The People of the State of Colorado, Petitioner-Appellee, In the Interest of T.B., Juvenile-Appellant.
of Appeals City and County of Denver Juvenile Court No.
01JD1407 Honorable D. Brett Woods, Judge Honorable Karen M.
J. Weiser, Attorney General, Joseph G. Michaels, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for
Johnson & Klein, PLLC, Gail K. Johnson, Katherine C.
Steefel, Boulder, Colorado, for Juvenile-Appellant
Elizabeth Logemann, Denver, Colorado, for Amicus Curiae
Colorado Juvenile Defender Center and Children's Rights
1 The Colorado Sex Offender Registration Act (CSORA),
sections 16-22-101 to -115, C.R.S. 2018, requires that
juveniles who are twice adjudicated for unlawful sexual
behavior must register as sex offenders for life. T.B. is one
of those juveniles. He now appeals the denial of his petition
to deregister, arguing that the statute's requirement
that he register as a sex offender for life for offenses that
he committed as a juvenile constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment. This court has repeatedly rejected similar
claims, each time on the basis that sex offender registration
is not a punishment. We, however, conclude that the lifetime
registration requirement arising from juvenile adjudications
constitutes a punishment and, therefore, remand the case for
further proceedings to determine whether the punishment is
2 In 2001, when T.B. was twelve years old, he was adjudicated
for unlawful sexual contact, a class 1 misdemeanor if
committed by an adult. In 2005, he pleaded guilty to sexual
assault. Following the 2005 adjudication, he successfully
completed probation and offense specific treatment. He has no
other criminal record.
3 In 2010, T.B. filed a pro se petition to discontinue sex
offender registration in both cases. By checking a box on the
petition, he represented that "I have successfully
completed the terms and conditions of my sentence related to
that offense. I have not been subsequently convicted or
adjudicated a juvenile delinquent for any offense involving
unlawful sexual behavior."
4 Following an evidentiary hearing, the juvenile court found
that T.B. "has earned the right not to have to
register" and "he is not a risk to sexually
reoffend." Then the court granted the petition as to the
2005 case but concluded that discontinuing registration was
not permitted in the earlier case because T.B. had a
subsequent sex offense adjudication (i.e., the 2005 case).
5 Almost five years later, now twenty-six years old and
represented by counsel, T.B. filed a second petition to
discontinue registration. This time he argued that lifetime
registration violated due process and constituted cruel and
unusual punishment. Again, the juvenile court held a hearing.
In a written order relying primarily on People in
Interest of J.O., 2015 COA 119, the court rejected
T.B.'s constitutional arguments and denied the petition.
6 T.B. appeals that denial.
7 Relying on cases decided under Crim P. 35(c), the People
assert that T.B.'s constitutional arguments are
procedurally barred. We disagree.
8 Claims that could have been raised in a prior appeal are
usually barred as successive. See Dunlap v. People,
173 P.3d 1054, 1062 (Colo. 2007) (citing Crim. P. 35(c));
People v. Vondra, 240 P.3d 493, 495 (Colo.App. 2010)
("Defendant could have challenged the district
court's factual findings and its conclusion that counsel
was not ineffective on direct appeal, but chose not to do
so."). But we reject the Attorney General's
successiveness argument for two reasons.
9 First, the Attorney General's successiveness argument
assumes that cases decided under Crim. P. 35(c) should
control this case. Unsurprisingly, such cases apply the
mandate of Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(VI)-(VII) ("The court shall
deny any claim that was raised and resolved in a prior
appeal" or "could have been presented in an appeal
previously brought."). But T.B. never sought relief
under Crim. P. 35(c). Nor, for that matter, do we see how he
could have taken this approach in pursuit of discontinuing
10 Second, while it is accurate that the juvenile court twice
denied T.B.'s petition to discontinue the registration
requirement and T.B. did not appeal from the first denial,
the Attorney General's assertion that "[n]othing
legal or factual has changed since the first ruling" is
only partly true. The factual basis for seeking to
discontinue registration was the same in both petitions -
T.B. no longer posed a risk to sexually reoffend. But, as
detailed in Part III.B.1.a below, the legal landscape
involving juvenile sentencing in general and lifetime
registration in particular has evolved substantially since
T.B.'s first petition in 2010. See, e.g.,
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012)
(extending Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010),
and holding "that the Eighth Amendment forbids a
sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without
possibility of parole for juvenile offenders" convicted
of homicide); Graham, 560 U.S. at 73 (observing that
just because a juvenile defendant "posed an immediate
risk" at one point in his young life does not mean that
he will "be a risk to society for the rest of his
life"); State in Interest of C.K., 182 A.3d
917, 932-33 (N.J. 2018) (collecting cases issued since 2012
where state courts of last resort have held that lifetime
registration and notification requirements for juvenile sex
offenders are unconstitutional).
