Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Ingle v. Ieros, LLC

United States District Court, D. Colorado

June 13, 2019

JAZMINE INGLE, Plaintiff,
v.
IEROS, LLC d/b/a LIFE FLOWER DISPENSARY f/k/a MEDICINE MAN MEDICAL MARKET, Defendant.

          ORDER

          LEWIS T. BABCOCK, JUDGE

         Before me is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 8. Plaintiff asserted two claims for relief: wrongful termination based on sex and quid pro quo sexual harassment, both in violation of Title VII. Compl., ECF No. 2 at 5-6. Defendant argues that both claims should be dismissed. After consideration of the parties' arguments, I DENY the Motion for the reasons set forth below.

         I. Background

         Defendant employed Plaintiff as an assistant manager. ECF No. 2 at ¶¶ 8 & 9. Neil Bigelow was Defendant's general manager and Plaintiff's direct supervisor. Id. at ¶ 10. In August 2015, Bigelow invited Plaintiff to a “pool day, ” which Plaintiff considered to be an invitation for a romantic date. Id. at ¶ 13. Plaintiff refused the invitation. Id. at ¶ 14. In September 2015, Defendant hired Justin Seymour, who dated Plaintiff at the time. Id. at ¶¶ 15 & 16. The relationship was initially unknown to Bigelow. Id. at ¶¶ 17 & 21.

         On February 15, 2016, Bigelow sent a text message to Plaintiff that read “I truly appreciate how reliable you have been and how hard you work, holding down the shop all night every night! I apologize for not being 100% on top of my game lately!” Id. at ¶ 18. Concurrent to the text, Bigelow gave Plaintiff a bonus accompanied by a message on her paystub that read “Please keep up the hard work.” Id. at ¶ 19.

         Later in February, Bigelow discovered that Plaintiff and Seymour were dating. Id. at ¶ 21. On February 22, Bigelow suspended Seymour and terminated him a week after. Id. at ¶ 22. The same day Bigelow terminated Seymour, Bigelow asked Plaintiff if she wanted to go out for drinks after work. Id. at ¶ 24. Plaintiff took this as an invitation for a romantic date and declined the offer. Id. at ¶ 24 & 26. Around the same time, Bigelow again expressed his confidence in Plaintiff's work ability. Id. at ¶ 23.

         On March 4, Bigelow suspended Plaintiff after she told Bigelow “to stop discussing her relationship with Seymour with other employees” and told Bigelow that “[y]ou're my manager, not my friend.” Id. at ¶ 27. On March 8, Bigelow terminated Plaintiff's employment. Id. at ¶ 28. When Plaintiff received her final paycheck a few days later, the paycheck was accompanied by three records of disciplinary action describing events that took place on February 15, March 1, and March 4. Id. at ¶¶ 29 & 32. Two of these records included “[a]greed-upon improvement plans, ” but Plaintiff “never agreed upon any improvement plan because she [did not] find out about the plans or the records of discipline until after she was fired.” Id. at ¶¶ 30 & 31.

         II. Law

         To avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain enough allegations of fact, taken as true, ‘to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671 F.3d 1188, 1190 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting Be l Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that enables the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.

         A court may not dismiss a complaint merely because it appears unlikely or improbable that a plaintiff can prove the facts alleged or ultimately prevail on the merits. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. Instead, a court must ask whether the facts alleged raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary elements. Id.

         Conclusory statements and legal conclusions are not accepted as true; mere “labels and conclusions” and “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” will not suffice. Khalik, 671 F.3d at 1190-91 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). As such, when examining a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), I disregard conclusory statements and look only to whether the remaining, factual allegations plausibly suggest the defendant is liable. Id. at 1191.

         III. Analysis

         Plaintiff stated two claims for relief: “Wrongful Termination Based on Sex in Violation of Title VII” and “Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment in Violation of Title VII.” Id. at 5-6. Defendant argues that both claims should be dismissed. ECF No. 8. I first discuss the exhaustion of administrative remedies.

         A. Plaintiff Exhausted Her Administrative Remedies.

         Initially, Defendant argues that both of Plaintiff's claims should be dismissed because she failed to properly allege, as a jurisdictional prerequisite, that she exhausted her administrative remedies. Id. at 4-5. Defendant claims that Plaintiff did not reference in her Complaint the filing of a charge of discrimination (the “Charge”) with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), nor did she confirm that she received a corresponding right-to-sue letter. Id. Alternatively, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's Charge to the EEOC did not ÔÇťassert a claim for gender discrimination or ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.