United States District Court, D. Colorado
OPINION AND ORDER
N.
REID NEUREITER, U.S. DISTRICT COURT MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The
government determined that Plaintiff Randy James Raygor was
not disabled for purposes of the Social Security Act for the
period from November 19, 2013 through August 22, 2017, the
date of the decision. (AR[1] 40-41.) Mr. Raygor has asked this Court
to review that decision. The Court has jurisdiction under 42
U.S.C. § 405(g), and both parties have agreed to have
this case decided by a U.S. Magistrate Judge under 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(c). (Dkt. #11.)
Standard
of Review
In
Social Security appeals, the Court reviews the decision of
the administrative law judge ("ALJ") to determine
whether the factual findings are supported by substantial
evidence and whether the correct legal standards were
applied. See Pisciotta v. Astrue, 500 F.3d 1074,
1075 (10th Cir. 2007). "Substantial evidence is such
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion. It requires more than a scintilla, but
less than a preponderance." Raymond v. Astrue,
621 F.3d 1269, 1271-72 (10th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation
marks omitted). The Court "should, indeed must, exercise
common sense" and "cannot insist on technical
perfection." Keyes-Zachary v. Astrue, 695 F.3d
1156, 1166 (10th Cir. 2012). The Court cannot reweigh the
evidence or its credibility. Lax v. Astrue, 489 F.3d
1080, 1084 (10th Cir. 2007).
Nonetheless,
the determination whether substantial evidence supports the
Commissioner's decision is not simply a quantitative
exercise, for evidence is not substantial if it is
overwhelmed by other evidence or if it constitutes mere
conclusion. Fulton v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 1052, 1055
(10th Cir. 1985). Ultimately, the Court must review the
record as a whole, and "[t]he substantiality of evidence
must take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts
from its weight." Universal Camera Corp. v.
NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951); see also
Casias, 933 F.2d at 800-01.
Background
At the
second step of the Commissioner's five-step sequence for
making determinations, [2] the ALJ found that Mr. Raygor "has
the following severe combination of impairments:
schizoaffective disorder; depression; anxiety; and, substance
(cannabis) abuse." (AR 34.) The ALJ found that these
"medically determinable impairments cause more than
minimal functional limitations on basic work-related
activities and are considered severe." (AR 34.)
The ALJ
then determined at step three that Mr. Raygor "does not
have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets
or medically equals the severity of one of the listed
impairments" in the regulations. (AR 34-35.) Because she
concluded that Mr. Raygor did not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that meets the severity of the
listed impairments, the ALJ found that Mr. Raygor has the
following residual functional capacity ("RFC"):
... to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels
but with the following nonexertional limitations: can perform
simple unskilled work activities; can solve problems and can
perform work without distracting others or being distracted
by others; can interact appropriately with coworkers,
supervisors and the public but cannot perform tasks requiring
teamwork; and, can maintain attendance in order to perform
sustained work activities.
(AR 35.)
The ALJ
concluded that Mr. Raygor had past relevant work as a cook
helper. (AR 39.) At step five, the ALJ found that, in
comparing Mr. Raygor's residual functional capacity with
the physical and mental demands of being a cook helper, Mr.
Raygor was able to perform as a cook helper as it is
generally performed in the national economy, and that there
are other jobs existing in the national economy that Mr.
Raygor is able to perform. (AR 39.) Accordingly, Mr. Raygor
was deemed not to have been under a disability from the
alleged onset date of November 19, 2013, through August 22,
2017, the date of the decision. (AR 40-41.)
Analysis
Mr.
Raygor argues that the ALJ's decision should be reversed
because she improperly weighed the medical opinion evidence
and improperly assessed the consistency of Mr. Raygor's
statements with the medical evidence. The Court agrees.
I.
Medical Opinion Evidence
An ALJ
must "give consideration to all the medical opinions in
the record" and "discuss the weight" she
assigns to them. Mays v. Colvin, 739 F.3d 569, 578
(10th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). "An
ALJ must evaluate every medical opinion in the record,
although the weight given each opinion will vary according to
the relationship between the disability claimant and the
medical professional." Hamlin v. Barnhart, 365
F.3d 1208, 1215 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing 20 C.F.R. §
401.1527(d)). The applicable regulations governing the
consideration of medical opinions distinguish among
"treating" physicians, "examining"
physicians, and "nonexamining" (or
"consulting") physicians. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.927(c). Generally, "the opinions of
physicians who have treated a patient over a period of time
or who are consulted for purposes of treatment are given
greater weight than are reports of physicians employed and
paid by the government for the purpose of defending against a
disability claim." Sorenson v. Bowen, 888 F.2d
706, 711 (10th Cir. 1989). See also Doyal v.
Barnhart, 331 F.3d 758, 762 (10th Cir. 2003).
The
evaluation of a treating source's opinion is a two-step
process. Watkins v. Barnhart, 350 F.3d 1297, 1300
(10th Cir. 2003). "The initial determination the ALJ
must make with respect to a treating physician's medical
opinion is whether it is conclusive, i.e., is to be accorded
'controlling weight,' on the matter to which it
relates." Krauser v. Astrue, 638 F.3d 1324,
1330 (10th Cir. 2011). "Such an opinion must be given
controlling weight if it is well-supported by medically
acceptable clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques and
is not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the
record." Id. Second,
Even if a treating opinion is not given controlling weight,
it is still entitled to deference; at the second step in the
analysis, the ALJ must make clear how much weight the opinion
is being given (including whether it is being rejected
outright) and give good reasons, tied to the factors
specified in the cited regulations for this particular
purpose, for the weight assigned.
Id.
The factors the ALJ ...