United States District Court, D. Colorado
ORDER
Kathleen M. Tafoya United States Magistrate Judge.
Before
the court is Plaintiff's “Motion to File a Second
Amended Complaint.” ([“Motion”], Doc. No.
157.) Defendant McKay has responded in opposition to
Plaintiff's motion (Doc. No. 166), as have Defendants
Werholz, Raemisch, Falk, and Chapdelaine. (Doc. No. 167.)
Pro
se Plaintiff Michael Ray Ingram, [1] an inmate in the
custody of the Colorado Department of Corrections
[“CDOC”], brings this civil rights action against
Defendants, all of whom are CDOC employees. (Doc. No. 21 at
3-5.) Plaintiff is said to suffer from numerous
“medical conditions/disabilities, ” which have
allegedly been exacerbated by issues pertaining to his prison
work assignments, his medical care, and his housing.
(Id. at 6-17.) In his First Amended Complaint,
Plaintiff asserts violations of: (1) the Eighth Amendment;
(2) the Fourteenth Amendment; (3) the Americans with
Disabilities Act [“ADA”]; (4) the Rehabilitation
Act [“RA”]; and (5) state law. (Id.)
Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as
compensatory and punitive damages. (Id. at 19-20.)
After
an initial screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A,
Plaintiff's claims for violations of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the ADA, and the RA were dismissed, as legally
frivolous. (Doc. No. 23 at 5-9.) Plaintiff's remaining
Eighth Amendment and state law claims were thereafter
dismissed, pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), on
September 23, 2015, and final judgment was then entered in
favor of Defendants. (Doc. Nos. 63, 69, 70.)
On
appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded the dismissal
of Plaintiff's ADA and RA claims, which were premised on
a lack of access to prescribed medications, as well as
Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant
McKay, specifically, based on his alleged deliberate
indifference in approving Plaintiff for prison kitchen work.
(Doc. No. 95 at 9.) As a result, the following claims remain
viable in this case: (1) a § 1983 claim against
Defendant McKay for violations of the Eighth Amendment; (2)
ADA claims against all Defendants; and (3) RA claims against
all Defendants.
On
August 2, 2019, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file a
Second Amended Complaint. (Mot. 1.) In the Motion, however,
Plaintiff provides no explanation as to the basis for his
request to amend his pleadings. Further, the proposed Second
Amended Complaint, which accompanies the Motion, does not add
any new causes of action, requests for relief, [2] or parties.
(See Doc. No. 157-1 at 22.) Nor does the proposed
pleading augment any of Plaintiff's remaining claims
against Defendants. Instead, the proposed Second Amended
Complaint merely provides additional, unnecessary details
pertaining to Plaintiff's medical history, and deletes
certain allegations regarding Plaintiff's previously
dismissed claims for violations of the Fourteenth Amendment
and state law. (See Id. at 6-12, 18-19.)
Because
the proposed Second Amended Complaint does not set forth any
new causes of action, or make any substantive changes to his
remaining claims, the amendment is wholly unnecessary and
futile. As a result, Plaintiff's motion for leave to
amend his complaint is denied.[3] See Bauchman ex rel. Bauchman
v. W. High Sch., 132 F.3d 542, 559 (10th Cir. 1997)
(finding no abuse of discretion in denial of leave to amend
where the amendment would be futile, because there was
“no material difference between the two
complaints”); Gibbs-Squires v. Urban Settlement
Servs., 623 Fed.Appx. 917, 923 (10th Cir. 2015)
(affirming denial of amendment, based on futility, because
“the proposed amendments added no new information to
assist the court in its analysis of the existing
claims”).
Accordingly,
it is
ORDERED
that Plaintiffs “Motion to File a Second Amended
Complaint” (Doc. No. 157) is DENIED
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Notes:
[1] Mindful of Plaintiff's pro
se status, the court “review[s] his pleadings and
other papers liberally and hold[s] them to a less stringent
standard than those drafted by attorneys.”
Trackwell v. United States, 472 F.3d 1242, 1243
(10th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted); see Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) (holding the
allegations of a pro se complaint “to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers”).
[2] The proposed Second Amended Complaint
does request two additional forms of injunctive relief: (1)
“a morning or afternoon job that starts late enough
after the morning or afternoon meal that nausea is not so
severe, with full time pay;” and (2) “an Offender
Care Aide to move my property during cell and facility
reassignments.” (Doc. No. 157-1 at 22.)
[3] Given that denial of Plaintiff's
motion is not dispositive of any claims or parties in this
case, an order is appropriate. See Ocelot Oil Corp. v.
Sparrow Indus., 847 F.2d 1461, 1462-63 (10th Cir. 1988)
(“Magistrates may issue orders as to non-dispositive
pretrial matters[.]”); Chavez v. Hatterman,
No. 06-cv-02525, 2009 WL 82496, at *1 (D. Colo. Jan. 13,
2009) (“Motions to amend are generally considered
non-dispositive because they do not dispose of a claim or
defense of a ...