United States District Court, D. Colorado
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff, and IRAQ ABADE, et al., Plaintiffs-Intervenors,
v.
JBS USA, LLC, d/b/a JBS Swift & Company, Defendant. and MARYAN ABDULLE, et al., Plaintiffs-Intervenors,
ORDER
PHILIP
A. BRIMMER CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
This
matter is before the Court on Plaintiff EEOCâs Motion to
Strike JBSâs Proposed Bill of Costs [Docket No. 623] and
Defendantâs Motion for Certification of Final Judgment on
Phase I Proceedings [Docket No. 627]. On September 24, 2018,
the Court entered its Phase I Findings of Fact and
Conclusions at Law (âPhase I Findingsâ) [Docket No. 620]. On
October 8, 2018, defendant JBS USA, LLC, d/b/a JBS Swift
& Company (âJBSâ) filed a proposed Bill of Costs. Docket
No. 621. On October 11, 2018, the Equal Opportunity
Employment Commission (âEEOCâ) filed a motion to strike the
proposed bill of costs [Docket No. 623] on the basis that the
proposed bill of costs was premature because the Court had
not yet entered a final judgment. Docket No. 623 at 1. JBS
filed its Motion for Certification of Final Judgment on Phase
I Proceedings [Docket No. 627] on October 24, 2018. JBS
argues that the Court should enter a certification of final
judgment on Phase I in its favor, Docket No. 627 at 8, at
which point, it contends, it will be entitled to costs and
the EEOCâs motion to strike will be rendered moot. Docket No.
633 at 2.
Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) allows a district court to
“direct entry of final judgment as to one or more, but
fewer than all, claims” where “the court
expressly determines that there is no just reason for
delay.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). In order to direct entry of
judgment under Rule 54(b), a court must find that three
prerequisites are met: “(1) multiple claims; (2) a
final decision on at least one claim; and (3) a determination
by the district court that there is no just reason for
delay.” Jordan v. Pugh, 425 F.3d 820, 826
(10th Cir. 2005). In determining whether to enter judgment
pursuant to Rule 54(b), the Court is to “weigh[] Rule
54(b)’s policy of preventing piecemeal appeals against
the inequities that could result from delaying an
appeal.” Stockman’s Water Co., LLC v. Vaca
Partners, L.P., 425 F.3d 1263, 1265 (10th Cir. 2005).
Ultimately, the granting of a Rule 54(b) motion is left to
the sound discretion of the trial court, which “must
take into account judicial administrative interests as well
as the equities involved.” Curtiss-Wright Corp. v.
Gen. Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 8 (1980).
To be a
final judgment for purposes of Rule 54(b), the claims
resolved must be “distinct and separable from the
claims left unresolved.” Okla. Turnpike Auth. v.
Bruner, 259 F.3d 1236, 1243 (10th Cir. 2001). In
determining whether claims are distinct and separable, courts
consider “(1) the factual overlap (of lack thereof)
between the claims disposed of and the remaining claims, and
(2) whether the claims disposed of and the remaining claims
seek separate relief.” Id. at 1242 (internal
quotation omitted). “Claims are not separable if
‘the claim that is contended to be separate so overlaps
the claim or claims that have been retained for trial that if
the latter were to give rise to a separate appeal at the end
of the case the [appeals] court would have to go over the
same ground that it had covered in the first appeal.”
Rodriguez v. Chavez, No. 12-cv-1071-PAB-MJW, 2015 WL
7075392, at *1 (D. Colo. Nov. 13, 2015) (alteration in
original).
