United States District Court, D. Colorado
DELMART E.J.M. VREELAND, II, Plaintiff,
CELIA SCHWARTZ, Legal Assistant II, Colorado Department of Corrections, Buena Vista Correctional Facility, LIEUTENANT S. MORGAN, BVCF/North Unit, Colorado Department of Corrections, Buena Vista Correctional Facility, SERGEANT G. WOOD, BVCF/North Unit, Colorado Department of Corrections, Buena Vista Correctional Facility, JEFF HANSEN, BVCF/North Unit, Colorado Department of Corrections, Buena Vista Correctional Facility, DAVID COTTEN, Administrative Service Manager, Colorado Department of Corrections, Buena Vista Correctional Facility, WILLIAM BRUNELL, Associate Warden, Colorado Department of Corrections, Buena Vista Correctional Facility, and JOHN DAVIS Warden, Colorado Department of Corrections, Buena Vista Correctional Facility, Defendants.
KATHLEEN M TAFOYA, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
matter is before the court on Plaintiff's “Motion
to Stay Bill of and Taxation of Costs” (Doc. No. 233,
filed September 19, 2019). Defendants filed their response on
October 10, 2019 (Doc. No. 241), and Plaintiff filed his
reply on October 23, 2019 (Doc. No. 244).
motion, Plaintiff objects to the taxing of costs for several
reasons. First, Plaintiff contends that the Bill of Costs was
submitted by a nonparty to this action. (Doc. No. 233, ¶
1.) Plaintiff made this same argument in his written
objections to the proposed costs. (Doc. No. 229 at 2.) The
Deputy Clerk overruled this argument at the hearing on the
Bill of Costs and noted that, “Counsel who filed the
Bill of Costs (Mr. Woodward of the Colo. Attorney
General's office) represents the individual defendants
and employees of the CDOC, all of whom were awarded costs in
the Final Judgment.” (Doc. No. 231 at 1.) The court
agrees with the Deputy Clerk.
Plaintiff argues that the Bill of Costs sought costs that
were not taxable. (Doc. No. 233, ¶ 2.) Plaintiff also
made this argument in his written objections. (Doc. No. 229
at 3.) However, at the hearing on the bill of costs, the
disputed costs were resolved when Plaintiff and
Defendants' counsel agreed to defer a decision by the
Clerk regarding the disputed printing costs until the
resolution of a pending, related case, Vreeland v.
Tiona, 17-cv-01580-PAB-SKC, and the Deputy Clerk
declined to award Defendants their travel expenses. (Doc. No.
231 at 1.) Accordingly, the costs disputed by Plaintiff were
not awarded to Defendant, and Plaintiff's argument is
Plaintiff argues that Defendants made no attempt to confer
regarding their request for costs, as required by
D.C.COLO.LCivR 54.1. This assertion is false. Defendants sent
Plaintiff a letter of conferral regarding their request for
costs on September 9, 2019. (Doc. No. 241-1; see
also Doc. No. 230, ¶ 4.)
Plaintiff argues that he submitted a timely objection to
Defendants' Bill of Costs. (Doc. No. 233, ¶ 5.)
However, Plaintiff's objections were considered by the
Deputy Clerk and overruled. (Doc. No. 231.) This is not a
basis upon which to stay the costs award.
Plaintiff also seeks a stay of the taxation of costs because
he has appealed this case to the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals. (Doc. No. 233, ¶ 6.) Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure Rule 62(b) allows an appellant to stay execution of
a judgment pending appeal by posting a supersedeas bond.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 62(b). “In most circumstances, a court
sets the amount of the bond to cover the full judgment,
including costs, interests, and damages for delay.”
Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co. v. American Nat. Ins. Co.,
No. 2:03 CV 646 (TC), 2009 WL 961171, at *1 (D. Utah Apr. 8,
2009); (citing Strong v. Laubach, 443 F.3d 1297,
1299 (10th Cir.2006); Olcott v. Del. Flood Co., 76
F.3d 1538, 1559 (10th Cir.1996); 11 Charles Alan Wright,
Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 2905 (2d ed.1995)). Courts have the
discretion to reduce or waive the security required pursuant
to Rule 62(b) only in unusual circumstances. Id.
(citing Miami Intern. Realty v. Paynter, 807 F.2d
871, 873 (10th Cir. 1986)). “In most cases, courts are
simply unwilling to accept a bond that represents less than
the full amount of assessed judgment.” Id.
(citations omitted). Plaintiff, as the party seeking the
stay, has the burden of demonstrating objectively that
posting a full supersedeas bond is impossible or impractical.
Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 2009 WL 961171, at *1;
Miami Intern. Realty, 807 F.2d at 873. Here,
Plaintiff has failed to justify a reduction or waiver of the
supersedeas bond requirement. Accordingly, to the extent
Plaintiff seeks a stay of the costs award, Plaintiff must
post a supersedeas bond in the amount of $2, 673.12 in order
to be granted a stay pursuant to Rule 62(b). See
Physicians Ins. Capital, LLC v. Praesidium All. Grp.,
LLC, 2013 WL 5232817, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 16, 2013)
(“[A] stay is a matter of right where the appellant
posts a satisfactory supersedeas bond.”); Frommert
v. Conkright, 639 F.Supp.2d 305, 308 (W.D.N.Y. 2009)
(noting that Fed.R.Civ.P. 62(b) [formerly Fed.R.Civ.P. 62(d)]
“provides for an automatic stay pending appeal upon the
posting of a supersedeas bond”).
that Plaintiff s “Motion to Stay Bill of and Taxation
of Costs” (Doc. No. 233) is DENIED