United States District Court, D. Colorado
ORDER DENYING APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS
BROOKE JACKSON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
matter is before the Court on an Application for a Writ of
Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. # 1),
filed pro se, by Ronald Wiggins, on June 7, 2019.
Respondent filed a Response to Application for Writ of Habeas
Corpus on August 6, 2019. (Doc. # 16). Applicant filed a
“Traverse” (Reply) on August 19, 2019. (Doc. #
21). Having considered the parties filings, the Court
dismisses the Application for the reasons discussed below.
February 6, 2004, Applicant was sentenced in the United
States District Court for the Central District of Illinois to
a 240-month term of imprisonment for bank robbery, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). (Doc. # 16-1;
Declaration of Cassandra Grow, ¶ 3, and attach. 1).
Applicant’s projected release date is September 13,
2020, via good conduct time. (Id.).
October 2, 2018, Applicant was found guilty in a prison
disciplinary proceeding of aiding in the assault of another
person (Code 201), in connection with Incident Report No.
3157619. (Application at 3; Grow Decl., ¶ 4 and attach.
1). He was sanctioned with, inter alia, the loss of
27 days of good conduct time. (Application at 3). Applicant
claims in the § 2241 application that the prison
disciplinary proceeding did not comport with the requirements
of due process. (Id. at 3-6). For relief, he asks
that: (1) the prison disciplinary conviction be vacated; (2)
27 days of forfeited good-time credits be restored; and, (3)
his custody classification be changed from “high”
to “medium.” (Id. at 8).
August 2019, after Applicant filed his § 2241
application, the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) expunged the prison
disciplinary conviction and restored the 27 days of forfeited
good-time credits. (Grow Decl. ¶¶ 5-6 and attach.
asserts that the § 2241 Application is now moot to the
extent Applicant requests expungement of the disciplinary
conviction and the restoration of forfeited good-time
credits. (Doc. # 16 at 2-3). Respondent further contends that
Applicant’s request for a change in his custody
classification should be denied because he does not have a
constitutionally-protected liberty interest in his custody
classification. (Id. at 3).
Habeas Corpus Actions
remedy of habeas corpus is available when a prisoner is
“in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. §
2241(c). A section 2241 habeas proceeding is “an attack
by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody, and
. . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure
release from illegal custody.” McIntosh v. U.S.
Parole Common, 115 F.3d 809, 811 (10th Cir.1997)
(quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484
(1973)). Prison disciplinary proceedings that result in the
deprivation of good-time credits may be challenged in a '
2241 proceeding. McIntosh, 115 F.3d at 811-12.
Pro Se Litigant
is proceeding pro se. The court, therefore,
“review[s] his pleadings and other papers liberally and
hold[s] them to a less stringent standard than those drafted
by attorneys.” Trackwell v. United States, 472
F.3d 1242, 1243 (10th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted); see
also Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21
(1972). However, a pro se litigant's
“conclusory allegations without supporting factual
averments are insufficient to state a claim on which relief
can be based.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106,
1110 (10th Cir.1991). A court may not assume that an
applicant can prove facts that have not been alleged or that
a respondent has violated laws in ways that an applicant has
not alleged. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v.
Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526
(1983). An applicant’s pro se status does not entitle
him to an application of different rules. See Montoya v.
Chao, 296 F.3d 952, 957 (10th Cir. 2002).
invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court, a litigant must
have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury
traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a
favorable judicial decision.” Lewis v. Cont'l
Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990). At all stages of
the case, the parties must have a “personal stake in
the outcome’ of the lawsuit. Spencer v. Kemna,
523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998) (quoting Lewis, 494 U.S. at
477-78). “This means that, throughout the litigation,
the plaintiff must have suffered, or be threatened with, an
actual injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be
redressed by a favorable judicial decision.”
Lewis, 494 U.S. at 477 (internal quotation marks
omitted). “A habeas corpus petition is moot when it no
longer presents a case or controversy under Article III,
§ 2, of the Constitution.” Aragon v.
Shanks, 144 F.3d 690, 691 (10th Cir.1998) (citing
Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7). See also Rhodes v.
Judiscak, 676 F.3d 931, 933 (10th Cir. 2012) (concluding
that habeas petition was moot where the petitioner no longer
suffered an actual injury that could be redressed by a
favorable judicial ...