United States District Court, D. Colorado
KANDICE L. RAVEN, Plaintiff,
v.
DEAN WILLIAMS, TRAVIS TRANI, MICHELLE NELSON, RYDER MAY, DAVID BLAKELY, JASON WALLACE, and STEVEN BLADE, Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STAY
DISCOVERY [ECF. #25]
S.
KATO CREWS, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This
order addresses Defendants Dean Williams, Travis Trani,
Michelle Nelson, Ryder May, David Blakely, Jason Williams,
and Steven Blade (collectively, the “Defendants”)
Motion to Stay Discovery [#25][1] (the “Motion”). The
Court has reviewed the Motion, the entire docket, and
applicable law. Oral argument will not materially assist the
Court in its decision. For the reasons below, the Motion is
GRANTED.
A.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff
Kandice L. Raven's (“Raven”) Complaint [#1]
brings two claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging
violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments arising
out of allegations concerning her medical care and conditions
of confinement against Defendants. [See generally
#1.] On August 27, 2019, Defendants filed their Motion to
Dismiss Prisoner Complaint asserting, among other things,
that they are entitled to qualified immunity. [#24.]
Defendants now seek a stay of discovery while their motion to
dismiss is pending. [ECF. #25.]
Rule 1
instructs that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
“shall be construed and administered to secure the
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action.” The decision to issue a protective order and
thereby stay discovery is within the sound discretion of the
trial court. See Diaz v. Paul J. Kennedy Law Firm,
289 F.3d 671, 674 (10th Cir. 2002). But stays are the
exception in this judicial district, not the rule. Bustos
v. United States, 257 F.R.D. 617, 623 (D. Colo. 2009)
(“This District generally disfavors stays of
discovery.”).
Upon a
showing of good cause, a protective order is appropriate to
stay discovery to “protect a party or person from
annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or
expense.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c). Courts consider the
propriety of a stay by balancing five factors: (1)
Boateng's interests in proceeding expeditiously and the
potential prejudice of a delay; (2) the burden on the
Defendants if no stay is issued; (3) the convenience to the
Court; (4) the interests of non-parties; and (5) the public
interest. See String Cheese Incident, LLC v. Stylus
Shows, Inc., No. 02-cv-01934-LTB-PAC, 2006 WL 894955, at
*2 (D. Colo. Mar. 30, 2006). “[W]hen one issue may be
determinative of a case, the court has discretion to stay
discovery on other issues until the critical issue has been
decided.” Ellis v. J.R.'s Country Stores,
Inc., No. 12-cv-01916-CMA-KLM, 2012 WL 6153513, at *1
(quoting 8 Charles Alan Wright, et al., Federal Practice
& Procedure § 2040, at 521-22 (2d ed.1994)) (further
citations omitted). See also Chavous v. D.C. Fin.
Responsibility & Mgmt. Assistance Auth., 201 F.R.D.
1, 2 (D.D.C. 2001) (“A stay of discovery pending the
determination of a dispositive motion is an eminently logical
means to prevent wasting the time and effort of all
concerned, and to make the most efficient use of judicial
resources.”) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
First,
the Court acknowledges that Raven has a presumptive right to
proceed expeditiously with her claims. See Alattar v.
Bell, No. 13-cv-02990-MSK-KMT, 2014 WL 2566271, at *2
(D. Colo. June 5, 2014). This right “should not be
denied except under the most extreme circumstances.”
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Chilcott
Portfolio Mgmt., 713 F.2d 1477, 1484 (10th Cir. 1983).
Although she did not file a response to the Motion, on
September 13, 2019, she filed her Motion to Stay Deadlines
[#36].[2] The Court construes Raven's filing of
her own motion to stay as consenting to the relief sought by
Defendants' Motion. Thus, apart from observing that a
stay would extend the period of discovery, the Court cannot
identify any specific prejudice that a delay would cause. In
any event, the Court finds that this consideration does not
outweigh the importance of first determining the
applicability of qualified immunity. Without any specific
examples of how Raven's ability to conduct discovery
could be adversely affected, the Court finds that the her
general interest in proceeding expeditiously is outweighed by
the other factors. Stone v. Vail Resorts Dev. Co.,
Civil Action No. 09-cv-02081-WYD-KLM, 2010 WL 148278, at *1
(D. Colo. Jan. 7, 2010).
The
Court also finds that the Defendants would be burdened in the
absence of a stay. Here, the Defendants have asserted the
qualified immunity defense. Qualified immunity serves to
spare officials from unwarranted liability as well as
“demands customarily imposed upon those defending a
long drawn out lawsuit, ” and are “effectively
lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to
trial.” Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232
(1991) (quoting in part Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472
U.S. 511, 525 (1985)). With respect to qualified immunity,
the Tenth Circuit has explained:
Qualified immunity is an entitlement not to stand trial or
face the other burdens of litigation. The privilege is an
immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability .
. . Accordingly, qualified immunity questions should be
resolved at the earliest possible stage in litigation. Even
such pretrial matters as discovery are to be avoided if
possible, as inquiries of this kind can be peculiarly
disruptive of effective government.
Martin v. County of Santa Fe, 626 Fed.Appx. 736, 740
(10th Cir. 2015) (quoting Jiron v. City of Lakewood,
392 F.3d 410, 414 (10th Cir. 2004) (emphasis in original)).
Thus, “discovery generally should be avoided once
qualified immunity is raised, ” unless the plaintiff
demonstrates “how [such] discovery will raise a genuine
fact issue as to the defendants' qualified immunity
claim.” Id. (quoting Cole v. Ruidoso Mun.
Sch., 43 F.3d 1373, 1387 (10th Cir.1994)). Raven has
made no such demonstration. This factor weighs in favor of a
stay.
Next,
the Court considers its own convenience. The Court recognizes
that an “ill-advised stay” may inconvenience
courts by making the “docket less predictable and,
hence, less manageable.” Stone, 2010 WL
148278, at *3. However, “[w]here a pending motion may
dispose of an action . . . a stay of proceedings may allow
the Court to avoid expending resources in managing an action
that ultimately will be dismissed.” Id. In
this case, the pending motion to dismiss may result in the
dismissal of some or all of the claims in the case.
Therefore, a stay may prevent the waste of judicial time and
resources in handling discovery disputes regarding claims and
parties that are subject to dismissal. Considering this case
is in the early stages, the Court concludes that the
interests of judicial economy weigh in favor of a stay.
With
respect to the fourth factor, neither party has identified
any nonparty whose interests would be impacted by the
requested stay. Finally, although there is a general public
interest in the speedy resolution of legal disputes, see,
e.g., Waisanen v. Terracon Consultants, Inc., Civil
Action No. 09-cv-01104-MSK-KMT, 2009 WL 5184699, at *2 (D.
Colo. Dec. 22, 2009), there is also a strong public policy in
“avoiding unnecessary expenditures of public and
private resources on litigation.” Chapman v. Fed.
Bureau of Prisons, No. 15-cv-00279-WYD-KLM, 2015 WL
4574863, at *4 (D. Colo. July 30, 2015). Given the
possibility of dismissal of the case, in whole or in part,
the fifth factor weighs in favor of a stay.
B.
CONCLUSION
Having
balanced the five String Cheese factors, the Court
finds that a stay of discovery pending the resolution of the
motion to dismiss is warranted. Therefore, IT IS ORDERED that
Defendants' Motion to Stay Discovery [ECF. #25] is
GRANTED. This Order does not ...