United States District Court, D. Colorado
LISA MURPHY, individually and on behalf of all similarly situated individuals and on behalf of the Proposed Rule 23 Class, Plaintiff,
v.
ALLSTAFF HOMECARE, LLC, Defendant.
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ PARTIAL MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
William J. Martínez, United States District Judge.
Before
the Court are the parties’ cross motions for summary
judgment. Both motions, in essence, seek the Court’s
determination of whether, as a matter of law, Plaintiff Lisa
Murphy or opt-in Plaintiff Gloria Pacheco (together,
“Plaintiffs”) were covered by the Fair Labor
Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§
201 et seq., while employed by Defendant AllStaff
Homecare, LLC (“Defendant”). Plaintiffs move for
partial summary judgment in their favor asking the Court to
declare, as a matter of law, that Defendant violated the FLSA
and an analogous Colorado state law, leaving only the issues
of willfulness and damages for trial. (ECF No. 64
(“Plaintiffs’ Motion”).) Defendant seeks
summary judgment in its favor on the grounds that Plaintiffs
have not and cannot put forth any evidence that either party
engaged in interstate commerce, and therefore Plaintiffs are
not covered by the FLSA. (ECF No. 63
(“Defendant’s Motion”).) Defendant also
asks the Court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over
Plaintiffs’ state law claims. (ECF No. 66.)
For the
reasons explained below, the Court grants Plaintiffs’
Motion and denies Defendant’s Motion.
I.
BACKGROUND
The
following summary is drawn from the parties’ statements
of material facts. The vast majority of the facts are
undisputed.
Plaintiffs
are former home health aides (“HHAs”) employed by
Defendant to provide in-home care for Defendant’s
clients. (ECF No. 64 at 7, ¶ 3; ECF No. 66 at 2, ¶
3.) Defendant is a Colorado corporation headquartered in
Denver, and employs HHAs to provide in-home direct care and
household services. (ECF No. 64 at 8, ¶ 6; ECF No. 66 at
2, ¶ 6.) Defendant has at least two employees and annual
dollar volume of sales or business of at least $500, 000.
(ECF No. 64 at 8, ¶¶ 7–8; ECF No. 66 at 2,
¶¶ 7–8.)
Murphy
worked for Defendant as a HHA from August 26, 2015 to June
19, 2016, and Pacheco worked for Defendant both as a
Certified Nursing Assistant (“CNA”) and an HHA
from October 16, 2014 to October 21, 2016. (ECF No. 64 at 8
¶¶ 4–5; id. at 7 ¶ 3 n.2; ECF
No. 66 at 2, ¶¶ 4–5.) Defendant required HHAs
to pass a competency examination that tested knowledge of,
among other things, observing and documenting clients’
status, reading vital signs, infection control procedures,
maintaining a clean, healthy, and safe environment, and using
appropriate and safe personal hygiene and grooming techniques
for clients. (ECF No. 64 at 9, ¶ 12; ECF No. 3, ¶
12.) Murphy’s job duties included:
bathing, grooming, and dressing the client; toileting the
client; other personal hygiene maintenance for the client;
conducting mobility exercises with the client; transferring
the client from bed to wheelchair to chair or couch;
preparing and serving meals to the client; transportation of
the client to medical appointments and . . . non-medical
appointments and attending those appointments with the
client; running errands for the client outside of the
client’s home; shopping for groceries and other items
for the client; traveling with the client on day and
overnight trips; cleaning the client’s rooms, living
space, bathroom, and kitchen; making beds for the client;
washing, drying and folding clothes for the client[;] washing
and drying dishes for the client; sweeping, mopping, and
vacuuming floors for the client; dusting for the client; and
taking out the trash for the client.
(ECF No. 64 at 9; ¶ 13; ECF No. 66 at 3, ¶ 13.)
Pacheco’s duties were similar, except that she also
provided oral care, cleaned dentures, and checked vitals, and
was never assigned a client who needed transferring. (ECF No.
64 at 10; ¶ 14; ECF No. 66 at 3, ¶ 14.)
Throughout
their employment, Plaintiffs regularly worked more than 40
hours per week, and Defendant did not pay Plaintiffs an
overtime premium of one-and-a-half times their regular pay
for time worked in excess of 40 hours. (ECF No. 64 at 10;
¶¶ 16–17; ECF No. 66 at 3, ¶¶
16–17.) Defendant deducted expenses for advertising,
automobile and truck expenses, postage, telephone, and
travel. (ECF No. 64 at 8, ¶ 9; ECF No. 66 at 2, ¶
9.)
Defendant
admits all of the above facts. Indeed, other than the dispute
about interstate commerce (see ECF No. 63 at
2–3, ¶ 1.a.–g; ECF No. 65 at 2–7,
¶ 1.a–g), the only dispute of fact concerns
Defendant’s provision of services to veterans.
Plaintiffs contend that Defendant “provides service to
veterans who came to Colorado from other states to receive
service.” (ECF No. 64 at 8, ¶ 10.) Defendant
clarifies that it takes referrals from the U.S. Department of
Veterans Affairs office in Denver, which only refers local
clients who have “come here from other States and
receive service, ” and that Defendant only takes
“referrals for the counties in Colorado [it]
serve[s].” (ECF No. 66 at 2–3, ¶ 10.)
Murphy
filed the Complaint on September 20, 2016, and moved for
conditional certification under the FLSA on December 15,
2016. (ECF Nos. 1 & 21.) The Court granted conditional
certification, and Pacheco was the only person who filed a
consent to join. (ECF Nos. 52 & 57.) Defendant filed an
Early Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing that the Court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the FLSA claims and
should decline to exercise supplement jurisdiction over the
state law claims. (ECF No. 36.) The Court denied that motion
without prejudice finding that the FLSA’s interstate
commerce requirements are non-jurisdictional rather than an
element of an FLSA claim. (ECF No. 46 at 7.) After the close
of discovery, the parties filed their summary judgment
motions.
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary
judgment is warranted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
56 “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a);
see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 248–50 (1986). Whether there is a genuine dispute
as to a material fact depends upon whether the evidence
presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to
the factfinder or, conversely, is so one-sided that one party
must prevail as a matter of law. Anderson, 477 U.S.
at 251–52; Stone v. Autoliv ASP, Inc., 210
F.3d 1132 (10th Cir. 2000). A fact is “material”
if, under the relevant substantive law, it is essential to
proper disposition of the claim. Wright v. Abbott Labs.,
Inc., 259 F.3d 1226, 1231–32 (10th Cir. 2001). An
issue is “genuine” if the evidence is such that
it might lead a reasonable trier of fact to return a verdict
for the nonmoving party. Allen v. Muskogee, 119 F.3d
837, 839 (10th Cir. 1997).
In
analyzing a motion for summary judgment, a court must view
the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Adler v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 670 (10th Cir.
1998) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)). In addition, the Court
must resolve factual ambiguities against the moving party,
thus favoring the right to a trial. See Houston v.
Nat’l Gen. Ins. Co., 817 F.2d 83, 85 (10th Cir.
1987).
III.
ANALYSIS
A.
Plaintiffs’ Partial Motion for Summary
Judgment
1.
FL ...