Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
Case No. 14CA1719
Attorneys for Petitioner: Daniel H. May, District Attorney,
Fourth Judicial District Doyle J. Baker, Senior Deputy
District Attorney Jennifer L. Darby, Deputy District Attorney
Colorado Springs, Colorado
Attorneys for Respondent: Megan A. Ring, Public Defender
Britta Kruse, Lead Deputy Public Defender Denver, Colorado
OPINION
SAMOUR, JUSTICE
¶1
"[C]riminal justice today is for the most part a system
of pleas, not a system of trials." Lafler v.
Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 170 (2012). Nowhere is this more
apparent than in the U.S. Supreme Court's recent
estimation that "[n]inety-seven percent of federal
convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are
the result of guilty pleas." Missouri v. Frye,
566 U.S. 134, 143 (2012). Against this backdrop, we must
determine whether the People are entitled to withdraw from a
plea agreement where, following the defendant's guilty
plea, the trial court determines that a more lenient sentence
than the one the parties set forth in the agreement is
appropriate. Because the statute and the rules governing plea
agreements in Colorado, section 16-7-302(2)-(3), C.R.S.
(2018), Crim. P. 11(f)(5), and Crim. P. 32(d) ("the
statute and rules"), allow the defendant, but not the
People, to withdraw from a plea agreement when the trial
court rejects a sentence concession after accepting the
guilty plea, we answer the question in the
negative.[1]
¶2
The statute and rules require the trial court to exercise its
independent judgment in deciding whether to adopt or reject
sentence concessions. Consistent with this authority, we
reiterate what we made clear more than four decades ago:
Regardless of what label the parties may attach to sentence
concessions in a plea agreement-be it "sentence
stipulations," "sentence agreements," or
something else-they are nothing more than sentence
recommendations that the trial court, in the exercise of its
independent judgment, may adopt or reject. And if the court
rejects a sentence concession after a defendant pleads
guilty, the statute and rules allow the defendant-and only
the defendant-to withdraw from the plea agreement.
¶3
We recognize that we have sometimes applied general
principles of contract law in analyzing plea agreements in
the past. But here, we do not address a situation in which a
party has allegedly breached a plea agreement.[2] Instead, the
question we confront is whether the People may withdraw from
a plea agreement when the trial court, in the exercise of its
discretion, rejects a sentence concession in the agreement
after accepting the defendant's guilty plea. Based on the
statute and rules, we hold that the People may not do so.
¶4
We are not persuaded by the People's argument that a
trial court violates the separation-of-powers doctrine when
it accepts a guilty plea to an uncharged offense pursuant to
a plea agreement but then rejects the parties' stipulated
sentence without allowing the People to withdraw from the
agreement. The People, not trial courts, provide the
opportunity for a defendant to plead guilty to an uncharged
offense as part of a plea agreement. And when defendants take
advantage of such an opportunity, the trial courts, not the
People, determine the appropriate sentence. The
separation-of-powers doctrine requires nothing more.
¶5
The Achilles' heel of the People's
separation-of-powers contention is that it assumes that a
trial court's acceptance of a guilty plea pursuant to a
plea agreement is contingent on the trial court's
subsequent adoption of the sentence concessions in the
agreement. The statute and rules belie such an assumption.
Under the statute and rules, when the People create an
opportunity for a defendant to plead guilty to an uncharged
offense as part of a plea agreement, any sentence concessions
in the agreement are mere recommendations that the trial
court may accept or reject, and if the trial court rejects a
sentence concession after the defendant pleads guilty, only
the defendant may withdraw from the plea agreement. Because
the statute and rules allowed only Mazzarelli to withdraw
from the plea agreement after he pled guilty and the court
rejected the sentence concession in the agreement, and
because the People do not question the constitutionality of
the statute and rules, we reject the separation-of-powers
claim.