11 Accordingly, we conclude that there is no successiveness
to T.B.'s petition and this appeal. Cf. People v.
Rainer, 2013 COA 51, ¶ 34 (concluding that a
juvenile's postconviction claim was not successive where
it was based on Graham, which "established a
new rule of substantive law which should be applied
retroactively"), rev'd on other grounds,
2017 CO 50.
Abuse of Process and the Law of the Case Doctrine
12 The Attorney General characterizes T.B.'s appeal
"as an abuse of process" because he "did not
challenge or appeal the first order denying his motion."
Of course, abuse of process may be asserted to prevent
perpetual review. Dunlap, 173 P.3d at 1062. But
below, the prosecution did not raise abuse of process. Thus,
it is not available here. See People v. Sherman, 172
P.3d 911, 915 (Colo.App. 2006) ("In this case, the
People did not plead or prove an abuse of process in the
trial court. Hence, this affirmative defense is not
13 The law of the case doctrine doesn't bar our review
either. "Whether the law of the case . . . applies to
bar the litigation of an issue is a question that we review
de novo." Jones v. Samora, 2016 COA 191, ¶
46. That doctrine applies "to the decisions of an equal
court or a different division of the same court."
Vashone-Caruso v. Suthers, 29 P.3d 339, 342
(Colo.App. 2001). Thus, the juvenile court could've
denied T.B.'s second petition on this basis alone. But
because no other division of this court has addressed
T.B.'s first petition, we are not so limited. Having
disposed of the Attorney General's procedural arguments,
we now turn to the merits.
14 T.B. contends that when applied to juveniles, automatic
lifetime registration under CSORA for repeat offenders
violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment. But before discussing the
constitutional implications of T.B.'s argument, it is
helpful to briefly discuss the relevant portions of CSORA.
Treatment of Juveniles Under CSORA
15 Juveniles who have been adjudicated for unlawful sexual
behavior must register as sex offenders. § 16-22-103(4),
C.R.S. 2018 ("The provisions of this article 22 apply to
any person who receives a disposition or is adjudicated a
juvenile delinquent based on the commission of any act that
may constitute unlawful sexual behavior or who receives a
deferred adjudication based on commission of any act that may
constitute unlawful sexual behavior . . . ."). Juvenile
sex offenders must adhere to the same registration
requirements as adult sex offenders except that a
juvenile's sex offender status is not posted on the
Colorado Bureau of Investigation's website. §
16-22-111(1)(c), C.R.S. 2018 (providing that the Colorado
Bureau of Investigation (CBI) website shall include
information about sex offenders who "[have] been
convicted as an adult" of specific offenses involving
unlawful sexual behavior).
16 The registration requirement lasts for the rest of an
individual's life or until the court enters an order
discontinuing the registration requirement. See
§ 16-22-103. Before the court can enter such an order,
an affected individual must file a petition to discontinue
the registration requirement. See § 16-22-113,
C.R.S. 2018. In determining whether to grant a petition to
discontinue registration, the juvenile court is guided by a
single criterion: whether the person is "likely to
commit a subsequent offense of or involving unlawful sexual
behavior." § 16-22-113(1)(e).
17 Under CSORA, however, certain individuals are not even
permitted to file a petition to discontinue the registration
requirement. § 16-22-113(3). Included among those who
are not permitted to file a petition are adults who have
"more than one conviction or adjudication for unlawful
sexual behavior." § 16-22-113(3)(c). This is
problematic for T.B. because he is an adult whose record
includes two juvenile adjudications for unlawful sexual
behavior. So, T.B. is not entitled to petition to discontinue
his registration requirement, even though he committed his
crimes as a juvenile, unless the registration requirement, as
applied to him, is unconstitutional. That is where we turn
18 We review constitutional challenges under the Eighth
Amendment de novo. People v. McCulloch, 198 P.3d
1264, 1268 (Colo.App. 2008) ("[A]ppellate scrutiny of an
Eighth Amendment challenge is de novo.").
