United States District Court, D. Colorado
ORDER DISSOLVING TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, DENYING
20 U.S.C. § 1415(J) INJUNCTION, AND TERMINATING
CASE
William J. Martinez, United States District Judge
Plaintiff
Michael Smith (“Smith”), proceeding pro
se, files this lawsuit against Defendant Cheyenne
Mountain School District 12 (“Cheyenne 12”).
Smith's sole cause of action is claim for an injunction
requiring Cheyenne 12 to continue educating his
eleven-year-old autistic son, R.S., while Smith and Cheyenne
12 work through a dispute over R.S.'s “placement,
” as that term is understood under the Individuals with
Disabilities in Education Act (“IDEA” or
“Act”), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et
seq.
Currently
before the Court is Smith's Verified Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction
(“Motion”). (ECF No. 3.) The Court previously
granted the TRO portion of the Motion. (See ECF No.
9; see also ECF No. 17 (extending TRO).) The Court
then called for and received further briefing on the
remainder of the Motion. (See ECF Nos. 12, 16, 18.)
Although the Court would normally hold a hearing on a matter
such as this, the Court finds that a hearing would not help
to resolve the questions presented because:
• Smith's complaint (ECF No. 1), Motion (ECF No. 3),
and reply in support of the Motion (ECF No. 16) are all
verified;
• Cheyenne 12's assertions of fact are made by way
of declaration or affidavit (see ECF Nos. 12-1,
18-1, 19-1); and
• the parties' briefs do not raise any disputes of
fact or issues of credibility.
Accordingly,
the Court will rule on the papers. For the reasons explained
below, the Court construes the preliminary injunction portion
of the Motion as a request for a statutory
“stay-put” injunction as provided for by IDEA
(see 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j))-in contrast to an
equitable injunction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
65. The Court finds that § 1415(j) relief is unavailable
in these circumstances, however. The Court therefore denies
the remainder of the Motion, dissolves the TRO, and
terminates this case.
I.
BACKGROUND
Based
on the record presented, the Court makes the following
findings of fact.
R.S.
does not live within Cheyenne 12's boundaries. When
living with his father (i.e., Plaintiff Smith), he
lives in the Harrison School District
(“Harrison”). (ECF No. 12-1 at 30, ¶
2.)[1]
When living with his mother, Ramona Smith, he lives in the
Colorado Springs School District 11 (“C.S. 11”).
(Id. at 32, ¶ 2.) Since beginning elementary
school, R.S. has attended The Vanguard School
(“Vanguard”), one of Cheyenne 12's charter
schools. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 1, 9.) This is possible
through Colorado's interdistrict school choice statute.
See Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 22-36-101 et
seq.
R.S.'s
autism qualifies him for special education and related
services, which are provided according to his IDEA-mandated
Individualized Education Program (“IEP”). (ECF
No. 1 ¶ 3.) His most recent IEP is dated May 6, 2019,
toward the end of his fifth-grade year. (Id. ¶
4; ECF No. 12-1 at 3-4.) It names his “Home
School” as Soaring Eagles Elementary (a Harrison
school) and his “School of Attendance” as
Vanguard. (Id. at 3.) It describes in detail the
effects of his autism, his needs, the amount of time he will
spend in general versus special education classes, and the
amounts and types of extra services he will receive.
(Id. at 5-24.) The Court will provide more details
from the IEP as they become relevant to the Court's
analysis.[2]
On May
30, 2019, Vanguard's executive director e-mailed a letter
to Smith stating that “Vanguard would have to continue
to hire a paraprofessional to work fulltime with [R.S.] in
order to provide the services contained in [his] IEP during
the 2019- 20 school year. As a result, The Vanguard School is
denying [R.S.'s] enrollment for the 2019-20 school
year.” (ECF No. 1 ¶ 7.)
On
August 7, 2019, Smith filed “a Due Process Complaint
with the Colorado Department of Education” contesting
Vanguard's action. (Id. ¶
10.)[3]
By doing so, Smith invoked the IEP grievance process that
IDEA requires states receiving funding under the Act to make
available. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a). Smith's
Due Process Complaint was “referred to Colorado's
Office of Administrative Courts” and is currently
pending. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 10.)
R.S.'s
first day of sixth grade at Vanguard-assuming he should have
been enrolled-was August 14, 2019. (Id. ¶ 14.)
“On those days when R.S. has been dropped off” at
Vanguard, he has been “confined to an office, separated
from his peers, and provided with no educational
services.” (Id. ¶ 15.)
On
August 20, 2019, the Court entered the TRO, restraining
Cheyenne 12 “from refusing to provide services to R.S.
at The Vanguard School in accordance with R.S.'s IEP
while Smith's Due Process Complaint (Colorado Office of
Administrative Courts docket number 2019:133) is being
adjudicated.” (ECF No. 9 at 5.)
II.
NATURE OF 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j) RELIEF & LEGAL
STANDARD
Smith's
asserts a single cause of action. Specifically, he requests
an injunction under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j), which reads in
relevant part as follows: “[D]uring the pendency of any
proceedings conducted pursuant to this section [such as the
Due Process Complaint] . . . the child shall remain in the
then-current educational placement of the child . . .
.” Section 1415(j) is often referred to as IDEA's
“stay-put” provision and is generally
“construed to impose an automatic statutory injunction
requiring that the child's then-current educational
placement be maintained” so that a school district
cannot “effect[] unilateral change ...