United States District Court, D. Colorado
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
CHRISTINE M. ARGUELLO JUDGE
This
matter is before the Court on Defendant State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment, in which Defendant requests that the Court enter
summary judgment in its favor on Plaintiff Jodi Stemple's
claims for unreasonable delay or denial of benefits under
Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 10-3-1115 and -1116; common law
bad faith; and exemplary damages. (Doc. # 81.) For the
reasons described below, the Court grants Defendant's
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
I.
BACKGROUND
On
September 2, 2014, Plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle
accident when her vehicle was struck by a vehicle driven by
non-party Raymond Bryant, who had sped through a red light at
an intersection in Denver, Colorado. (Doc. # 75 at 1.)
Plaintiff asserts that, as a result of the collision, she
sustained “serious injuries, including permanent
injuries to her cervical spine, [such as] a herniated disc in
her neck that is impinging on her spinal cord, which in turn
is causing radicular pain and . . . may result in future
surgery.” (Doc. # 84 at 3.)
Mr.
Bryan was at fault for the accident. (Doc. # 81-1 at 22-23.)
Mr. Bryant was insured by non-party Progressive Direct
Insurance Company and had a policy limit of $25, 000. (Doc. #
75 at 2.) Plaintiff settled her claims against Mr. Bryant for
his policy's $25, 000 limit in March 2016. (Id.;
Doc. # 81 at 2.)
On the
date of the collision, Plaintiff maintained an automobile
insurance policy with Defendant, Policy No. 326721206Q
(“the Policy”). (Doc. # 75 at 2.) The Policy
included underinsured motorist (“UIM”) coverage
up to $100, 000. (Id.) On April 4, 2016, more than a
year and a half after the collision, Plaintiff, acting
through counsel, demanded from Defendant the $100, 000 limit
of her UIM coverage under the Policy and submitted various
medical records and bills in support of her claim. (Doc. #
81-1 at 33; Doc. # 81 at 2.) Defendant's claim adjuster,
Matt Schultz, completed an evaluation of Plaintiff's
demand on May 5, 2016, and estimated the net value of
Plaintiff's claim to be between $3, 614 and $19, 114.
(Doc. # 81-1 at 5; Doc. # 81 at 2.) On the same day,
Defendant made an initial settlement offer of $5, 000 to
Plaintiff. (Doc. # 81 at 2; Doc. # 81-1 at 32.) Plaintiff did
not respond to the initial settlement offer, nor did she
respond to Defendant's communications following up on the
initial settlement offer on June 17, 2016; August 15, 2016;
September 13, 2016; October 19, 2016; and December 20, 2016.
(Doc. # 81-1 at 3-4.) Defendant reassigned Plaintiff's
demand to another claim adjuster, Sheryl Tanaka, who again
contacted Plaintiff as to the $5, 000 settlement offer on
February 9, 2017. (Id. at 29.) Plaintiff did not
respond.
On
March 23, 2017, Plaintiff submitted a supplemental demand to
Defendant for the limits of her UIM coverage, along with new
medical bills from a cervical MRI and physical therapy. (Doc.
# 75 at 2; Doc. # 81-1 at 3.) Defendant updated its
evaluation of Plaintiff's claim and extended a revised
settlement offer of $10, 000 on March 29, 2017. (Doc. # 81-1
at 3, 28.)
On
April 3, 2017, Plaintiff submitted additional bills for
massage therapy to Defendant. (Id. at 2.) Defendant
confirmed receipt of the bills but informed Plaintiff that it
appeared that as to “the continued massage treatments,
two years after the accident, [it] may be questionable
whether it is all related” to the collision.
(Id. at 27.) Approximately a week later, Plaintiff
submitted more bills for physical therapy and an MRI.
(Id. at 2.) Defendant reviewed the new information.
(Id.) On April 18, 2017, Defendant extended a
settlement offer of $15, 000 to Plaintiff. (Id. at
2, 26.) Plaintiff did not respond to the offer, nor did she
respond to Defendant's attempt to follow-up on it on June
8, 2017. See (id. at 2.; Doc. # 81 at 3.)
Plaintiff
initiated this litigation against Defendant on August 1, 2017
(Doc. # 5), and served the summons and complaint on Defendant
on September 11, 2017 (Doc. # 6). On November 16, 2017,
Defendant sent Plaintiff a check for $5, 000, “the
amount of [its] initial offer, ” in recognition that
they had “reached an impasse” regarding
Plaintiff's claim.[1] (Doc. # 84-7.)
Pursuant
to United State Magistrate Judge Scott T. Varholak's
Order permitting Plaintiff to amend her complaint (Doc. #
74), Plaintiff maintains four claims against Defendant: (1)
breach of contract; (2) unreasonable delay or denial of
benefits under Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 10-3-1115 and
-1116; (3) common law bad faith; and (4) exemplary
damages.[2] (Doc. # 75.) She asserts that though she
has “fulfilled all conditions precedent to UIM
insurance benefits coverage” under the Policy,
Defendant's settlement offers have been
“intentional, unreasonably low, and grossly
unfair.” (Id. at 2.)
Defendant
filed the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment presently
before the Court on December 10, 2018. (Doc. # 81.) Defendant
argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on
Plaintiff's second, third, and fourth claims; it does not
seek summary judgment on Plaintiff's claim for breach of
contract. See (id. at 1.) Plaintiff
responded to Defendant's motion on January 7, 2019,
asserting that “[it] is clear that Defendant neglected
its duty to handle Plaintiff's UIM claim in good faith,
fairly value her claims, and to do so without unreasonable
delay, and that such negligence was willful and
wanton.” (Doc. # 84 at 11.) Defendant filed its Reply
on January 22, 2019. (Doc. # 88.)
A
five-day jury trial in this matter is set to begin on August
19, 2019. (Doc. # 96.)
II.
APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARD
Summary
judgment is warranted when “the movant shows that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if it is
essential to the proper disposition of the claim under the
relevant substantive law. Wright v. Abbott Labs.,
Inc., 259 F.3d 1226, 1231-32 (10th Cir. 2001). A dispute
is “genuine” if the evidence is such that it
might lead a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the
nonmoving party. Allen v. Muskogee, Okl., 119 F.3d
837, 839 (10th Cir. 1997). When reviewing a motion for
summary judgment, a court must view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party-in the matter
presently before the Court, in the light most favorable to
Plaintiff. See Id. ...