19 The Eighth Amendment prohibits "cruel and unusual
punishments," U.S. Const. amend. VIII, and
"guarantees individuals the right not to be subjected to
excessive sanctions," Roper v. Simmons, 543
U.S. 551, 560 (2005). This right "'flows from the
basic "precept of justice that punishment for crime
should be graduated and proportioned"' to both the
offender and the offense." Miller, 567 U.S. at
469 (citations omitted).
20 Analyzing any statute under the Eighth Amendment involves
a two-part inquiry. First, a court must determine whether the
statute imposes a punishment. J.O., ¶ 30. If no
punishment is imposed, we need not venture further because
the Eighth Amendment is not implicated. Id. (If
"requiring juvenile sex offenders to register does not
constitute punishment under the Eighth Amendment, [the court]
need not address whether registration is cruel and
unusual."). If, on the other hand, the statute does
impose a punishment, the court must then decide whether that
punishment is cruel and unusual. Id. So first, we
must consider whether requiring a twice-adjudicated juvenile
to register as a sex offender for life constitutes a
punishment. We conclude it does.
21 To decide whether a statute creates a punishment, a court
must first "ascertain whether the legislature meant the
statute to establish 'civil' proceedings."
Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003) (quoting
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997)). This
is so because if the legislature intended to impose
punishment, "that ends the inquiry." Id.;
see also Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144,
169 (1963) (noting that "a detailed examination" of
the statute "is unnecessary" where "the
objective manifestations of congressional purpose indicate
conclusively that the provisions in question can only be
interpreted as punitive").
22 There is some textual indication in CSORA that the
legislature recognized that the registration requirement may
be punitive, at least as it applies to juveniles.
Specifically, among the factors a juvenile court must
consider before exempting a juvenile from registering as a
sex offender at sentencing is whether "the registration
requirement . . . would be unfairly punitive"
to the juvenile. § 16-22-103(5)(a) (emphasis added).
This is certainly some recognition by the General Assembly
that requiring a juvenile to register may be punitive (and in
some circumstances, unfairly so). See also Millard v.
Rankin, 265 F.Supp.3d 1211, 1226 n.8 (D. Colo. 2017)
("The use of 'unfairly' suggests that at least
some level of punishment is intended - just not an
'unfair' level."). But still, on balance, we
agree with the courts before us: CSORA's text does not
explicitly create a punishment. See §
16-22-112(1), C.R.S. 2018 ("[I]t is not the general
assembly's intent that the information [found on the sex
offender registry] be used to inflict retribution or
additional punishment on any person convicted of unlawful
sexual behavior . . . .").
23 But this does not end our inquiry. Instead, we must
"further examine whether the statutory scheme is 'so
punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate'"
the legislature's purportedly nonpunitive purpose.
Smith, 538 U.S. at 92 (quoting Hendricks,
521 U.S. at 361). The Supreme Court cautioned that "only
the clearest proof" will suffice to override that
declared intent and transform a civil remedy into a criminal
penalty. Id. (quoting Hudson v. United
States, 522 U.S. 93, 100 (1997)).
Colorado Case Law and the Evolving Legal Landscape Regarding
24 Although our supreme court has not weighed in on the issue
we are addressing today, we are not writing on a blank slate.
Indeed, we recognize that on multiple occasions, and without
exception, divisions of this court have concluded that
CSORA's registration requirement is not a punishment.
See People in Interest of C.M.D., 2018 COA 172,
¶ 20; J.O., ¶ 22; People v.
Carbajal, 2012 COA 107, ¶ 37; People v.
Sowell, 327 P.3d 273, 277 (Colo.App. 2011); People
v. Durapau, 280 P.3d 42, 49 (Colo.App. 2011);
Fendley v. People, 107 P.3d 1122, 1125 (Colo.App.
2004); People v. Stead, 66 P.3d 117, 120 (Colo.App.
2002), overruled on other grounds by Candelaria v.
People, 2013 CO 47; People in Interest of J.T.,
13 P.3d 321, 323 (Colo.App. 2000); People v.
Montaine, 7 P.3d 1065, 1067 (Colo.App. 1999);
Jamison v. People, 988 P.2d 177, 180 (Colo.App.
