United States District Court, D. Colorado
THE ESTATE OF DENNY LOVERN, by and through its personal representative Darla Dailey, and DARLA DAILEY, individually, Plaintiffs,
v.
CORRECT CARE SOLUTIONS, LLC, BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS FOR THE COUNTY OF ARAPAHOE, COLORADO, TYLER BROWN, in his official capacity as Arapahoe County Sheriff, JENNA WALTER, RN, individually, HEIDI LANTZ, LPN, individually, CHERYL THOMPSON, RN, individually, and RON WAITS, NP individually, Defendants.
ORDER
Kristen L. Mix, United States Magistrate Judge.
This
matter is before the Court on Defendants Board of County
Commissioners for the County of Arapahoe, Colorado, and Tyler
Brown's[1] (collectively the “County
Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs'
Complaint [#26][2] (the “Motion”). Plaintiffs
timely filed a Response [#33] in opposition to the Motion
[#26], and Defendants filed a Reply [#39]. The Court has
reviewed the Motion [#26], the Response [#33], the Reply
[#39], the entire case file, and the applicable law, and is
sufficiently advised in the premises. For the reasons set
forth below, the Motion [#26] is DENIED.
I.
Background [3]
In the
Motion [#26], the County Defendants assert that
Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint [#49] fails to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted, pursuant to
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Motion [#26] at 1. This
action arises out of the death of Denny Lovern
(“Lovern”), who died on April 8, 2017, at the
Arapahoe County Detention Facility (“ACDF”) as a
result of a heart attack at the age of 59. First Am.
Compl. [#49] at ¶¶ 1-2. Medical care at ACDF
was provided by Defendant Correct Care Solutions
(“CCS”) pursuant to a contract with Arapahoe
County. Id. at ¶ 15.
The
relevant factual allegations contained in Plaintiff's
First Amended Complaint [#49][4] are summarized as follows. Mr.
Lovern's incarceration at ACDF began on April 3, 2017.
Id. at ¶ 23. Mr. Lovern “had an extensive
medical history of cardiac-related conditions, including
previous heart attacks and stent-placement surgery, ”
conditions for which Mr. Lovern was prescribed Plavix,
“a critically important drug for patients with heart
problems.” Id. at ¶¶ 24, 28.
Plaintifs allege that “Mr. Lovern was not administered
his prescribed Plavix for several days . . . because ACDF did
not have or promptly secure his necessary prescribed
medication.” Id. at ¶ 31. Mr. Lovern
first began experiencing chest pain on the evening of April
6, 2017, and reported to a CCS nurse that he felt as though
he might be having a heart attack. Id. at
¶¶ 40-43. However, no CCS nurse called a doctor or
further reported Mr. Lovern's concern that he might be
having a heart attack, and instead diagnosed Mr. Lovern with
esophageal problems. Id. at ¶¶ 49, 50, 55,
62. On April 7, 2017, a CCS nurse provided Mr. Lovern with
his first dose of Plavix since the start of his
incarceration. Id. at ¶ 77. However, she did
not take his vitals or administer an EKG test, despite Mr.
Lovern's continued complaints of abdominal pain and
regular vomiting of bile, dismissing his symptoms as those of
“just normal heartburn.” Id. at
¶¶ 79, 81-82, 86. Around 1:45 a.m. on April 8,
2017, Mr. Lovern's cellmate reported to ACDF deputies
that Mr. Lovern had collapsed on the toilet. Id. at
¶ 89. Responding deputies “found Mr. Lovern
unresponsive, not breathing, and without a pulse” in
his cell, where he died. Id. at ¶ 91-92.
Plaintiffs
assert that “CCS controls all aspects of health care
available to inmates” and maintains
“unconstitutional policies, customs and training”
in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Id. at ¶ 95. Such alleged policies, customs,
and training include:
(1) a written contractual policy of deliberately indifferent
low staffing and under-budgeting inmate medical care; (2)
under-stocking or not timely securing inmates' necessary
prescription medications; (3) a custom of disregarding
inmates' medical complaints as faked or exaggerated
without ruling out serious medical conditions that could lead
to substantial injury or death, and training regarding the
same; (4) allowing nurses and EMTs to practice outside their
licensure scope rather than having inmates be seen by higher
level medical providers in part to save money; and (5) a
widespread custom of disregarding or ignoring serious medical
conditions.
Id. Plaintiffs further allege “an affirmative
causal link between the deliberate indifference of the
individual health care workers towards Mr. Lovern's
medical needs and the policies, practices, customs, and
training” described in their First Amended Complaint.
Id. at ¶ 166. Accordingly, Plaintiffs assert
their Second Claim for Relief against both CCS and the County
Defendants. Id. at ¶¶ 163, 169-70. Because
the County Defendants contracted with CCS to provide medical
services to inmates at ACDF, see id. at ¶ 162,
Plaintiffs seek to hold the County Defendants
“non-delegably liable for the constitutional violations
of the CCS Defendant” through the doctrine set forth in
Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658
(1978). Id. at 163. The County Defendants seek to
dismiss only the Monell claim pursuant to this
Motion [#26].
II.
Legal Standard
The
purpose of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is
to test “the sufficiency of the allegations within the
four corners of the complaint after taking those allegations
as true.” Mobley v. McCormick, 40 F.3d 337,
340 (10th Cir. 1994); Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) (stating that a
complaint may be dismissed for “failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted”). “The
court's function on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is not to
weigh potential evidence that the parties might present at
trial, but to assess whether the plaintiff's complaint
alone is legally sufficient to state a claim for which relief
may be granted.” Sutton v. Utah State Sch. for the
Deaf & Blind, 173 F.3d 1226, 1236 (10th Cir. 1999)
(citation omitted). To withstand a motion to dismiss pursuant
to Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain enough
allegations of fact ‘to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.'” Robbins v.
Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)); see also Shero v. City of Grove, Okla., 510
F.3d 1196, 1200 (10th Cir. 2007) (“The complaint must
plead sufficient facts, taken as true, to provide
‘plausible grounds' that discovery will reveal
evidence to support the plaintiff's allegations.”
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570)).
“A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). “A pleading that offers labels and conclusions
or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action will not do. Nor does a complaint suffice if it
tenders naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual
enhancement.” Id. (brackets in original;
internal quotation marks omitted).
To
survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the
factual allegations in the complaint “must be enough to
raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”
Christy Sports, LLC v. Deer Valley Resort Co., 555
F.3d 1188, 1191 (10th Cir. 2009). “[W]here the
well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than
the mere possibility of misconduct, ” a factual
allegation has been stated, “but it has not show[n]
that the pleader is entitled to relief” as required by
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (first
alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation
omitted).
III.
Analysis
Monell
holds that “a local government may not be sued under
§ 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees
or agents. Instead, it is when execution of a
government's policy or custom, whether made by its
lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said
to represent official policy, inflicts the ...