United States District Court, D. Colorado
ORDER
NINA
Y. WANG, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This
matter comes before the court on Defendant City of
Trinidad's (“Defendant” or
“City”) Motion to Stay Proceedings (or
“Motion”), filed July 24, 2019. [#84]. Defendant
requests the court stay this matter pending its forthcoming
petition to the Supreme Court of the United States for writ
of certiorari. See [id.]. Having reviewed
the Motion and associated briefing [#87; #90], the applicable
case law, and the comments offered at the August 2, 2019
Status Conference [#88], I DENY the Motion
to Stay Proceedings.
BACKGROUND
The
court has discussed the background of this matter in its
prior Orders, e.g., [#67], and therefore will limit
its discussion to only those facts most salient to the
instant Motion. On December 1, 2017, the court issued its
Memorandum Opinion and Order, wherein it granted
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgement and denied
Plaintiff Stephen Hamer's (“Plaintiff” or
“Mr. Hamer”) Motion for Summary Judgment, holding
the statute of limitations barred Mr. Hamer's American
with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and Rehabilitation
Act (“RA”) claims. See generally
[id.]. Because the court's ruling was
dispositive of all claims, Final Judgment issued in favor of
Defendant and against Mr. Hamer on December 1, 2017.
See [#68]. Thereafter, Mr. Hamer filed a timely
appeal of the court's Final Judgment to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit (“Tenth
Circuit”) on December 20, 2017. See [#69].
The
Tenth Circuit issued its Opinion and Judgment on May 15,
2019. See [#75; #76]. The Tenth Circuit reversed and
remanded this matter back to the undersigned, concluding the
statute of limitations did not bar Mr. Hamer's ADA and RA
claims in their entirety, and directed the undersigned to
conduct further proceedings not inconsistent with its
Opinion. See [#75; #76]. The Tenth Circuit's
Mandate issued on June 20, 2019, see [#77],
following its denial of the City's petition for rehearing
en banc.
Following
the Tenth Circuit's Mandate, the court set this matter
for a Status Conference. At this Status Conference, the City
informed the court of its intent to file the instant Motion
to Stay Proceedings pending its forthcoming petition to the
Supreme Court for writ of certiorari. See [#80]. The
court also set this matter for a Supplemental Scheduling
Conference for August 2, 2019, later converted to a Status
Conference. See [id.; #88]. The City filed
the instant Motion on July 24, 2019, seeking a stay of this
matter. See [#84]. Plaintiff has since responded to
the Motion [#87] and Defendants replied [#90] and the court
entertained brief argument on the matter at the August 2
Status Conference [#88]. The Motion is now ripe for
disposition.
ANALYSIS
I.
The Motion to Stay Proceedings
Arguing
under the String Cheese factors, [1] Defendant moves
for a stay of this matter pending the outcome of its
forthcoming petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme
Court. See [#84 at 2-3]. It argues a stay is
warranted, because it would not prejudice Plaintiff, whose
damages consist of repairs and compensatory damages which
will not be affected by a stay; the burden on the City would
be large should it have to engage in further litigation that
may be irrelevant if successful at the Supreme Court-this
same reason imposing a high burden on the court; and the
public and non-parties will not be prejudiced by a stay as
the City intends to repair many of the sidewalks and curb
cuts at issue pending its appeal to the Supreme Court.
See [id. at 3-4].
In his
Response, Mr. Hamer argues against a stay because the Motion
is procedurally improper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2101(f), which requires the City to file said Motion with the
Tenth Circuit or a Justice of the Supreme Court, not the
district court. See [#87 at 1-2]. Further, Plaintiff
argues the Motion is substantively deficient because Mr.
Hamer would be prejudiced by a stay and the City fails to
satisfy its high burden that the Supreme Court would not only
accept its petition for writ of certiorari but would then
rule in the City's favor. See [id. at
2-4]. For the following reasons, I respectfully conclude a
stay is not appropriate presently.
First
, the court agrees with Mr. Hamer that the Motion is
procedurally defective pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2101(f).
Section 2101(f) provides,
In any case in which the final judgment or decree of any
court is subject to review by the Supreme Court on writ of
certiorari, the execution and enforcement of such judgment or
decree may be stayed for a reasonable time to enable the
party aggrieved to obtain a writ of certiorari from the
Supreme Court. The stay may be granted by a judge of the
court rendering the judgment or decree or by a justice of the
Supreme Court . . . .
28 U.S.C. § 2101(f). Interestingly, the City argues that
§ 2101(f) does not apply because “there has been
no final judgment or decree in the case- hence the need for
remand and further proceedings.” [#90 at 1-2]. But the
court indeed issued a Final Judgment in favor of the City and
against Mr. Hamer, disposing of all claims and dismissing
this matter with prejudice on December 1, 2017. See
[#68]; cf. Utah v. Norton, 396 F.3d 1281, 1286 (10th
Cir. 2005) (“A final judgment is one that terminates
all matters as to all parties and causes of action”
(internal quotations and citations omitted)). And the Tenth
Circuit's reversal and remand for further proceedings is
similarly a final judgment subject to review by the Supreme
Court, see 28 U.S.C. § 1254; hence the
City's forthcoming petition for writ of certiorari,
see New York Times Co. v. Jascalevich, 439 U.S.
1317, 1318 (1978) (“Under 28 U.S.C. § 2101(f), a
stay is authorized only if the judgment sought to be stayed
is final and is subject to review by the Supreme
Court on writ of certiorari.” (emphasis in original)).
While
not identical on all fours to the instant matter, I find
persuasive the court's reasoning in Brinkman v.
Department of Corrections of State of Kansas, 857
F.Supp. 775 (D. Kan. 1994). There, in response to the
plaintiffs' motion to direct payment to their attorney
following the defendant's unsuccessful appeal of the
trial verdict to the Tenth Circuit, the defendant requested
that the court not direct payment because of its forthcoming
petition for writ of ...