Here,
JBS argues that the entry of final judgment is appropriate
because there is “nothing left to do in Phase I because
the Court has dismissed all of the EEOC’s Phase I
claims.” Docket No. 627 at 3-4. JBS, however, makes no
argument that the EEOC’s Phase I claims are
“distinct and separable” from the remaining
claims still left to litigate in Phase II. Indeed, JBS admits
that “many of the Court’s Phase I factual
findings and legal conclusions are central and controlling to
the EEOC’s and Intervenors’ Phase II individual
claims.” Docket No. 627 at 4. The remaining claims are
based on the same underlying facts, directed at the same
defendant, and seek relief for the same conduct. See,
e.g., Docket No. 504 at 20, ¶ 62; id. at
21, ¶ 68 (intervenors raising claims of (1) pattern or
practice of discrimination on the basis of race, national
origin, religion, or retaliation and (2) failure to
accommodate); see also Docket No. 1 at 10, ¶
61; id. at 9, ¶ 56; id. at 11, ¶
70 (EEOC raising claims of hostile work environment and
discriminatory discipline, discharge, and retaliation for
times other than Ramadan 2008).
Moreover,
the Court finds that JBS has failed to demonstrate that the
equities weigh in favor of granting Rule 54(b) certification.
JBS argues that the “resolution of any appeal prior to
Phase II could substantially reduce all parties’ future
expenses and encourage settlement negotiations” and
that “settlement discussions may well be thwarted by
challenges to the validity or finality of the Court’s
Phase I findings.” Docket No. 627 at 7. The Court
disagrees. The EEOC filed a motion for reconsideration
[Docket No. 631] of the Court’s Phase I Findings and
has challenged the finality of the Phase I Findings in its
response to JBS’s motion for certification of final
judgment, see Docket No. 632 at 4, and in its motion
to strike JBS’s proposed bill of costs. See
Docket No. 623 at 3. Despite the EEOC’s challenges to
the validity or finality of the Phase I Findings, settlement
negotiations have persisted. See, e.g., Docket No.
650 (notifying the court of participation in mediation);
Docket No. 651 (notifying the court of further mediation
efforts and stating that “negotiations are
continuing”).
Certifying
the Phase I Findings as a final judgment would allow an
immediate appeal of the Phase I Findings. This would be
judicially inefficient and could ultimately lead to two
appeals involving the same facts and legal claims.
“Rule 54(b) . . . is intended to promote efficiency at
the appellate-court level.” Continental Materials
Corp. v. Valco, Inc., 2018 WL 3213717, at *6 (10th Cir.
2018) (unpublished). “[I]n the long run it will be less
wasteful and more efficient for district and appellate courts
to adhere to the rule that only separate and distinct claims
can be isolated for appeal under Rule 54(b).”
Jordan, 425 F.3d at 829. “Interrelated legal
claims . . .should be litigated together and appealed
together.” Id.
Given
the “strong federal policy against piecemeal
review” and JBS’s failure to demonstrate any
inequity or prejudice it will suffer from denying the motion,
no colorable basis to direct entry of judgment under Rule
54(b). See Charles A. Wright, et al., Federal
Practice & Procedure § 2659 (2019) (stating that
federal courts should allow piecemeal review “only in
the infrequent case in which a failure to do so might have a
harsh effect”). The Court finds that the equities do
not weigh in favor of certifying the Phase I Findings as
final and will deny JBS’s motion for certification
under Rule 54(b). As a result, JBS’s proposed bill of
costs [Docket No. 621] is premature. “[T]he time for
taxing costs begins to run only from the entry of what would
ordinarily be a final judgment as to all parties and all
issues.” Woodmen Acc. & Life Ins. Co. v.
Bryant, 784 F.2d 1052, 1057 (10th Cir. 1986); see
also Milligan v. Reed, 2007 WL 1725240, at *1 (D. Colo.
June 14, 2007) (where there is no final judgment, the filing
of a bill of costs is premature). Accordingly, the Court will
grant the EEOC’s motion and deny JBS’s bill of
costs as premature.
Wherefore,
it is ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion
for Certification of Final Judgment on Phase I Proceedings
[Docket No. 627] is DENIED. It is further
ORDERED
that Plaintiff EEOC’s Motion to Strike JBS’s
Proposed Bill of Costs [Docket No. 623] is granted in part
and denied in part. It is further
ORDERED
that the Bill of Costs ...