25 Even though "[w]e are not obligated to follow the
precedent established by another division," we give
"such decisions considerable deference." People
v. Smoots, 2013 COA 152, ¶ 20, aff'd sub
nom. Reyna-Abarca v. People, 2017 CO 15. And we do not
take the prospect of departing from this court's uniform
precedent lightly, nor do we do so without careful
consideration. But a confluence of developments in the law
since our court first concluded that sex offender
registration was nonpunitive twenty years ago persuades us to
take a fresh look at the issue, particularly as it involves
lifetime registration for juveniles.
26 First, the conclusion that CSORA's sex offender
registration requirement is nonpunitive has come under recent
scrutiny. See Millard, 265 F.Supp.3d at 1225
("[A]lthough panels of the Colorado Court of Appeals
have declined to find SORA's provisions to be punitive,
those cases have not engaged in the 'intent-effects'
analysis used by the United States Supreme Court, and the
Colorado Supreme Court has not addressed the
question."). Although we are in no way bound by the
conclusion in Millard, the decision highlights that
a growing number of states are revisiting whether sex
offender registration requirements are punitive. Id.
at 1224 (collecting cases from other jurisdictions where
state courts have concluded that their states'
registration requirements are punitive).
27 Second, and more importantly, the legal landscape
involving juvenile sentencing in general has evolved
considerably. Consider, for example, the United States
Supreme Court's evolving jurisprudence on juvenile
sentencing over the last fourteen years. In Roper,
543 U.S. at 555, 568, the Court concluded that imposing the
death penalty on offenders who were under eighteen at the
time of their capital offenses is unconstitutional. Then in
Graham, the Court held that juveniles convicted of
nonhomicide offenses could not constitutionally be sentenced
to life without parole. 560 U.S. at 74. Finally, in
Miller, the Court extended Graham, holding
"that the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme
that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole
for juvenile offenders" convicted of homicide. 567 U.S.
28 Likewise, our supreme court has recently addressed
juvenile sentencing in other contexts and adopted these
federal standards. See, e.g., Estrada-Huerta v.
People, 2017 CO 52; Lucero v. People, 2017 CO
49; People v. Tate, 2015 CO 42.
29 Third, the Eighth Amendment jurisprudence on lifetime sex
offender registration for juveniles in particular has also
evolved. A growing number of courts in other states have
recently discussed the constitutionality of requiring a
juvenile to register as a sex offender for life. See,
e.g., In re A.C., 54 N.E.3d 952, 968
(Ill.App.Ct. 2016); In Interest of T.H., 913 N.W.2d
578 (Iowa 2018); C.K., 182 A.3d 917; In re
C.P., 967 N.E.2d 729 (Ohio 2012); In re J.B.,
107 A.3d 1 (Pa. 2014); Vaughn v. State, 391 P.3d
1086, 1098 (Wyo. 2017). And, unsurprisingly, many of these
courts have drawn on the Supreme Court's evolving
juvenile sentencing jurisprudence, emphasizing that juvenile
offenders have greater prospects for rehabilitation. See
Miller, 567 U.S. at 479 ("[J]uveniles have
diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform . . .
30 Against this backdrop, it is our respectful assessment
that the issue of whether the punitive effects of CSORA's
lifetime registration requirement for juveniles are
sufficient to override its stated nonpunitive purpose
warrants examination through fresh lenses. b. Applying the
31 To determine if a statute's punitive effect overrides
its declared civil intent, courts must consider the
following: (1) whether the sanction involves an affirmative
disability or restraint; (2) whether it has historically been
regarded as a punishment; (3) whether the court imposes the
sanction only upon a particular finding of scienter; (4)
whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of
punishment; (5) whether the behavior to which it applies is a
crime; (6) whether there is a rational connection to a
nonpunitive purpose; (7) whether it appears excessive in
relation to the nonpunitive purpose. C.M.D., ¶
22 (citing Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-69).