¶6
The court of appeals in this case upheld the trial
court's refusal to allow the People to withdraw from the
plea agreement after Mazzarelli pled guilty. We affirm its
judgment. But we do so for markedly different reasons-our
holding takes root in the statute and rules. Given this
determination, we decline to address the merits of the
conclusions reached by the court of appeals with respect to
the two remaining issues on which we granted certiorari
review.[3] Instead, we vacate its opinion in its
entirety.
I.
Facts and Procedural History
¶7
The People charged Christopher Anthon Mazzarelli with knowing
or reckless child abuse resulting in serious bodily injury to
his infant son, a class 3 felony. See §
18-6-401(1)(a), (7)(a)(III), C.R.S. (2018). The underlying
factual allegations involved shaken-baby syndrome.
¶8
Mazzarelli and the People executed a plea agreement, which
indicated that he wished to plead guilty to an added charge
of criminally negligent child abuse resulting in serious
bodily injury, a class 4 felony. See §
18-6-401(1)(a), (7)(a)(IV). In exchange for Mazzarelli's
guilty plea, the prosecution agreed to dismiss the original
charge. The parties further agreed as follows with respect to
the sentence:
The sentence will be a Department of Corrections Sentence
within the Extraordinary Risk Crime Range of 2 to 8 years.
Both sides are free to argue as to [the] actual amount of
incarceration the Court should impose.
The
plea agreement also included a clause that permitted
Mazzarelli to withdraw from the agreement:
I understand that any sentence imposed by the judge must
conform to [the] agreement. If, after I plead guilty, the
judge decides not to accept the sentence recommendation or
limitation, I will have the right to withdraw my guilty plea
and have a trial.
¶9
During a hearing, Mazzarelli's counsel informed the court
that the parties had reached a plea agreement. She explained
the terms of the agreement, including the "stipulation
for prison . . . between two and eight years." Following
an advisement of his rights pursuant to Crim. P. 11(b),
Mazzarelli pled guilty to the added charge and the court
accepted his plea and granted the People's motion to
dismiss the original charge. The court then postponed
sentencing pending completion of a presentence report by the
probation department.
¶10
At the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor acknowledged that
Mazzarelli's son did not have any permanent injuries, but
nevertheless urged the court to impose a sentence consistent
with the plea agreement. The court expressed reluctance to
punish Mazzarelli with imprisonment for "what might have
happened." It also articulated concerns about sending
Mazzarelli to prison based on its knowledge of the
"great strides and progress" he had made in a
related dependency and neglect proceeding and the substantial
impact that such a sentence would have on his
fifteen-month-old son. At the end of its comments, the court
announced that it was "not going to accept the plea
agreement" because it was "not willing to send
[Mazzarelli] to prison." The court noted, however, that
it would accept a plea agreement with "an open
sentence" with potential placement in community
corrections. Given this decision, the court asked the
prosecutor if she wished to withdraw from the plea agreement.
The prosecutor asked for a week to consider how to proceed,
and the court granted her request and scheduled a new hearing
on the next available date.
¶11
The day before the new hearing took place, Mazzarelli filed a
motion requesting the appointment of a special prosecutor,
arguing that the prosecutor had made "blatantly
false" statements during the previous hearing about the
child-abuse incident. At the hearing held the following day,
the prosecutor admitted she had misspoken and attempted to
clarify the alleged misstatements. She apologized, opposed
Mazzarelli's motion for a special prosecutor, and asked
to withdraw from the plea agreement. The trial court found
that the prosecutor's misstatements amounted to
prosecutorial misconduct and denied her request to withdraw
from the plea agreement as a sanction. Accordingly, the court
moved forward with the sentencing hearing and sentenced
Mazzarelli to supervised probation for a period of three
years, instead of the agreed-upon prison sentence.
