United States District Court, D. Colorado
NICHOLAS J. AURELIO and ALLEN DE ATLEY, Plaintiffs,
v.
CORRECTIONS CORPORATION OF AMERICA, CORE CIVIC, INC., MICHAEL MILLER, INVESTIGATOR ORTIZ, MS. WALTER, and DAVID M. ZUPAN, Defendants.
ORDER
PHILIP
A. BRIMMER Chief United States District Judge
This
matter is before the Court on plaintiff Allen De Atley's
Motion for Reconsideration [Docket No. 74] filed on September
11, 2019. On October 2, 2019, defendants filed a response.
Docket No. 89. The Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331.
On June
2, 2017, plaintiffs Nicholas Aurelio and Allen De Atley,
currently in the custody of the Colorado Department of
Corrections (“CDOC”), sued defendants under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that their right of access to the
courts under the First, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments had
been infringed. Docket No. 6 at 6, ¶ 25. On August 29,
2019, the Court granted defendants' motion for summary
judgment and dismissed plaintiffs' complaint with
prejudice. Docket No. 72 at 10.
On
September 11, 2019, plaintiff De Atley filed a motion for
reconsideration [Docket No. 74]. He argues that
“material fact questions exist precluding [the entry]
of summary judgment.” Docket No. 74 at 2. Plaintiff
appears to argue that he has claims to raise under the
Colorado Organized Crime Control Act (“COCCA”),
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-17-101 et seq., based
upon “crimes being committed by [defendants] and . . .
Judges Brimmer and Hegarty and [their] staff.”
Id. Specifically, plaintiff argues that
“[p]robable cause existed to support charges that
defendants violated the [Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (“RICO”)] statutes and [COCCA]
based on evidence that defendants knowingly conducted or
participated in affairs of a corporation through series of
acts of ‘mail fraud,' ‘wire fraud,' and
‘theft,' fraudulent and false statements, perjury
committing civil rights violations including constitutional
violations.” Id.
The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not specifically provide
for motions for reconsideration. See Hatfield v. Bd. of
County Comm'rs for Converse County, 52 F.3d 858, 861
(10th Cir. 1995). Instead, motions for reconsideration fall
within a court's plenary power to revisit and amend
interlocutory orders as justice requires. See Paramount
Pictures Corp. v. Thompson Theatres, Inc., 621 F.2d
1088, 1090 (10th Cir. 1980) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b));
see also Houston Fearless Corp., 313 F.2d at 92.
However, in order to avoid the inefficiency which would
attend the repeated re-adjudication of interlocutory orders,
judges in this district have imposed limits on their broad
discretion to revisit interlocutory orders. See,
e.g., Montano v. Chao, No. 07-cv-00735-EWN-KMT,
2008 WL 4427087, at *5-6 (D. Colo. Sept. 28, 2008) (applying
Rule 60(b) analysis to the reconsideration of interlocutory
order); United Fire & Cas. Co. v. McCrerey &
Roberts Constr. Co., No. 06-cv-00037-WYD-CBS, 2007 WL
1306484, at *1-2 (D. Colo. May 3, 2007) (applying Rule 59(e)
standard to the reconsideration of the duty-to-defend order).
Regardless of the analysis applied, the basic assessment
tends to be the same: courts consider whether new evidence or
legal authority has emerged or whether the prior ruling was
clearly in error. Motions to reconsider are generally an
inappropriate vehicle to advance “new arguments, or
supporting facts which were available at the time of the
original motion.” Servants of the Paraclete v.
Does, 204 F.3d 1005, 1012 (10th Cir. 2000). Because
plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court will
construe his motion for reconsideration liberally without
serving as his advocate. See Hall v. Bellmon, 935
F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
Plaintiff
has not demonstrated that new evidence or legal authority has
emerged since the Court's August 29, 2019 order granting
defendants' motion for summary judgment that would
justify granting reconsideration here. Instead, plaintiff
argues that “clearly [the] Court has tried to not
follow any law” and that “the Court must
re[-]read the statement of De Atley with all the
proof.” Docket No. 74 at 3.[1] Such conclusory statements
are insufficient to prove that reconsideration of the
Court's order is warranted. Ysais v. Richardson,
603 F.3d 1175, 1180 (10th Cir. 2010). Further, although
plaintiff disagrees with the Court's legal conclusions,
he has not presented any legal authority demonstrating that
the Court's decision was clearly erroneous. For example,
he references “the need to correct a manifest . . .
injustice, ” but fails to explain what he believes was
manifestly unjust about the Court's ruling. Docket No. 74
at 4. Plaintiff has not provided a credible basis for
reconsideration.
Additionally,
plaintiff's argument that the Court overlooked a genuine
issue of material fact concerning defendants' purported
violations of RICO or COCCA is not well-taken. In their
complaint, plaintiffs exclusively raised a claim under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Docket No. 6 at 6. They did not raise
claims under RICO or COCCA, see id., and a motion
for reconsideration is an improper vehicle to raise new legal
arguments. Servants of the Paraclete, 204 F.3d at
1012. Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiff has failed
to demonstrate that reconsideration of its order granting
defendants' motion for summary judgment is warranted.
Wherefore,
it is
ORDERED
that plaintiff Allen De Atley's Motion for
Reconsideration [Docket No. 74] is DENIED.
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Notes:
[1]While plaintiff does not indicate to
which statement he refers, he urges the Court to
“re-read” the statement, which indicates that it
is evidence that has already been considered by the Court.
Evidence already considered by the Court is an improper basis
for a motion ...