United States District Court, D. Colorado
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
CHRISTINE M. ARGUELLO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
This
matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Russ Petrie's
Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. # 65) requesting the Court
to reconsider its Order Granting Defendant GoSmith,
Inc.'s Motion to Compel Arbitration (Doc. # 64). The
Motion has been fully briefed. (Doc. ## 65, 66, and 67.)
Having reviewed the underlying briefing, pertinent record,
and applicable law, for the following reasons, the Court
denies Plaintiff's Motion.
I.
BACKGROUND
The
Court's Order granting Defendant's Motion to Compel
Arbitration (Doc. # 64) provides a thorough recitation of the
factual and procedural background of this dispute and is
incorporated herein by reference. Accordingly, the facts will
be presented only to the extent necessary to address the
Motion for Reconsideration.
The
crux of the underlying Motion to Compel Arbitration and to
Dismiss or in the Alternative Stay the Action (Doc. # 27)
turned on two arguments: (1) Defendant's argument that an
enforceable arbitration agreement existed, and that Plaintiff
assented to it; and (2) Plaintiff's argument that he
never agreed to Defendant's Terms of Use, which included
the arbitration clause. (Doc. # 64 at 3.) The Court issued
its Order Granting Defendant's Motion to Compel
Arbitration on January 31, 2019. (Id.)
With
respect to the first argument, the Court applied the relevant
law and determined that Defendant “met its initial
burden of demonstrating an enforceable arbitration
agreement” when Defendant “presented evidence
that there was reasonable notice of the arbitration agreement
and that Plaintiff assented to that agreement.”
(Id. at 4-5.) Specifically, Defendant's evidence
showed that “Plaintiff manifested assent to the Terms
of Use, and thus the arbitration agreement, by affirmatively
‘check[ing] [the] box to indicate his agreement to the
Terms of Use and Privacy Policy, and click[ing] ‘See
Job Matches.'” (Id. at 4-5.)
Regarding
the second argument, the Court rejected both of
Plaintiff's contentions that there were genuine disputes
of material facts as to the existence of an arbitration
agreement. (Id. at 5-7.) Applying the proper legal
standard, the Court determined that Plaintiff's own
denial and statement that he did not recall visiting a
website or agreeing to arbitrate were insufficient to create
a dispute of material fact. (Id. at 6.) Moreover, in
rejecting Plaintiff's assertion that Defendant's
evidence was unreliable, the Court concluded that the
unrebutted and undisputed evidence established that Plaintiff
“checked the box indicating that he agreed to the Terms
of Use and, therefore, assented to the arbitration
clause.” (Id. at 7.)
On
February 28, 2019, Plaintiff filed his Motion for
Reconsideration and asserts three arguments. (Doc. # 65.)
First, Plaintiff argues that the Court erred in finding that
Plaintiff “made only a general denial that he had
agreed to arbitrate” as opposed to the “detailed
and specific explanation” that Plaintiff provided to
support that “he knew that he did not
visit” Defendant's website. (Id. at 4-5
(emphasis in original).) Second, Plaintiff contends that the
Court erred by accepting Defendant's unreliable
“reply evidence at face value.” (Id. at
5-7.) Third, Plaintiff avers that any failure of the Court to
reconsider its Order will result in manifest injustice.
(Id. at 7-8.)
On
March 21, 2019, Defendant filed its Opposition to
Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration. (Doc. # 66.) On
April 4, 2019, Plaintiff filed his Reply to the Response
(Doc. # 67.) For the following reasons, Plaintiff's
arguments are insufficient to warrant reconsideration, and as
such, Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration is denied.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not explicitly authorize
a motion for reconsideration for final judgments or
interlocutory orders. Van Skiver v. United States,
952 F.2d 1241, 1243 (10th Cir. 1991); Mantooth v. Bavaria
Inn Rest., Inc., 360 F.Supp.3d 1164, 1169 (D. Colo.
2019). However, regarding a final judgment, the Rules allow a
litigant who was subject to an adverse judgment to file a
motion to change the judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) or a
motion seeking relief from the judgment pursuant to Rule
60(b). Van Skiver, 952 F.2d at 1243. With respect to
interlocutory orders, “district courts have broad
discretion to reconsider their interlocutory rulings before
the entry of judgment.” Mantooth, 360
F.Supp.3d at 1169 (considering order regarding motion to
compel arbitration as an interlocutory order). Indeed,
“every order short of a final decree is subject to
reopening at the discretion of the district judge.”
Elephant Butte Irrigation Dist. v. U.S. Dep't of
Interior, 538 F.3d 1299, 1306 (10th Cir. 2008). Still,
“[t]he Court may be guided by Rules 59 and 60 standards
in deciding whether to alter or vacate an interlocutory
order.” Mantooth, 360 F.Supp.3d at 1169
(citing Perkins v. Fed. Fruit & Produce Co.
Inc., 945 F.Supp.2d 1225, 1232 (D. Colo. 2013)).
There
are three major grounds justifying reconsideration of an
interlocutory order: “(1) an intervening change in the
controlling law, (2) new evidence [that was] previously
unavailable, [or] (3) the need to correct clear error or
prevent manifest injustice.” Servants of the
Paraclete v. Does, 204 F.3d 1005, 1012 (10th Cir. 2000).
Concomitantly, a motion for reconsideration is appropriate
where the court has misapprehended the facts, a party's
position, or the controlling law, but such motions are
“inappropriate vehicles to reargue an issue previously
addressed by the court when the motion merely advances new
arguments, or supporting facts which were available at the
time of the original motion.” Servants of the
Paraclete, 204 F.3d at 1012 (citing Van Skiver,
952 F.2d at 1243).
To that
end, “[a]bsent extraordinary circumstances . . . the
basis for the second motion must not have been available at
the time the first motion was filed.” Id. A
motion for reconsideration is not appropriate to revisit
issues already addressed. Van Skiver, 952 F.2d at
1243. “Rather, as a practical matter, to succeed in a
motion to reconsider, a party must set forth facts or law of
a strongly convincing nature to induce the court to reverse
its prior decision.” Mantooth, 360 F.Supp.3d
at 1169 (citing Nat'l Bus. Brokers, Ltd. v. Jim
Williamson Prods., Inc., 115 F.Supp.2d 1250, 1256 (D.
Colo. 2000)) (internal quotations omitted). “Even under
this lower standard, ‘[a] motion to reconsider should
be denied unless it clearly demonstrates manifest error of
law or fact or presents newly discovered evidence.”
Id. (citing Sanchez v. Hartley, No.
13-cv-1945-WJM-CBS, 2014 WL 4852251, at *2 (D. Colo. Sept.
30, 2014) (refusing to reconsider an interlocutory order
where the defendants did not show “an intervening
change in the law, newly discovered evidence, or the need to
correct clear error or manifest injustice”)).
III.
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