-KLM, 2015 WL 4574863, at *4
(D. Colo. July 30, 2015). As a result, the fifth factor
supports granting the stay.
Considering
the factors set forth above, the Court determines that a stay
of discovery pending resolution of the Motion to Dismiss is
warranted. Accordingly, the Motion to Stay Discovery [#30] is
GRANTED.
The
Court further notes that Plaintiff has yet to respond to the
Motion to Dismiss. The Court sua sponte extends
Plaintiff's deadline to respond to December 12, 2019.
Should Plaintiff fail to respond by that date, the
Court will consider the Motion to Dismiss without input from
Plaintiff. Finally, a Status Conference is
set for March 6, 2020 at 10:30 a.m. in Courtroom
A-402 before Magistrate Judge Scott T. Varholak. Plaintiff,
and, if ...