United States District Court, D. Colorado
THE ESTATE OF JEFFREY SCOTT LILLIS, by and through its co-personal representatives Meghan Lillis and Michele Driscoll, MEGHAN LILLIS, individually, C.A.L., individually, a minor, by and through Michele Driscoll as guardian, C.S.L., individually, a minor, by and through Michele Driscoll as guardian, A.L., individually, a minor, by and through Robin Booth as next friend and mother, JORDAN LILLIS, individually, and ASHLEY PERRY, individually, Plaintiffs,
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF ARAPAHOE COUNTY; TYLER S. BROWN, in his official capacity as Arapahoe County Sheriff, and RUTH KYAMBADDE, RN, individually; Defendants.
KRISTEN L. MIX MAGISTRATE JUDGE
matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion
for Summary Judgment [#173] (the “Motion”).
Plaintiff filed a Response [#185] in opposition to the
Motion, and Defendants filed a Reply [#192]. The Court has
reviewed the Motion, Response, Reply, the entire case file,
and the applicable law, and is sufficiently advised in the
premises. F or the reasons set forth below, the
Motion [#173] is GRANTED in part and DENIED in
the relevant time underlying this lawsuit, Jeffrey Lillis
(“Lillis”) was a pretrial detainee at the
Arapahoe County Detention Facility
(“ACDF”). He was transferred to the infirmary there
on the morning of Friday, December 12, 2014, after
complaining to a pod nurse that he was not feeling well and
was running a fever. Motion [#173] at 2;
Response [#185] at 1. He died in his cell in the
infirmary on the evening of December 14, 2014. Id.
Defendant Ruth Kyambadde (“Kyambadde”) is a
Registered Nurse who was working at ACDF's infirmary unit
on December 14 at the time Mr. Lillis died. Decl. of
Kyambadde [#173-2] ¶ 1. Based on the events
occurring at ACDF in the afternoon and evening of December
14, the remaining claims in this case are (1) a claim under
the Fourteenth Amendment for deliberate indifference to
medical needs against Defendant Kyambadde in her individual
capacity and (2) a Monell claim against the Board of
County Commissioners of Arapahoe County and Arapahoe County
Sheriff Tyler Brown (collectively, the “County”).
The factual details provided by the parties are examined
in-depth in the Analysis section below.
Standard of Review
purpose of a motion for summary judgment pursuant to
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 is to assess whether trial is necessary.
See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323
(1986). Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a), summary judgment
should be entered if the pleadings, the discovery, any
affidavits, and disclosures on file show “that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” An issue
is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
could resolve the issue in favor of the nonmoving party.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986). A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of
the case under the governing substantive law. Id.
burden is on the movant to show the absence of a genuine
issue of material fact. Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 670-71 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323). When the movant does not
bear the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial, the
“movant may make its prima facie demonstration [of the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact] simply by
pointing out to the [C]ourt a lack of evidence for the
nonmovant on an essential element of the nonmovant's
claim.” Id. at 671. If the movant carries the
initial burden of making a prima facie showing of a lack of
evidence, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to put forth
sufficient evidence for each essential element of his claim
such that a reasonable jury could find in his favor. See
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The nonmovant must go beyond
the allegations and denials of his pleadings and provide
admissible evidence, which the Court views in the light most
favorable to him. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.,
398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970); Panis v. Mission Hills Bank,
N.A., 60 F.3d 1486, 1490 (10th Cir. 1995) (citing
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324). Conclusory statements
based merely on conjecture, speculation, or subjective belief
are not competent summary judgment evidence. Bones v.
Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 366 F.3d 869, 875 (10th Cir.
2004). The nonmoving party's evidence must be more than
“mere reargument of [his] case or a denial of an
opponent's allegation” or it will be disregarded.
See 10B Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal
Practice and Procedure § 2738 (4th ed. 2017).
documents that meet the evidentiary requirements of
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 may be considered for purposes of summary
judgment. Rule 56(c) provides that:
(1) A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely
disputed must support the assertion by:
(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record,
including depositions, documents, electronically stored
information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations
(including those made for purposes of the motion only),
admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials[.] . .
(3) Materials Not Cited. The court need consider only the
cited materials, but it may consider other materials in the
(4) Affidavits or Declarations. An affidavit or declaration
used to support or oppose a motion must be made on personal
knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in
evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent
to testify on the matters stated.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)-(4).