32 When applied to juveniles, some of the factors support the
conclusion that CSORA's lifetime registration requirement
is not a punishment. First, the registration requirement
involves no affirmative disability or restraint, at least not
directly. See id. at ¶ 23 ("Unlike prison,
probation, or parole, registration does not limit where
offenders may live or where they may work, although local
ordinances may do so."). Second, there is no finding of
scienter that is required before a juvenile is required to
register under CSORA. Instead, juveniles are required to
register unless the juvenile court determines "that the
registration requirement . . . would be unfairly punitive and
that exempting the person from the registration requirement
would not pose a significant risk to the community."
§ 16-22-103(5)(a). This standard, however, does not
require that the juvenile court evaluate a juvenile's
state of mind before imposing the registration requirement.
But we agree with the courts that have concluded that the
scienter factor is of little value when determining whether a
sex offender registration requirement is a punishment.
See Smith, 538 U.S. at 105 (scienter factor is
"of little weight in this case"); T.H.,
913 N.W.2d at 592 ("[T]he lack of a scienter requirement
weighs in favor, albeit marginally, of finding the statute
nonpunitive."); State v. Eighth Judicial Dist.
Court, 306 P.3d 369, 387 (Nev. 2013) (same).
33 The remaining factors, however, support the conclusion
that requiring automatic lifetime sex offender registration
for juvenile offenses is a punishment.
34 First, the effect of requiring a juvenile to register as a
sex offender for life is reminiscent of traditional forms of
punishment. The dissemination of information that is then
used to humiliate and ostracize offenders can resemble forms
of punishment that historically have been used to ensure that
offenders cannot live a normal life Smith, 538 U.S. at 109
(Souter, J, concurring in the judgment). And when applied to
juveniles, the dissemination of information becomes even more
characteristic of a punishment because the information about
a juvenile's criminal history would not otherwise be
publicly available. See § 19-1-304(1), C.R.S.
2018 (setting forth limitations on public access to juvenile
records); see also Chief Justice Directive 05-01,
Directive Concerning Access to Court Records §
4.60(b)(4) (amended Oct. 18, 2016) (providing that juvenile
delinquency records are presumptively non-public).
35 It is true that the Supreme Court concluded that the
dissemination of accurate information about an
individual's criminal record is not a traditional form of
punishment. Smith, 538 U.S. at 98. But in that case
the Court was addressing the consequences that befall
adult sex offenders. Id. And, unlike
records of juvenile adjudications, records of adult
convictions are presumptively public.
36 It is also true that T.B.'s status as a sex offender
is not available on the sex offender registry that the
Colorado Bureau of Investigation is required to make
available on the internet. See §
16-22-111(1)(c). But that doesn't change the fact that
anyone who inquires into T.B.'s background is given
access to information that he or she would not otherwise be
able to have. Moreover, any member of the public may
request and obtain from his or her local law enforcement
agency a list of sex offenders, which would include juvenile
offenders such as T.B. See § 16-22-112(2). And
at the hearing on his petition to deregister, T.B.'s
parole officer testified that information about T.B.'s
status as a sex offender could still show up in a background
check and be the basis for T.B. losing an apartment or being
fired from his job. These public opprobrium consequences are
often the sort of consequences associated with more
traditional forms of punishment.
37 Further, as the Supreme Court has recognized, juveniles
are different from adults for the purposes of the Eighth
Amendment. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 471
("Because juveniles have diminished culpability and
greater prospects for reform, we explained, 'they are
less deserving of the most severe punishments.'"
(quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 68)). This
differentiation is particularly acute when considering the
consequences that juveniles face when they are required to
register as sex offenders. As Ohio's supreme court
With no other offense is the juvenile's wrongdoing
announced to the world. Before a juvenile can even begin his
adult life, before he has a chance to live on his own, the
world will know of his offense. He will never have a chance
to establish a good character in the community. He will be
hampered in his education, in his relationships, and in his
work life. His potential will be squelched before it has a
chance to show itself.
C.P., 967 N.E.2d at 741. CSORA imposes similar
burdens on T.B. for offenses that he committed when he was a
child; and these consequences resemble traditional forms of
38 Second, CSORA's lifetime registration requirement
promotes the traditional aims of punishment -
"retribution and deterrence."
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168. A statute begins
to look more retributive, and therefore punitive, when it
imposes a sanction for past conduct and when it does not
provide a mechanism by which an offender can "reduce or
end registration based upon a showing that the offender is no
longer a threat to the community." Starkey v. Okla.
