United States District Court, D. Colorado
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
HON.
DANIEL D. DOMENICO, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
This
case alleges that Defendant JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.
(Chase) falsified signatures and indorsements on a promissory
note, thereby permitting it to fraudulently obtain a judgment
in Colorado state court authorizing a foreclosure sale of Ms.
MacIntyre's property. Chase moves to dismiss for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim.
(Doc. 12.) In addition to responding, Ms. MacIntyre moves to
strike Chase's motion because it was filed before service
of the Complaint. (Doc. 20.) Because this case seeks to
reopen a matter that was decided by a final decision of a
Colorado state court, the Court has no jurisdiction to
resolve it. Therefore, the case is DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
I.
BACKGROUND
Unless
specifically noted, the following allegations are drawn from
the Complaint (Doc. #1) and are taken as true. See Wilson
v. Montano, 715 F.3d 847, 850 n.1 (10th Cir. 2013).
Holly
MacIntyre was the owner of real residential property in
Jefferson County, Colorado. On January 10, 2003, she executed
a $100, 000 promissory note made payable to Broker One
Lending and secured by a deed of trust on the property. On
December 16, 2014, Chase-claiming to be the holder of the
note- sought a judgment permitting it to conduct a
foreclosure sale of the property. During the trial in state
court, Chase knowingly produced a different, “forged
and falsified” note bearing a “simulated
handwritten indorsement apparently made by Broker One Lending
to Flagstar Bank” and “simulated ink-stamped
indorsement in blank, apparently made by Flagstar Bank, but
not actually made by Flagstar Bank.” At the state
trial, “Chase disputed every allegation that MacIntyre
made there about the falsification of the false notes and the
signatures.” After weighing the evidence, the
“state court concluded that Chase is the
‘holder' of the purported ‘note' and
issued a judgment of judicial foreclosure against
MacIntyre.”
Ms.
MacIntyre appealed to the Colorado Court of Appeals and filed
three motions to stay execution of the foreclosure judgment.
Chase's attorneys obtained denials of all three motions
to stay by “using fraudulent misrepresentations of fact
and law.” On January 21, 2016, the property was sold at
a sheriff's sale. On April 28, 2016, the Colorado Court
of Appeals affirmed the foreclosure judgment. Ms. MacIntyre
sought certiorari review in the Colorado Supreme Court, but
she later filed a “suggestion of mootness and motion to
dismiss as moot, ” and the high court dismissed on
mootness grounds on January 3, 2017.
On
January 18, 2019, proceeding pro se, Ms. MacIntyre filed this
case alleging that “Chase's fraud in the
foreclosure proceeding has caused [her] extraordinary
financial damage by the irreversible loss of her primary
residence. . . . Chase's foreclosure fraud was solidified
by the fraudulent tactics it used in thwarting the
indispensable stay she needed to have any possibility of
reversing the foreclosure judgment on appeal.” In the
Complaint, she argued that the “mootness of her
appeals” entitles her to have her foreclosure judgment
vacated-a theory she alleged she would test with forthcoming
appellate filings.
Counsel
for Chase appeared on February 7 and waived service on behalf
of Chase. On February 28, Chase filed a motion to dismiss for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under either the
Rooker-Feldman or Younger doctrines. Chase
further submits that the Complaint fails to state a claim
because Ms. MacIntyre is estopped from relitigating certain
issues, she filed more than a year beyond the applicable
statute of limitations period, and she is unable to plead the
necessary fraud element of reliance.
On
March 28, Ms. MacIntyre filed a “motion to vacate
judgment as moot” in the Colorado Court of Appeals.
(Doc. 19-1.) On April 11, the Court of Appeals ordered:
“Appellant's motion to vacate the judgment as moot
is denied. Case was mandated on January 4, 2017. No. further
motion to vacate will be considered.” (Doc. 22-1, at
2.)
On
April 5, Ms. MacIntyre served Chase with the Complaint. On
April 9, she moved to strike the motion to dismiss as
premature solely because it was filed before service of the
Complaint. She further responded to the motion to dismiss by
singularly addressing Chase's invocation of collateral
estoppel. The Court considers the parties' motions
together.
II.
ANALYSIS
Courts
must hold pro se litigants' pleadings “to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
(1972). Because Ms. MacIntyre is pro se, the Court reads the
Complaint broadly for facts that could be sufficient to state
a valid claim, Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110
& n.3 (10th Cir. 1991), or which might “evince[] a
basis for the court's subject-matter jurisdiction.”
Kucera v. Cent. Intelligence Agency, 754 Fed.Appx.
735, 736 (10th Cir. 2018). At the same time, where the
Court's subject-matter jurisdiction is in question, the
Court is not constrained to accept a complaint's
allegations as true. Holt v. United States, 46 F.3d
1000, 1002-03 (10th Cir. 1995). And here, Ms. MacIntyre
supplied the Court with her unsuccessful post-Complaint
appellate filings, which may bear on the jurisdictional
question.
The
Court's principle concern is whether it has the power to
hear this case. Federal courts “have an independent
obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction
exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party,
” and thus a court may sua sponte raise the
question of whether there is subject matter jurisdiction
“at any stage in the litigation.” Arbaugh v.
Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 501 (2006). Therefore, if
Chase is correct that the Court does not have jurisdiction,
whether its motion to dismiss should be stricken is
immaterial considering the Court's ongoing obligation to
evaluate its own jurisdiction. The Rooker-Feldman
and Younger doctrines raised by Chase both implicate
the Court's subject-matter jurisdiction. See Exxon
Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280,
281 (2005); Chapman v. Oklahoma, 472 F.3d 747, 748
(10th Cir. 2006).
Rooker-Feldman
takes its name from the Supreme Court's decisions in
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923),
and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v.
Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). In Rooker,
plaintiffs previously defeated in state court filed suit in a
federal district court alleging that the adverse state court
judgment was unconstitutional and asking that it be declared
“null and void.” 263 U.S. at 414-15. The Supreme
Court stated that even if the state court was wrong,
“that did not make the judgment void, but merely left
it open to reversal or modification in an appropriate and
timely appellate proceeding, ” and such was not the
province of the federal district courts. Id. at
415-16. In Feldman, the Supreme Court similarly
concluded that a federal district court lacked ...