United States District Court, D. Colorado
JOHN P. WILL, Plaintiff,
PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCIATES, LLC, Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS
S. Krieger, Senior United States District Judge.
MATTER comes before the Court pursuant to the
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Class
Action Complaint (#25), to which the
Plaintiff failed to file a timely response.
reasons that follow, the motion is granted.
Court exercises jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1331.
facts, as recited in Plaintiff John Will’s (“Mr.
Will”) Complaint (#1), are
straightforward. At some point in time, Mr. Will defaulted on
his debt in the amount of $7, 084.52 to Bank of America.
(#1 at ¶ 1). Bank of America sold Mr.
Will’s debt to Defendant Portfolio Recovery Associates,
attempt to collect the debt, on March 13, 2018, PRA sent Mr.
Will a letter (“Collection
Letter”). (#1 at ¶ 2). The
Collection Letter stated that PRA is a debt collector and
that Mr. Will owed a debt in the amount of $7, 084.52.
(#1 at 1-2). The Collection Letter offered
several options for Mr. Will to repay the debt including a
1-Month, a 12-Month, or a 24-Month payment plan. (#1
at 1-2). Due to the age of the debt and the fact
that it is was beyond the applicable statute of limitations
for any debt collection lawsuit, PRA’s Collection
Letter provided the following disclosure, “[t]he law
limits how long you can be sued on a debt. Because of the age
of your debt, we will not sue you for it.” (#1
at 1-2). Mr. Will did not make any payments to PRA,
and instead, he sued them for sending the Collection Letter.
Complaint alleges that the “State of Colorado has a
statute of limitations that applies to prohibit the filing of
lawsuits more than six years after the last payment made by a
person, ” and that when the Collection Letter was sent
to Mr. Will, the applicable statute of limitations had
expired on the subject debt. (#1 at ¶¶
5-6). Mr. Will alleges that because his last payment
on the subject debt “was more than six years from the
date of the Collection Letter, ” he had “no legal
responsibility” to repay the debt.
addition, the Complaint alleges that the Collection
Letter’s disclosure language violates the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) because it
“falsely represents the character and legal status of
the Subject Time-Barred Debt, ” and unfairly fails to
inform Mr. Will that “choosing any of the repayment
options would restart the statutory period for another
creditor or debt collector if the debt were to be
sold.” (#1 at ¶¶ 8-12). The
Complaint further alleges that the Collection Letter is
“intentionally deceptive and confusing to consumers and
[is] designed to induce payment on debts that are
time-barred” (#1 at ¶63).
Will now brings the following claims against PRA on behalf of
himself and others similarly situated based on the March 13,
2018 Collection Letter: (1) an individual claim for a
violation of sections 1692e and 1692f of the FDCPA and (2)
the same claim for a violation of sections 1692e and 1692f of
the FDCPA on behalf of a putative class of Colorado
residents. (#1 at ¶¶ 75-112).
reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the
Court must accept all well-pleaded allegations in the
Complaint as true and view those allegations in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party. Stidham v. Peace
Officer Standards & Training, 265 F.3d 1144, 1149
(10th Cir. 2001) (quoting Sutton v. Utah State Sch. for
the Deaf & Blind, 173 F.3d 1226, 1236 (10th Cir.
1999)). The Court must limit its consideration to the four
corners of the Complaint, any documents attached thereto, and
any external documents that are referenced in the Complaint
and whose accuracy is not in dispute. Oxendine v.
Kaplan, 241 F.3d 1272, 1275 (10th Cir. 2001);
Jacobsen v. Deseret Book Co., 287 F.3d 936, 941
(10th Cir. 2002); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v.
Howsam, 261 F.3d 956, 961 (10th Cir. 2001).
is subject to dismissal if it fails to state a claim for
relief that is “plausible on its face.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). To make
such an assessment, the Court first discards those averments
in the Complaint that are merely legal conclusions or
“threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements.”
Id. at 678-79. The Court takes the remaining,
well-pleaded factual contentions, treats them as true, and
ascertains whether those facts (coupled, of course, with the
law establishing the requisite elements of the claim) support
a claim that is “plausible” or whether the claim
being asserted is merely “conceivable” or
“possible” under the facts alleged. Id.
What is required to reach the level of
“plausibility” varies from context ...