Dep't of Corr., 305 P.3d 1004, 1028 (Okla. 2013);
cf. J.O., ¶ 29 (stating that among the
distinctions that rendered the Colorado's juvenile sex
offender requirement nonpunitive was that the juvenile in the
case could "petition to discontinue registration after
successfully completing and being discharged from his
juvenile sentence or disposition"). CSORA does both with
respect to twice-adjudicated juveniles like T.B. T.B. was
compelled to register solely because of his past conduct and
is still required to register even though the juvenile court
made an express finding that he is no longer a danger to the
community and is not likely to reoffend. Moreover, as the
federal district court in Millard recognized, the
Colorado Bureau of Investigation's own website states
that one of the goals of the sex offender registry is
deterrence; and deterrence is a traditional goal of
punishment. See Millard, 265 F.Supp.3d at 1229
("The CBI website also states that the registry's
goals are 'Citizen/Public Safety; Deterrence of sex
offenders for committing similar crimes; and Investigative
tool for law enforcement.'" (quoting Colorado Bureau
of Investigation, Registration,
39 Third, for juveniles, the behavior to which CSORA applies
is already a crime. For juveniles, CSORA's lifetime
registration requirement sweeps in only those who have been
adjudicated for committing past crimes - and, once the
requirement to register for life is imposed, it does so
without regard to whether he or she is likely to reoffend.
And "[t]he fact that a statute applies only to behavior
that is already, and exclusively, criminal supports a
conclusion that its effects are punitive." Doe v.
State, 189 P.3d 999, 1014 (Alaska 2008).
40 The final two factors - whether there is a rational
connection between the sanction and its stated nonpunitive
purpose and whether the statute is excessive given that
purpose - must be considered together. It cannot be disputed
that there is a rational connection between CSORA's
registration requirement and public safety. §
16-22-112(1). But we also must consider whether CSORA's
lifetime registration requirement for juveniles is excessive
given the important public safety justifications at issue.
Smith, 538 U.S. at 97.
41 The question in this regard is not whether the legislature
has chosen the best path to address its nonpunitive
objective, but rather whether "the regulatory means
chosen are reasonable in light of the nonpunitive
objective." Id. at 105. Other courts have
placed the greatest weight on this factor. See T.H.,
913 N.W.2d at 594 ("The final Mendoza-Martinez
factor is the most significant of the seven . . . .");
see also Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 383 (Ind.
2009) (collecting cases stating the same). We agree with the
courts that have viewed this as a weighty factor.
42 Indeed, a growing number of states have concluded that
lifetime registration requirements similar to CSORA's are
excessive as applied to juveniles considering their
nonpunitive purpose. See Wallace, 905 N.E.2d at 384
(The statute is excessive in relation to its public safety
purpose because it "makes information on all sex
offenders available to the general public without restriction
and without regard to whether the individual poses any
particular future risk."); T.H., 913 N.W.2d at
596 ("[M]andatory [lifetime] registration for juveniles
is excessive in light of its nonpunitive purpose.");
Commonwealth v. Baker, 295 S.W.3d 437, 446 (Ky.
2009) ("Given . . . the fact that there is no individual
determination of the threat a particular registrant poses to
public safety, we can only conclude that [the statute
requiring lifetime registration] is excessive with respect to
the nonpunitive purpose of public safety.");
C.P., 967 N.E.2d at 742 (requiring lifetime sex
offender registration for juveniles is excessive because it
is not dependent on what is actually necessary to preserve
43 In contrast, other states have concluded that a sex
offender registration statute is not excessive in relation to
its nonpunitive purpose when it provides an individualized
assessment of the risk that a juvenile will reoffend. See
In re Nick H., 123 A.3d 229, 247 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
2015) (holding that a statute is not excessive because it
requires that the court make an individualized finding that
registration is appropriate for the juvenile and the period
is only for up to five years); Eighth Judicial Dist.
Court, 306 P.3d at 387 (holding that a statute is not
excessive because it limits sex offender registration for
juveniles to only those crimes that pose the highest risk of
reoffending); In re Justin B., 747 S.E.2d 774, 783
(S.C. 2013) (holding that a statute is not excessive when a
juvenile may petition to deregister after ten years);
Vaughn, 391 P.3d at 1100 (holding that a statute is
not excessive in relation to public safety purpose because an