United States District Court, D. Colorado
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART INDIVIDUAL
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS AND GRANTING
AURORA’S MOTION TO DISMISS
William J. Martínez United States District Judge
In this
action, Plaintiff Philip Boateng (“Plaintiff”)
sues Defendants City of Aurora (“Aurora”), as
well as two employees of the Aurora Police Department in
their individual capacities, Chief Nicholas Metz
(“Metz”) and Sergeant Jeffrey Longnecker
(“Longnecker”) (together, “Individual
Defendants”), for alleged violations of certain First,
Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, as well as for
malicious prosecution. (ECF No. 1.) Currently before the
Court are the Individual Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
and Aurora’s Motion to Dismiss. (ECF Nos. 21 & 22.)
For the reasons stated below, the Individual Defendantsâ
Motion is granted in part and denied in part, and Auroraâs
Motion is granted.
I.
BACKGROUND
The
Court accepts the following allegations as true for purposes
of resolving the pending motions. All paragraph references
(“¶__ ”) are to Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint (“Complaint”). (ECF No. 17.)
A.
Impoundment of Plaintiff’s Vehicle
On
November 12, 2017, Plaintiff drove his black BMW SUV bearing
license plate QXK512 to work at his usual time, approximately
6:20 p.m. He drove along his usual route, taking Potomac
Street to Colfax Avenue to the University Hospital.
(¶¶ 14, 16.) He parked his car in his usual lot,
Parking Lot 4, at his usual time, 6:23 p.m. (¶ 15.) He
walked into the University Hospital building and clocked into
work at 6:28 p.m. (¶ 16.)
At 6:26
p.m., after Plaintiff left his car but before he clocked into
work, Longnecker and two other Aurora Police Department
officers pulled into Parking Lot 4 and towed
Plaintiff’s vehicle. (¶ 18.) When parked,
Plaintiff’s vehicle was not obstructing traffic or
interfering with highway maintenance, nor did it fall under
any of the enumerated conditions under which an Aurora Police
Department officer may tow a vehicle. (¶ 40.) The same
day Plaintiff’s vehicle was towed, Plaintiff was
charged with three violations of Colorado law: careless
driving, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 42-4-1402; speeding,
id. § 42-4-1101; and eluding police,
id. § 42-4-1413. (¶ 37.) Plaintiff
contends that there was no lawful reason to charge him with
these violations. (¶ 50.) Plaintiff was ordered to
appear in Arapahoe County District Court on January 5, 2018.
(¶ 38.)
Plaintiff
alleges that at 6:23 p.m. on the day of the towing,
“Longnecker was in the 900–1000 block of Potomac
Street and observed a blue BMW SUV with Colorado license
plate KYX512.” (¶ 17.) The import of this fact is
not explained in the Complaint, but perhaps Plaintiff intends
to suggest that Longnecker confused Plaintiff’s vehicle
with the blue SUV.[1]
In any
event, when Plaintiff left work after his night shift (it is
unclear whether he left late on November 12 or on the morning
of November 13), he could not find his car, and so called the
University Police to report his car missing. (¶¶
19–21.) The University Police investigated and advised
Plaintiff that his car had been towed by Longnecker at 6:26
p.m. (¶ 21.)
Plaintiff
called Longnecker and left several messages. (¶¶
23–24.) Longnecker eventually returned
Plaintiff’s calls. (¶ 24.) During their
conversation, Longnecker accused Plaintiff of
“speeding, eluding a police officer, drinking and
driving, being on drugs, and lying to [ ] Longnecker about
all of these things.” (¶ 25.) Plaintiff denied
engaging in such behavior, and asked why his vehicle had been
towed. (¶ 26.) Longnecker asked Plaintiff for
identifying information, and Plaintiff provided his name,
address, and date of birth. (¶¶ 27–28.)
Plaintiff confirmed that the vehicle was his. (¶ 30.)
Plaintiff declined to provide his social security number,
regarding it as unnecessary. (¶ 27.) Longnecker stated
that if Plaintiff refused to provide his social security
number, Plaintiff’s car would remain impounded until
Longnecker returned to work the following week. (¶ 29.)
