The People of the State of Colorado, Petitioner-Appellee, In the Interest of D.L.C., Juvenile-Appellant.
Paso County District Court No. 16JD742 Honorable G. David
J. Weiser, Attorney General, Kevin E. McReynolds, Assistant
Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Petitioner-Appellee
Trenary, Alternate Defense Counsel, Broomfield, Colorado, for
1 Under the juvenile restitution statute, may a juvenile
court suspend accrual of postjudgment interest on restitution
for a juvenile while he is committed to the Division of Youth
Services (DYS)? We answer "no" and affirm the
district court's order denying D.L.C.'s motion to
suspend postjudgment interest.
Factual Background and Procedural History
2 D.L.C. pleaded guilty to aggravated motor vehicle theft. He
also agreed to pay restitution. The juvenile court magistrate
sentenced D.L.C. to probation and granted the People's
restitution request, ordering D.L.C. to pay $59,
417.07 in restitution.
3 Later, the magistrate revoked D.L.C.'s probation after
he pleaded guilty to committing other offenses in a different
case (17JD487) and committed D.L.C. to DYS. The magistrate
ordered D.L.C. to pay restitution in this case and also made
it a condition of his parole in case 17JD487 after his
commitment to DYS.
4 D.L.C. filed a motion asking the magistrate to suspend
postjudgment interest on restitution in this case and case
17JD487 while he is committed to DYS. After the magistrate
denied the motion, D.L.C. asked the district court to review
the magistrate's order. The district court upheld the
magistrate's order, finding that it didn't have
authority to suspend postjudgment interest under the
statutory scheme or case law.
Postjudgment Restitution Interest Can't Be Suspended for
a Juvenile Under the Adult Restitution Statute
5 D.L.C. contends that the district court erred in refusing
to suspend accrual of postjudgment interest on his
restitution obligation while he is committed to DYS because
section 19-2-918(2), C.R.S. 2018, authorizes such suspension
"to ensure that restitution is ordered to be paid in a
reasonable manner." We disagree.
Standard of Review and Applicable Law
6 We generally review a trial court's restitution order
for an abuse of discretion. See People v. Henry,
2018 COA 48M, ¶ 12; cf. People v. Barbre, 2018
COA 123, ¶ 21. A court abuses its discretion when its
decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or
when it misconstrues or misapplies the law. Henry,
¶ 12. We review de novo statutory interpretation
questions. See Cowen v. People, 2018 CO 96, ¶
11; Dubois v. People, 211 P.3d 41, 43 (Colo. 2009).
7 Our primary purpose when construing a statute is to
ascertain and give effect to the General Assembly's
intent. Cowen, ¶ 12. We look first to the
statute's language, giving words and phrases their plain
and ordinary meanings. Doubleday v. People, 2016 CO
3, ¶ 19. We read statutory words and phrases in context
and construe them according to the rules of grammar and
common usage. Id.; Marquez v. People, 2013
CO 58, ¶ 8 ("It is widely accepted that where the
legislature has not expressly defined a statutory term or
otherwise limited its meaning, that term ...