United States District Court, D. Colorado
OPINION AND ORDER
N.
REID NEUREITER, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The
government determined that Plaintiff Anne Martha Andrew was
not disabled for purposes of the Social Security Act for the
period from October 20, 2013 through January 4, 2018, the
date of the decision. (AR[2] 28.) Ms. Andrew has asked this Court to
review that decision. The Court has jurisdiction under 42
U.S.C. § 405(g), and both parties have agreed to have
this case decided by a U.S. Magistrate Judge under 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(c). (Dkt. #13.)
Standard
of Review
In
Social Security appeals, the Court reviews the decision of
the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) to determine
whether the factual findings are supported by substantial
evidence and whether the correct legal standards were
applied. See Pisciotta v. Astrue, 500 F.3d 1074,
1075 (10th Cir. 2007). “Substantial evidence is such
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion. It requires more than a scintilla, but
less than a preponderance.” Raymond v. Astrue,
621 F.3d 1269, 1271-72 (10th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation
marks omitted). The Court “should, indeed must,
exercise common sense” and “cannot insist on
technical perfection.” Keyes-Zachary v.
Astrue, 695 F.3d 1156, 1166 (10th Cir. 2012). The Court
cannot reweigh the evidence or its credibility. Lax v.
Astrue, 489 F.3d 1080, 1084 (10th Cir. 2007).
Background
At the
second step of the Commissioner's five-step sequence for
making determinations, [3] the ALJ found that Ms. Andrew
“has the following severe impairments: anxiety disorder
and a substance addiction disorder.” (AR 19.) The ALJ
determined that Ms. Andrew had the following non-severe
mental impairments: post-traumatic stress disorder
(“PTSD”), borderline personality disorder, panic
disorder, and “reportedly dyslexia.”
(Id.) The ALJ considered any limitations associated
with these impairments with respect to her anxiety disorder.
(Id.) The ALJ determined that Ms. Andrew had the
following non-severe physical impairments: chronic pain,
particularly in the sacroiliac area, tendonitis
hyperflexibility, and fibromyalgia. (Id.) Finally,
the ALJ found that Ms. Andrew's weight loss related to
her mental health conditions was a non-medically determinable
impairment. (AR 20.)
The ALJ
then determined at step three that Ms. Andrew “does not
have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets
or medically equals the severity of one of the listed
impairments” in the regulations. (AR 20-22) Because he
concluded that Ms. Andrew did not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that meets the severity of the
listed impairments, the ALJ found that Ms. Andrew has the
following residual functional capacity (“RFC”):
. . . the claimant [Ms. Andrew] has the residual functional
capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR
404.1567(b) and 416.967(b), specifically the claimant can
lift and carry up to twenty pounds occasionally and ten
pounds frequently, can stand or walk for six hours total, and
can sit for six hours total in an eight-hour workday with
normal breaks. The claimant can perform work that requires up
to three months' time to learn techniques and acquire
information for an average job performance. The claimant can
frequently have contact with supervisors and coworkers. The
claimant can occasionally have contact with the general
public. The claimant can have no exposure to pulmonary
irritants, industrial chemicals such as cleaners and glues.
The claimant can have no exposure to loud noises, to
unprotected heights, ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. The
claimant would be expected to miss an average of one day of
work per month to manage medical issues.
(AR 22.)
The ALJ
concluded that Ms. Andrew had no past relevant work. (AR 27.)
At step five, the ALJ found that, considering Ms.
Andrew's age, education, work experience, and RFC, there
are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national
economy that she can perform, including Office Helper and
Garment Sorter. (AR 27-28.) Accordingly, Ms. Andrew was
deemed not to have been under a disability from the alleged
onset date of October 20, 2013, through January 4, 2018, the
date of the decision. (AR 29.)
Analysis
Ms.
Andrew, proceeding pro se, [4] argues that the ALJ's
decision should be reversed because he improperly weighed the
medical opinion evidence and discounted her subjective
complaints. The Court disagrees.
Medical
Opinion Evidence
An ALJ
must “give consideration to all the medical opinions in
the record” and “discuss the weight he assigns to
them.” Mays v. Colvin, 739 F.3d 569, 578 (10th
Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). “An ALJ
must evaluate every medical opinion in the record, although
the weight given each opinion will vary according to the
relationship between the disability claimant and the medical
professional.” Hamlin v. Barnhart, 365 F.3d
1208, 1215 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing 20 C.F.R. §
401.1527(d)). The applicable regulations governing the
consideration of medical opinions distinguish among
“treating” physicians, “examining”
physicians, and “nonexamining” (or
“consulting”) physicians. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.927(c). Generally, “the opinions of
physicians who have treated a patient over a period of time
or who are consulted for purposes of treatment are given
greater weight than are reports of physicians employed and
paid by the government for the purpose of defending against a
disability claim.” Sorenson v. Bowen, 888 F.2d
706, 711 (10th Cir. 1989). See also Doyal v.
Barnhart, 331 F.3d 758, 762 (10th Cir. 2003) (quoting 20
C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(2)) (“The treating
physician's opinion is given particular weight because of
his or her ‘unique perspective to the medical evidence
that cannot be obtained from the objective medical findings
alone or from reports of individual examinations, such as
consultative examinations or brief
hospitalizations.'”).
The
evaluation of a treating source's opinion is a two-step
process. Watkins v. Barnhart, 350 F.3d 1297, 1300
(10th Cir. 2003). “The initial determination the ALJ
must make with respect to a treating physician's medical
opinion is whether it is conclusive, i.e., is to be accorded
‘controlling weight,' on the matter to which it
relates.” Krauser v. Astrue, 638 F.3d 1324,
1330 (10th Cir. 2011). “Such an opinion must be given
controlling weight if it is well-supported by medically
acceptable clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques and
is not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the
record.” Id. But good cause may exist for
rejecting an opinion that is brief, conclusory, or
unsupported by the medical evidence. Frey v. Bowen,
816 F.2d 508, 513 (10th Cir. 1987). Second,
Even if a treating opinion is not given controlling weight,
it is still entitled to deference; at the second step in the
analysis, the ALJ must make clear how much weight the opinion
is being given (including whether it is being rejected
outright) and give good reasons, tied to the factors
specified in ...