Longnecker
then stated that the only way Plaintiff would be able to
retrieve his vehicle before Longnecker’s absence from
the office was if Plaintiff met Longnecker that evening.
(¶ 31.) Longnecker’s police narrative stated that
he impounded the vehicle so that he could meet Plaintiff in
person to verify his identity. (¶ 41.) Plaintiff was
hesitant, and told Longnecker that “he wanted to speak
to an attorney because he did not commit any crimes.”
(¶ 31.) Plaintiff inquired if there were other days he
could retrieve his vehicle, but Longnecker “repeated
that he would only release the vehicle if Plaintiff met with
him when he was back at his desk the following week.”
(¶ 33.) Longnecker also stated that he would put a note
in the system so that no other officer would release the
vehicle to Plaintiff while Longnecker was out of the office.
(¶ 34.)
On
November 14, 2018, Plaintiff’s counsel contacted Metz
about releasing Plaintiff’s vehicle. (¶ 43.)
Counsel provided Metz with detailed information and argued
that Longnecker’s impoundment of the vehicle was
improper. (¶ 44.) After that conversation, Aurora City
Attorney Nancy Rogers contacted Plaintiff’s counsel on
behalf of Metz and advised that Metz would not release the
car and was “not in the business of second-guessing his
officers.” (¶ 45.)
On
December 6, 2017, an Aurora municipal judge found that the
impound of Plaintiff’s vehicle was improper, and
ordered the car be released. (¶ 49.) On May 29, 2018,
the Arapahoe County District Attorney’s Office
dismissed all charges against Plaintiff. (¶ 51.)
Plaintiff claims that the charges were dismissed after a
“review of the evidence provided by Defendant
Longnecker, ” and that the dismissal “reflect[ed]
a prosecutorial judgment that the case could not be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Id.)
B.
Allegations of Racial Profiling
Plaintiff,
who is African American, alleges that Longnecker wrongfully
charged Plaintiff and impounded his vehicle because of his
race. (¶¶ 52, 133.) He adds that Metz and Aurora
did not question Longnecker’s actions because
“Defendants have a history and unwritten policy of
racially profiling Aurora citizens of color and wrongfully
charging them or over-charging them with crimes”
because of their race. (¶ 53.)
Plaintiff
adds that Aurora has failed to properly train and supervise
officers to avoid racially-biased policing, and has instead
continually condoned and ratified officers’ misconduct.
(¶ 56.) In support, Plaintiff cites over a dozen claims
alleging Aurora Police Department officer misconduct against
persons of color, many of which settled for a sum of money.
(ECF No. 17-1.)
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
Under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may move to
dismiss a claim in a complaint for “failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.” The Rule
12(b)(6) standard requires the Court to “assume the
truth of the plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual
allegations and view them in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff.” Ridge at Red Hawk, LLC v.
Schneider, 493 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 2007). In
ruling on such a motion, the dispositive inquiry is
“whether the complaint contains ‘enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Granting a motion
to dismiss “is a harsh remedy which must be cautiously
studied, not only to effectuate the spirit of the liberal
rules of pleading but also to protect the interests of
justice.” Dias v. City & Cnty. of Denver,
567 F.3d 1169, 1178 (10th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation
marks omitted). “Thus, ‘a well-pleaded complaint
may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual
proof of those facts is improbable, and that a recovery is
very remote and unlikely.’” Id. (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
III.
ANALYSIS
A.
Individual Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No.
22)
Plaintiff
asserts three claims against the Individual Defendants. Set
forth in the sequence in which they will be addressed below,
they are: (1) retaliation in violation of the First Amendment
(Claim 2); (2) racial discrimination in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (Claim
4); and (3) malicious prosecution (Claim 3). The Individual
Defendants claim that qualified immunity protects them from
liability on all claims asserted against them. (ECF No. 22.)
“Qualified
immunity shields federal and state officials from money
damages unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the
official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and
(2) that the right was ‘clearly established’ at
the time of the challenged conduct.” Ashcroft v.
al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011). This Court has
discretion to address the “clearly established”
element ...