United States District Court, D. Colorado
ORDER
KATHLEEN M. TAFOYA UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
This
matter is before the court on the following motions:
1.
“CDOC Parole Officer Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
Second Amended Complaint Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(b)(6)” (Doc. No. 37 [Parole Officers' Mot.],
filed February 1, 2019), to which Plaintiff responded (Doc.
No. 42 [Resp. Parole Officers' Mot.], filed February 22,
2019) and the Parole Officers replied (Doc. No. 45 [Parole
Officers' Reply], filed March 5, 2019); and
2.
“Defendant Washington County Sheriff John Stivers'
Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint (Doc. # 36)”
(Doc. No. 38 [Stivers' Mot. Dismiss], filed February 5,
2019), to which Plaintiff responded (Doc. No. 44 [Resp.
Stivers' Mot.], filed February 26, 2019) and Defendant
Stivers replied (Doc. No. 46 [Stivers' Reply], filed
March 12, 2019).
STATEMENT
OF THE CASE
Plaintiff
states that Defendant Dean Gonzalez was his Parole Officer in
September 2016; Defendant Nadia Gatchell was his Parole
Officer in October 2016, during Plaintiff's detention in
the Washington County Jail from October 19, 2016, through
December 21, 2016, and after his release from the Washington
County Jail; and Defendant John Stivers, is the Washington
County Sheriff who operated the Washington County Jail from
October 19, 2016 to December 21, 2016. (Doc. No. 36 [Second
Am. Compl.], ¶¶ 2-4.)
In the
first week of September 2016, Plaintiff injured his right
foot and was seen at Lutheran Medical Hospital and scheduled
to return for casting of the foot. (Id., ¶ 6.)
Before the casting, Plaintiff alleges he was “subjected
by Defendant Gonzales to a short term detention pursuant to
the Sure and Swift Program of the Colorado Department of
Corrections” (“CDOC”). (Id.,
¶ 7.) The Sure and Swift Program allows a detention of
one to five days as a sanction for minor violations of parole
rules. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges he advised Defendant
Gonzalez of his pending appointment for the cast placement,
and Defendant Gonzalez promised to arrange for Plaintiff to
be released for the appointment. (Id., ¶ 8.)
Despite this promise, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Gonzalez
failed to make arrangements for Plaintiff to attend the
appointment. (Id.)
Upon
his release, Plaintiff went to the Lutheran Medical Center
and obtained another appointment for the cast placement.
(Id.) Plaintiff then went to check in with Defendant
Gonzalez, who again placed Plaintiff in the Denver County
Jail pursuant to the Sure and Swift Program. (Id.)
Again, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Gonzalez promised and yet
failed to arrange for Plaintiff to attend the rescheduled
cast placement appointment. (Id., ¶ 9.)
When
Plaintiff was released from the second Sure and Swift
incarceration, Plaintiff was assigned a new Parole Officer,
Defendant Gatchell. (Id., ¶ 10.) Plaintiff
alleges that, during his first visit with Defendant Gatchell,
she falsely accused Plaintiff of missing an appearance and
changing his address without permission. (Id.)
Defendant Gatchell arrested Plaintiff, placed him in jail,
charged him with a parole violation, and commenced a
proceeding for a 90-day turnaround. (Id.) Plaintiff
was sent to the Washington County Jail on October 19, 2016.
(Id., ¶ 11.)
Plaintiff
alleges the medical unit of the Washington County Jail
learned from Plaintiff's intake evaluation that he had a
serious medical need which required specialized care and that
the delay in treatment caused him severe discomfort and
progressive worsening of his condition. (Id., ¶
14.) Plaintiff alleges that, despite this knowledge, the
Washington County Jail refused to arrange for medical
treatment, other than providing Tylenol. (Id.,
¶ 12.) Plaintiff submitted grievances, and the responses
to the grievances advised Plaintiff that Defendant Stivers
had a policy that prevented the Washington County Jail staff
from providing care for injuries suffered to detainees prior
to becoming inmates at the jail. (Id., ¶ 15.)
Plaintiff
states he was in the Washington County Jail for 55 days, and
when he was released, he again met with Defendant Gatchell at
Plaintiff's aunt's home. (Id., ¶¶
17-18.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant Gatchell again arrested
him on a false charge and placed him in the Denver County
Jail. (Id., ¶ 18.) Plaintiff states Defendant
Gatchell again instituted a 90-day turnaround proceeding, and
Plaintiff spent 30 days at the Douglas County Jail and 60
days at the Cheyenne Mountain Re-entry Center. (Id.)
Plaintiff states Defendant Gatchell failed to arrange for
care for his foot during this time. (Id., ¶
20.)
Plaintiff
sues the defendants in only their individual capacities,
asserting one claim for cruel and unusual punishment, seeking
actual and punitive damages. (See id., ¶ 5; at
7.) Defendants move to dismiss the claims in their entirety.
(See Parole Officers' Mot.; Stivers' Mot.)
STANDARD
OF REVIEW
Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides that a defendant
may move to dismiss a claim for “failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(b)(6). “The court's function on a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion is not to weigh potential evidence that the parties
might present at trial, but to assess whether the
plaintiff's complaint alone is legally sufficient to
state a claim for which relief may be granted.”
Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1201 (10th
Cir. 2003) (quotation marks omitted).
“A
court reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint presumes all
of plaintiff's factual allegations are true and construes
them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”
Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1109 (10th Cir.
1991). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.' ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Plausibility, in the context of a
motion to dismiss, means that the plaintiff pleaded facts
which allow “the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. The Iqbal evaluation
requires two prongs of analysis. First, the court identifies
“the allegations in the complaint that are not entitled
to the assumption of truth, ” that is, those
allegations which are legal conclusion, bare assertions, or
merely conclusory. Id. at 679-81. Second, the Court
considers the factual allegations “to determine if they
plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.”
Id. at 681. If the allegations state a plausible
claim for relief, such claim survives the motion to dismiss.
Id. at 679.
Notwithstanding,
the court need not accept conclusory allegations without
supporting factual averments. S. Disposal, Inc., v. Texas
Waste, 161 F.3d 1259, 1262 (10th Cir. 1998).
“[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of
the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to
legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a
cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do
not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S at 678. Moreover,
“[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and
conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.' Nor does the
complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked
assertion[s]' devoid of ‘further factual
enhancement.' ” Id. (citation omitted).
“Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely
consistent with' a defendant's liability, it
‘stops short of the line between possibility and
plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.' ”
Id. (citation omitted).
ANALYSIS
A.
Judicial Notice of Documents
At the
outset, the court notes that Defendant Stivers urges the
court to take judicial notice of several exhibits attached to
his Motion to Dismiss. (Stivers' Mot. at 6, n.1; 7-9.)
First, Defendant Stivers attaches a medical agreement signed
by Plaintiff upon his arrival at the Washington County Jail.
(Stivers' Mot. at 5-6, Ex. A.) Defendant Stivers claims
this is a a “governmental document[]” of which
the court may take judicial notice. (Id. at 6, n.1.)
A court can take judicial notice of government documents or
records of prior litigation under Federal Rule of Evidence
201, as long as the litigation is directly or closely related
to the case at hand. United States v. Ahidley, 486
F.3d 1184, 1192 n.5 (10th Cir. 2007) (“Although we are
not obliged to do so, we may exercise our discretion to take
judicial notice of publicly-filed records in our court and
certain other ...