United States District Court, D. Colorado
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS
WILLIAM J. MARTÍNEZ, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
The
Government charges Defendant Marvin Sakori Maleik Dudley
(“Dudley”) with possession of methamphetamine
with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and
(b)(1)(B)(viii); possession of a firearm during and in
furtherance of drug trafficking, 18 U.S.C. §
924(c)(1)(A)(i); and possession of a firearm as a felon, 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). (ECF No. 22 at 1-2.) Dudley moves to
dismiss the case against him, alleging that the Government
destroyed exculpatory evidence, and asks for a hearing (the
“Motion”). (ECF No. 72.) The Court has reviewed
the parties' briefing and finds that no hearing is
necessary. For the reasons discussed below, the Court denies
the Motion.
I.
BACKGROUND
The
Court has previously recounted the facts of this case in its
Order granting in part and denying in part Dudley's
Motion to Suppress. (ECF No. 58.) The Court presumes
familiarity with that prior Order, and thus briefly recounts
only the facts relevant to the instant Motion.
On
April 28, 2018, Denver Police Department (“DPD”)
Officers Heather Jossi and Gavin Whitman ran the license
plate number of a gold Suzuki sedan with Colorado license
plate ONH737. The officers learned that the vehicle had been
reported stolen on April 16, 2018, and initiated a high-risk
traffic stop of the vehicle in a 7-Eleven parking lot at 1000
East Colfax Avenue, Denver, Colorado. Other officers joined
to conduct the high-risk stop.
Officer
Whitman ordered Dudley to exit the vehicle. Once Dudley
stepped out of the car, officers immediately placed him in
handcuffs. Dudley informed the officers that he was carrying
a gun, and officers removed the weapon from Dudley's
waistband.
Prior
to seating Dudley in the back of a police car, several
officers searched Dudley and found a green Crown Royal bag
hanging from Dudley's belt loop and tucked inside his
pants. The officers removed the bag, looked inside, and found
two separate plastic bags containing suspected
methamphetamine. Officers also searched the car that Dudley
was driving, and recovered a number of items.
The
officers filled out a DPD “Property Invoice” for
the items found on Dudley and in the vehicle. (ECF No. 72-2.)
The Property Invoice listed, among other things, $319 in U.S.
currency, the two bags of suspected methamphetamine (one of
which contained a number of smaller baggies of suspected
methamphetamine), a digital scale, and “pipes.”
(Id.) At the scene, Officer Jossi described the
pipes as “drug paraphernalia.” The majority of
the items were booked as evidence, but the pipes were
designated as “personal property.” (Id.)
Under DPD policy, items designated as personal property have
“no evidentiary value but must be held for safekeeping
for the owner.” (ECF No. 81-1 at 2.) Personal property
is held by DPD for 30 days, after which time it is
“disposed of or sold at public auction.”
(Id. at 5.) The pipes were subsequently destroyed.
Dudley characterizes this situation as Officer Jossi
authorizing the destruction of the two drug paraphernalia
pipes. (ECF No. 72 at 3.)
The
officers advised Dudley of his rights, and he agreed to speak
with them. Dudley stated that the owner of the vehicle had
loaned her car to him for $80 worth of heroin. He surmised
that the owner had likely reported the vehicle stolen, rather
than pay the $80. The officers then asked Dudley if he was in
the area trying to sell the drugs found in the Crown Royal
bag. Dudley said no. The officers suggested that the quantity
Dudley was carrying was greater than what they normally found
on persons in the area. To this, Dudley replied that he
“had pounds of that [inaudible].”[1]
DPD
Foresnic Chemist Jason Schimschal tested the suspected
methamphetamine. (ECF No. 77 at 4.) The first bag tested
positive for 11.79 grams of methamphetamine at a purity level
of 85.26%, or 9.991 grams of pure methamphetamine. The other
bag contained 6.3 grams of methamphetamine in 22 individual
baggies. The 6.3 grams were tested only for type of substance
and not for purity.
II.
ANALYSIS
Dudley
argues that the Government violated his right to due process
by destroying exculpatory evidence, and thus asks the Court
to dismiss the indictment.
California
v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984), and Arizona v.
Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988), set forth the standards
used to determine whether the Government violated a
defendant's right to due process through the destruction
of evidence. The Government violates a defendant's due
process when it fails to preserve or destroys evidence with
“an exculpatory value that was apparent before it was
destroyed” and “of such a nature that the
defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by
other reasonably available means.” Trombetta,
467 U.S. at 489. In Trombetta, the Supreme Court
noted that, “[w]hatever duty the Constitution imposes
on the States to preserve evidence, that duty must be limited
to evidence that might be expected to play a significant role
in the suspect's defense.” Id. at 488.
In
Youngblood, the Supreme Court clarified that the Due
Process Clause does not “impos[e] on the police an
undifferentiated and absolute duty to retain and preserve all
material that might be of conceivable evidentiary
significance in a particular prosecution.”
Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58. Instead, if the item is
of indeterminate evidentiary value or only potentially
useful-i.e., “evidentiary material of which no
more can be said than that it could have been subjected to
tests, the results of which might have exonerated the
defendant”-there is no due process violation unless the
defendant proves the state acted in bad faith by destroying
or failing to preserve the evidence. Id. at 57-58.
The Supreme Court specifically noted that “the police
...