Ruybalid v. Board of County Commissioners of County of Las Animas County

          Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals, Court of Appeals Case No. 16CA1473

         Attorneys for Petitioner: Francisco E. Ruybalid, Trinidad, Colorado, Limited Appearance by Steven Lawrence Jensen, Golden, Colorado

         Attorneys for Respondents Board of County Commissioners of the County of Huerfano, Gerald Cisneros, Ray Garcia, and Max Vezanni: Garrett Sheldon, Walsenburg, Colorado

         Attorneys for Respondents Board of County Commissioners of the County of Las Animas, Anthony Abeyta, Gary D. Hill, and Mack Louden: Newnam Land LLP, Mary D. Newnam, Wimberley, Texas

         OPINION

         JUSTICE BOATRIGHT

Page 424

         [¶1] Francisco Ruybalid was accused of numerous ethical violations arising out of cases that he either prosecuted or supervised while he was the District Attorney for the Third Judicial District of Colorado. Ultimately, Ruybalid admitted to 26 violations in exchange for another 138 alleged violations being dismissed. As a result of initially contesting the allegations of misconduct, Ruybalid incurred substantial attorney’s fees and costs during the disciplinary proceeding. The counties of the Third Judicial District refused to reimburse Ruybalid for these expenses. We must now determine whether the counties are obligated to reimburse Ruybalid for these attorney’s fees and costs under section 20-1-303, C.R.S. (2018), which directs a county to reimburse a district attorney for "expenses necessarily incurred in the discharge of his official duties for the benefit of [the] county."^[1]

         [¶2] We conclude that because Ruybalid’s ethical violations were at times committed recklessly or knowingly, his attorney’s fees and costs were not necessarily incurred in the discharge of his official duties. Hence, we hold that Ruybalid is not entitled to reimbursement for the attorney’s fees and costs that he incurred in defending the disciplinary proceeding against him, and therefore he failed to state a claim for relief in his original complaint. As a result, we affirm the court of appeals’ decision on different grounds.

          I. Facts and Procedural History

         [¶3] Ruybalid served as District Attorney for the Third Judicial District of Colorado, which comprises Las Animas and Huerfano Counties (the Counties). During Ruybalid’s term as district attorney, the Office of Attorney Regulation Counsel filed two disciplinary complaints against him that alleged over 150 ethical violations related to his failure to provide discovery in cases that he either prosecuted or supervised. During the ensuing disciplinary proceeding, the Counties refused to assume the cost for Ruybalid’s defense; ^[2] as a result, Ruybalid hired private counsel.^[3] The disciplinary proceeding eventually resolved when Ruybalid entered into a stipulation. In that stipulation, Ruybalid admitted that he had failed to provide the required discovery in eighteen cases. Ultimately, Ruybalid admitted to twenty-six ethical violations: eight violations of Colo. RPC 1.3 (failure to act diligently and promptly in representing a client); eight violations of Colo. RPC 8.4(d) (engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice); and ten violations of Colo. RPC 5.1(b) (failure to make reasonable

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efforts to ensure that subordinate lawyers conform to the Rules of Professional Conduct). In return, 138 alleged ethical violations were dismissed. For purposes of determining the appropriate sanction, Ruybalid stipulated that his mental state varied during each ethical violation from negligent, to reckless, to knowing. As a result of the stipulation, Ruybalid agreed to pay over $ 23,000 in costs incurred in the disciplinary proceeding; he was then suspended from practicing law for six months, which was stayed pending his successful completion of a twenty-three-month probation period. In addition to the $ 23,000 in costs, Ruybalid claims to have accrued over $ 200,000 in attorney’s fees.

         [¶4] After resolving the disciplinary case, Ruybalid filed a complaint in district court for a declaratory judgment and attached a copy of the stipulation from the disciplinary proceeding. In the complaint, Ruybalid asserted that the Counties were obligated to reimburse him for the attorney’s fees and costs that he incurred during the disciplinary proceeding as well as the costs that he would incur in complying with the terms of his probation. Ruybalid argued that the fees and costs from the disciplinary proceeding were "expenses necessarily incurred in the discharge of his official duties for the benefit of" the Counties under "the DA Expense Statute"— section 20-1-303. Ruybalid pointed to two other sources of potential authority to support his argument that the Counties were obligated to reimburse him: section 24-10-110, C.R.S. (2018), of the Colorado Government Immunity Act (CGIA) and Colorado Counties Casualty & Property Pool v. Board of County Commissioners, 51 P.3d 1100 (Colo.App. 2002) (holding that a district attorney was entitled to attorney’s fees incurred while defending against a wrongful discharge lawsuit).^[4] The Counties moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5).

         [¶5] The district court granted the motion to dismiss. It first found that Ruybalid’s actions were disallowed by ethical canons. For this reason, the court concluded that his conduct did not constitute performance of the official duties of a district attorney, and thus was not covered by the DA Expense Statute. Additionally, the district court found that section 24-10-110 of the CGIA did not cover Ruybalid’s attorney’s fees because there was no injury sustained by a third party— a requirement under the CGIA. Finally, the court concluded that Colorado Counties was distinguishable ...