¶12
The People appealed. A division of the court of appeals ruled
that, "regardless of the trial court's sanction, the
People were not entitled to withdraw from the plea
agreement" and the trial court "had discretion to
sentence Mazzarelli outside the terms of the stipulated
sentencing range." People v. Mazzarelli, 2016
COA 35, ¶¶ 9, 33, P.3d . The division gave four
reasons for its ruling. First, it found that the trial court
had accepted Mazzarelli's guilty plea, but had never
agreed to be bound by the sentence recommendation in the plea
agreement. Id. at ¶ 25. Second, the division
noted that when the trial court accepted Mazzarelli's
guilty plea, it had not yet received, much less reviewed, the
presentence report. Id. at ¶ 26. The division
reasoned that a trial court can only be bound by sentencing
concessions in a plea agreement if they are supported by the
presentence report. Id. Third, it pointed out that
the People had not alleged that Mazzarelli "materially
and substantially breached the plea agreement."
Id. at ¶ 33 (quoting Keller v. People,
29 P.3d 290, 297 (Colo. 2000)). According to the division,
the People may not withdraw from a plea agreement after
"acceptance of the entirety of the . . .
agreement," unless there is a sentence reduction that
amounts to "'a material and substantial breach of
the plea agreement.'" Id. at ¶ 31
(quoting Keller, 29 P.3d at 297). Finally, the
division explained that the prosecutor's misconduct led
to the denial of her request to withdraw from the plea
agreement. Id. at ¶ 28. Thus, the division
affirmed the trial court's order.
II.
Analysis
¶13
Like the division, we conclude that the trial court correctly
refused to allow the People to withdraw from the plea
agreement. But we do so for different reasons-our decision
rests on the statute and rules.
¶14
We first examine the statute and rules in detail. We then
discuss our caselaw in this area. And we end by rejecting the
People's separation-of-powers claim.
A.
The Statute and Rules Do Not
Support the
People's Position
¶15
Section 16-7-302(3) provides that, "[n]otwithstanding
the reaching of a plea agreement between the district
attorney and defense counsel or defendant, the judge in every
case should exercise an independent judgment in deciding
whether to grant . . . sentence concessions." Crim. P.
11(f)(5) contains an identical mandate. Therefore, under
section 16-7-302(3) and Rule 11(f)(5), the trial court is
always required to exercise its independent judgment in
determining whether to go along with or diverge from the
"sentence concessions" in a plea
agreement.[4] This is not surprising given what is at
stake. Allowing the parties in a criminal case to require the
judge to impose a particular sentence, regardless of whether
she believes it is appropriate, justified, or fair, would
bode ill for our criminal justice system. It is imperative
that the trial court exercise its independent judgment in
determining whether to adopt the sentence concessions in a
plea agreement.
¶16
The question then is what options, if any, are available to
the parties if, in the exercise of its independent judgment,
the court rejects a sentence concession in a plea agreement
after a defendant pleads guilty? Crim. P. 32(d) requires the
court to "advise the defendant and the district
attorney" that it is rejecting the sentence concession
"and then call upon the defendant to either
affirm or withdraw the plea of guilty." (Emphasis
added.) Section 16-7-302(2) substantially mirrors Crim. P.
32(d). Significantly, neither section 16-7-302(2) nor Rule
32(d) contains a similar provision allowing the
People to affirm the plea agreement or withdraw from
it.[5]
This omission is telling because the statute and the rule
expressly refer to the People elsewhere. Of particular
relevance here, they both direct the trial court to advise
the defendant and the People whenever it decides to
reject a sentence concession after the defendant has pled
guilty. Yet, in the very next part of that sentence, the
statute and the rule provide that the defendant may
then withdraw from the plea agreement.
¶17
Subsection (2) of section 16-7-302 confirms that the
legislature did not intend to permit the People to withdraw
from a plea agreement when the trial court rejects a sentence
concession after the defendant has pled guilty. That
subsection delineates the course of action the People may
take in the event they are concerned that the court will
disagree with a sentence concession in a plea agreement after
the defendant pleads guilty:
If a tentative plea agreement has been reached which
contemplates entry of a plea of guilty . . . in the
expectation that . . . sentence concessions will be granted,
the trial judge may, upon request of the parties, permit the
disclosure to him of the tentative agreement and the reasons
therefor in advance of the time for tender of the plea. He
may then indicate to the district attorney and defense
counsel or defendant whether he will concur in the ...