United States District Court, D. Colorado
KATHLEEN M. TAFOYA UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
the court is Plaintiff's “Motion for Deposition
Transcript and Extension of Time to File a Response.”
([“Motion”], Doc. No. 41.) Defendant has
responded in opposition to Plaintiff's motion, and
Plaintiff has replied. ([“Response”], Doc. No.
44; [“Reply”], Doc. No. 45.)
OF THE CASE
se Plaintiff Reuben Waterman,  proceeding in forma
pauperis [“IFP”], brings suit against
Defendant The City of Colorado Springs, alleging
discriminatory hiring practices, in violation of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
[“ADEA”], 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq..
([“Complaint”], Doc. No. 6; see Doc. No.
is an attorney with over forty years of professional
experience. (Compl. 3.) On August 22, 2017, Plaintiff applied
for two positions available with Defendant: City Attorney
Division Chief and Staff Attorney. (Id.;
[“Answer”], Doc. No. 11 at 2.) At that time,
Plaintiff was seventy-five-years old. (Compl. 3.) On
September 20, 2017, Defendant's Human Resources
Recruiter, Frances Huffman, sent Plaintiff an email,
informing him that the City Attorney Division Chief position
had been filled. (Id.; Answer 2.) A few weeks later,
on October 12, 2017, Plaintiff received another email from
Huffman, which stated that the Staff Attorney position had
also been filled. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that the
two individuals hired by Defendant were “much younger
and less qualified” than him. (Compl. 3.)
6, 2018, Plaintiff filed this action, asserting a claim for
age discrimination, based on Defendant's failure to hire
him for either of the attorney positions. (Id. at
3.) At the close of discovery, on September 13, 2019,
Defendant moved for summary judgment on Plaintiff's
claim. (Doc. No. 38.) In support of its motion for summary
judgment, Defendant attached excerpts from Plaintiff's
deposition testimony. (Doc. No. 39 Ex. 3.)
September 17, 2019, Plaintiff filed a motion to compel
Defendant to provide him with a gratis copy of his entire
deposition testimony, so that he can “effectively
respond” to Defendant's summary judgment motion.
(Mot. 3-5.) Plaintiff contends that he should not have to pay
for a copy himself, because he is a pro se IFP
litigant. (Id. at 1, 3.) In addition,
Plaintiff requests an extension of time to file his response
to Defendant's motion. (Id. at 4.) Specifically,
Plaintiff asks for an additional twenty-one days after the
issuance of this Order to respond, “or until Defendant
provides a copy of the transcript sought, whichever occurs
first argues that the court should, pursuant to its
“inherent equitable powers, ” order Defendant to
furnish him with a copy of his own deposition
testimony. (Id. at 2.) In making that
argument, Plaintiff emphasizes the disparity in the
parties' relative financial circumstances. (Id.
at 3.) However, even if Plaintiff is indigent, his
obligations to finance his own litigation expenses cannot be
arbitrarily thrust upon Defendant. See Tabron v.
Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 158-60 (3d Cir. 1993)
(“[I]ndigent litigants [must] bear their own litigation
expenses.”). Indeed, “[a] defendant is not
required to advance a plaintiff's stenographic and
transcription deposition expenses merely because a plaintiff
is unable to pay for such expenses.” Doe v. United
States, 112 F.R.D. 183, 184 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Badman
v. Stark, 139 F.R.D. 601, 606 (M.D. Pa. 1991).
case, Plaintiff has failed to put forth any justifiable
reason for requiring Defendant to provide him with a free
copy of his entire deposition transcript. Plaintiff argues
that Defendant “created the necessity” for the
transcript, because it “rel[ied] on hand-picked
excerpts from the deposition to factually support its motion
for summary judgment.” (Mot. 2.) However, given that
the Local Rules of Practice explicitly require parties to
“limit exhibits to essential portions of documents,
” Plaintiff's argument is without merit.
D.C.COLO.LCivR 56.1(c); see Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c)(1)(A) (“A party asserting that a fact cannot be
or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by . . .
citing to particular parts of materials in the
record.”) (emphasis added).
Plaintiff seeks a copy of his own testimony. Because
Plaintiff was the deponent, he is assumed to be knowledgeable
of the substance of his testimony. See Tabron, 6
F.3d at 159 (finding no abuse of discretion in the denial of
a pro se plaintiff's motion to compel defendants
to provide a copy of deposition transcripts, because the
record showed that the plaintiff “attended and
participated in all of the depositions and therefore was able
to take notes and compile information from the live
testimony”); Dowling v. Sturgeon Elec. (MYR
Grp.), No. 10-cv-01118-REB-KMT, 2011 WL 5357264, at *1
(D. Colo. Nov. 7, 2011) (denying a pro se
plaintiff's motion to compel production of her own
deposition transcript, because she “should be quite
familiar with the substance of her deposition
from the fact that Plaintiff is indigent, and his conclusory
statement that his ability to respond to Defendant's
motion for summary judgment will otherwise be
“indisputably impaired, ” Plaintiff has failed to
show any entitlement to a gratuitous copy of his deposition
transcript. For that reason, Plaintiff's motion to compel
production of that transcript is denied.
final matter, Plaintiff asks for an extension of time to
respond to Defendant's motion for summary judgment. (Mot.
4.) Plaintiff does not provide any specific reason for the
requested extension. Nevertheless, the court finds that an