United States District Court, D. Colorado
ORDER ADOPTING JULY 17, 2019 RECOMMENDATION OF
MAGISTRATE JUDGE GRANTING DEPUTY WOOD'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DISMISSING DOE DEFENDANTS
WILLIAM J. MARTÍNEZ, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
This
matter is before the Court on United States Magistrate Judge
Kristen L. Mix's Recommendation dated July 17, 2019 (the
“Recommendation”; ECF No. 260), which recommended
that this Court (1) dismiss Defendants John Doe Deputy, John
Doe Officer, John Doe Deputies, and John Doe Officers
(collectively, “Doe Defendants”) from this case;
and (2) grant Defendant Deputy Wood's (“Deputy
Wood”) Motion for Summary Judgment (the
“Motion”; ECF No. 243). The Recommendation is
incorporated herein by reference. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(B); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). Plaintiff Elizabeth
Wojdacz (“Plaintiff”) filed an Objection to the
Recommendation (“Objection”; ECF No. 264), to
which Deputy Wood responded (ECF No. 270).
For the
reasons set forth below, the Recommendation is adopted in its
entirety, Plaintiff's Objection is overruled, the Doe
Defendants are dismissed without prejudice, and Deputy
Wood's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.
I.
BACKGROUND[1]
On the
night of September 28, 2014, Deputy Wood was on patrol in the
9500 block of East Iliff Avenue in Denver, Colorado. (¶
2.)[2]
During his patrol, Deputy Wood observed Plaintiff's white
Chevrolet S-10 driving past him on the other side of the
street. (Id.) Deputy Wood then received a
“hit” on his License Plate Reader, which informed
him that there was a misdemeanor warrant associated with the
vehicle. (Id.) Deputy Wood turned his patrol car
around and followed Plaintiff's vehicle. (Id.)
Deputy Wood then observed Plaintiff's vehicle turn left
into a parking lot behind a store located at 2281 South
Parker Road. (Id.) Deputy Wood continued to the stop
light at the intersection of East Iliff Avenue and South
Parker Road. (Id.)
While
at the stop light, Deputy Wood researched the License Plate
Reader “hit, ” and learned that there was an
“attempt to locate” notice on the vehicle rather
than a warrant. (¶ 3.) Deputy Wood then observed
Plaintiff's vehicle turn left out of the parking lot
“into the outer-most right-hand lane” of South
Parker Road. (Id.; see also ECF No. 243-2
at 2 (Plaintiff admitting that in turning left out of the
parking lot, she went “straight across the road, [to]
the farthest lane”).) Deputy Wood perceived this turn
as an improper lane violation under Colorado traffic law and,
for this reason, activated his emergency lights and pulled
over Plaintiff's vehicle for a traffic stop. (¶ 3.)
See also Colo. Rev. Stat. § 42-4-901(1)(b)
(“Whenever practicable, the left turn shall be made to
the left of the center of the intersection so as to leave the
intersection or other location in the extreme left-hand lane
lawfully available to traffic moving in the same direction as
such vehicle on the roadway being entered.”).
Upon
making contact with the vehicle, Deputy Wood observed
Plaintiff as the sole occupant and driver of the vehicle.
(¶ 4.) Deputy Wood recalls that Plaintiff's vehicle
was “full of personal items” and in
“disarray, ” and that it was apparent Plaintiff
“was living out of her vehicle.” (¶ 11;
see also ECF No. 243-2 at 15 (Plaintiff
acknowledging that she lived in her vehicle at the time).)
Deputy Wood asked Plaintiff for her license, registration,
and proof of insurance. (¶ 4.) Plaintiff provided Deputy
Wood with her license, registration, and an expired proof of
insurance. (Id.) In addition to providing the
expired proof of insurance, Plaintiff claims that she also
provided Deputy Wood with a valid, unexpired proof of
insurance. (ECF No. 243-2 at 15 (“I gave him two
[proofs of insurance]: One valid, one expired.”).)
(But see id. (when asked why she gave Deputy Wood
two proofs of insurance, Plaintiff responded: “I gave
him all the stuff I had in my wallet. I didn't go through
it.”).) Plaintiff, however, never informed Deputy Wood
that she provided him with a valid proof of insurance-nor did
Deputy Wood ever acknowledge the receipt of any valid proof
of insurance. (¶¶ 4-5; ECF No. 243-2 at 3.)
Deputy
Wood requested that Plaintiff provide an alternative proof of
insurance. (¶ 4.) In response, Plaintiff provided Deputy
Wood with a bill for payment of insurance. (Id.)
Deputy Wood did not accept this alternative proof of
insurance because it did not identify the vehicle associated
with the insurance bill or the policy dates of coverage.
(Id.) According to Plaintiff's deposition
testimony, she believed that the insurance bill should have
been accepted because it contained the policy number. (ECF
No. 243-2 at 3.)
Deputy
Wood then returned the expired proof of insurance to
Plaintiff and returned to his patrol car with her license and
registration in order to write a citation. (¶ 6.)
Plaintiff alleges that, at some point during this
interaction, Deputy Wood unbuttoned his shirt and placed her
unexpired proof of insurance in his shirt. (ECF No. 243-2 at
15-16.) (But see ¶ 20 (“During traffic
stops, my practice is to clip the driver's license and
registration to my shirt pocket using the clip of my pen,
which is already in my pocket. I take these documents with me
when I go back to my vehicle to enter information in the
computer system. My best guess is [Plaintiff] observed me
placing the documents she gave to me on my shirt pocket.
