United States District Court, D. Colorado
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTION FOR
ATTORNEYS' FEES
Daniel
D. Domenico United States District Judge
This
matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for
Attorney Fees (Doc. 172), filed December 14,
2018.[1] On January 10, 2019, Defendant filed a
response in opposition to the motion, and on January 31,
2019, Plaintiff filed her reply. For the reasons stated
below, Plaintiff's motion is GRANTED in
part and DENIED in part.
I.
BACKGROUND
This
civil rights case arose out of a May 16, 2010, incident
involving a former Denver Police Officer, Hector Paez, who
kidnapped and sexually assaulted Plaintiff Valerie Arend
(“Plaintiff”). Following lengthy and contentious
criminal proceedings in the state court, Paez was ultimately
convicted of sexual assault-in custody of law and
second-degree kidnapping of Plaintiff. Paez appealed his
conviction, which was affirmed by the Colorado Court of
Appeals.
On May
14, 2012, Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit against Hector
Paez (“Defendant”) asserting a claim pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983 for unlawful seizure, excessive force,
and cruel and unusual punishment. On February 20, 2014, Judge
Daniel denied without prejudice Plaintiff's initial
motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability
and administratively closed this case pending a resolution of
the Defendant's appeal of his underlying state court
criminal conviction. (Doc. 80.) On September 27, 2017,
Plaintiff filed a motion to reopen this case, attaching both
the Colorado Court of Appeals's December 31, 2015 opinion
affirming the Denver District Court's judgment of
conviction and the Colorado Supreme Court's denial of
Defendant's Petition for Writ of Certiorari. On September
27, 2017, Judge Daniel granted Plaintiff's motion and
reopened this case for good cause shown. After the case was
reinstated, on October 26, 2017, Plaintiff filed a renewed
motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of
liability. On June 20, 2018, Judge Daniel issued a written
order granting summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff and
against the Defendant as to liability on her Section 1983
claim. (Doc. 104.) Thus, on October 29-30, 2018,
Plaintiff's sole remaining claim for damages was tried to
a jury. The jury awarded Plaintiff $167, 250.00 in actual
damages and $100, 000.00 in punitive damages. On November 1,
2018, final judgment was entered for Plaintiff. (Doc. 164.)
II.
ATTORNEYS' FEES
Plaintiff
seeks an award of attorneys' fees in the amount of $84,
114.16, reflecting 358.4 hours expended by three attorneys at
rates ranging from $225 to $250 per hour. Two of the
attorneys also bill a total of 25.6 hours for travel time at
$120 per hour plus mileage.
Title
42 U.S.C. § 1988 provides that in federal civil rights
actions, including suits like the instant case brought under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, “the court, in its discretion,
may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable
attorney's fee as part of the costs.” To obtain
attorney's fees under § 1988, “a claimant must
prove two elements: (1) that the claimant was the prevailing
party in the proceeding; and (2) that the claimant's fee
request is reasonable.” Robinson v. City of
Edmond, 160 F.3d 1275, 1280 (10th Cir. 1998) (internal
quotations and citations omitted). “The fee applicant
bears the burden of establishing entitlement to an award and
documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly
rates.” Case v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 233, Johnson
County, Kansas, 157 F.3d 1243, 1249 (10th Cir. 1998)
(internal citations omitted); see also Mares v. Credit
Bureau of Raton, 801 F.2d 1197, 1210 (10th Cir. 1986)
(internal citations omitted) (holding that it is
“counsel's burden to prove and establish the
reasonableness of each dollar, each hour, above zero”).
A.
Prevailing Party
A
plaintiff may be considered a prevailing party for
attorneys' fees purposes if he or she “succeed[s]
on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of
the benefit the part[y] sought in bringing suit.”
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)
(internal citations omitted). Here, the Court found liability
in favor of the Plaintiff on her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim,
and the jury awarded both actual damages and punitive
damages, and Defendant does not contest Plaintiff's
status as a prevailing party. The dispute is as to the
reasonableness of the amount of requested fees.
B.
Reasonableness of the Fee Request
“The
most useful starting point for determining the amount of a
reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on
the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.”
Id. “This calculation provides an objective
basis on which to make an initial estimate of the value of a
lawyer's services.” Id. In other words,
“[t]o determine the reasonableness of a fee request, a
court must begin by calculating the so-called lodestar amount
of a fee, and a claimant is entitled to the presumption that
this lodestar amount reflects a reasonable fee.”
Robinson, 160 F.3d at 1281 (internal quotations and
citations omitted).
In
determining the reasonableness of the hours expended, a court
considers several factors, including: (1) whether the amount
of time spent on a particular task appears reasonable in
light of the complexity of the case, the strategies pursued,
and the responses necessitated by an opponent's
maneuvering; (2) whether the amount of time spent is
reasonable in relation to counsel's experience; and (3)
whether the billing entries are sufficiently detailed,
showing how much time was allotted to specific tasks. See
Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546, 553-54 (10th Cir. 1983).
“The
party seeking an award of fees should submit evidence
supporting the hours worked and rates claimed.”
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433. “Counsel for the
party claiming the fees has the burden of proving hours to
the district court by submitting meticulous, contemporaneous
time records that reveal, for each lawyer for whom fees are
sought, all hours for which ...