However, I returned all of those documents to her.”).)
While
in his patrol car, Deputy Wood contacted dispatch to obtain
additional information regarding the “attempt to
locate” notification. (¶ 7.) Dispatch informed
Deputy Wood that “there was a tow order out of Denver,
that the vehicle was wanted as evidence in another crime, and
that the Denver Police Department [(‘DPD')] would
arrange to have the vehicle towed.” (Id.)
Deputy Wood also requested a second law enforcement vehicle
to assist. (Id.) Shortly after, Sergeant Melissa
Williams arrived at the scene to assist Deputy Wood, and two
DPD officers arrived to tow Plaintiff's vehicle.
(¶¶ 8-9; ECF No. 243-3 at 2, ¶¶ 4-5.)
Because
(1) Plaintiff could not provide any future address; (2) DPD
was towing her vehicle, which she lived out of; and (3) of
her erratic behavior, Deputy Wood became concerned that
Plaintiff would not appear for court if he issued her a
summons. (¶ 12; see also ¶ 10; ECF No.
243-3 at 2, ¶ 6 (Sergeant Williams's account of
Plaintiff's erratic behavior).) See also Colo.
Rev. Stat. § 16-3-105(1)(b) (an officer may arrest a
person for an arrestable offense where there is a concern
that the suspect will not appear for court). Therefore,
Deputy Wood arrested Plaintiff for failure to provide valid
proof of insurance and booked her into the Arapahoe County
Detention Facility (“ACDF”) that night. (¶
12; ECF No. 243-1 at 8-9.) See also People v.
Patnode, 126 P.3d 249, 254 (Colo.App. 2005) (“In
failing to produce the required insurance card, defendant
committed a class one misdemeanor traffic offense for which
arrest is authorized.” (citing Colo. Rev. Stat. §
42-4-1409(4)(a))). Plaintiff alleges that, while she was
being held at the ACDF, Deputy Wood returned her stolen valid
proof of insurance by placing it into her property bag at the
jail. (ECF No. 243-2 at 8.)
According
to evidence submitted by Plaintiff, the charge against her
for failure to provide valid proof of insurance appears to
have been dismissed. (See ECF No. 255 at 16-17
(Plaintiff filing a motion to dismiss the charge);
id. at 21-24 (Plaintiff discussing in state court
filings how the district attorney agreed to dismiss the
charge); id. at 34 (Plaintiff stating in a state
court filing that “[a]t some point, the Court
[d]ismissed the [insurance] charge”).) This appears to
be because prosecutors later learned that Plaintiff did in
fact have insurance coverage at the time of her arrest.
(See id. at 16-17, 21, 27; ECF No. 245 at 22 (letter
from L.A. Insurance Agency confirming that Plaintiff was
insured on the date of her arrest).) See also Colo.
Rev. Stat. § 42-4-1409(6) (“A person charged with
violating subsection (1), (2), or (3) of this section shall
not be convicted if the person produces in court a bona fide
complying policy or certificate of self-insurance that was in
full force and effect as required by law at the time of the
alleged violation.”).
II.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The
procedural history of this case is not easily summarized, but
a brief recitation of events will be helpful. On September
22, 2015, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed suit
against numerous defendants, including Deputy Wood and the
Doe Defendants. (ECF No. 1.) On December 15, 2015, Plaintiff
filed her First Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 10.) Following
the filing of a Motion to Strike (ECF No. 31) and several
Motions to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 37-38, 43, 47, 48), Judge Mix
ordered Plaintiff to file a Second Amended Complaint (ECF No.
86).
On
August 31, 2016, Plaintiff filed her Second Amended Complaint
(ECF No. 88), which was soon met by a second round of Motions
to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 89, 91, 97, 100, 106, 108, 134, 138). On
September 14, 2017, the Court granted the Motions to Dismiss,
dismissed all of Plaintiff's claims, and granted
Plaintiff leave to file a Third Amended Complaint with
respect to the claims dismissed without prejudice. (ECF No.
172.)
On
October 2, 2018, Plaintiff filed her Third Amended Complaint,
which is the currently operative complaint. (“Third
Amended Complaint”; ECF No. 175.) Shortly after the
Third Amended Complaint was docketed, another round of
Motions to Dismiss were filed. (ECF Nos. 184, 197-98, 201.)
On April 24, 2018, Judge Mix recommended that this Court
grant the Motions to Dismiss and dismiss with prejudice all
of Plaintiff's claims except for
(1) Claim Two (First Amendment retaliation) against John Doe
Deputy and John Doe Officer;
(2) Claim Three (Fourth Amendment unlawful arrest) against
[Deputy] Wood; and
(3) Claim Four (Fourth Amendment unlawful seizure of
property) against John Doe Deputies and John Doe Officers.
(ECF No. 226; see id. at 25-26.) Plaintiff failed to
timely object, and the Court adopted the Recommendation in
its entirety after conducting a clear error review. (ECF No.
228.)
On
April 8, 2019, Deputy Wood moved for summary judgment. (ECF
No. 243.) Plaintiff filed a Response to the Motion on April
16, 2019. (“Response”; ECF No. 245.) The
undersigned subsequently referred the Motion to Judge Mix,
who issued her Recommendation on July 17, 2019. (ECF Nos. 246
& 260.) The following week, Plaintiff filed “Nunc
Pro Tunc Corrections” to her Third Amended Complaint
and to her Response-which the Court will address ...