United States District Court, D. Colorado
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
CHRISTINE M. ARGUELLO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
This
matter is before the Court on Defendant American Family
Mutual Insurance Company, S.I.'s Motion for Summary
Judgment, in which Defendant requests that the Court enter
summary judgment in its favor on Plaintiff Shawn
Williams's three claims against it. (Doc. # 25.) For the
reasons described below, the Court grants in part and denies
in part Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff
was involved in a two-car motor vehicle collision on July 1,
2015, in Denver, Colorado. (Doc. # 6 at 1.) Plaintiff was
driving a 1993 Lexus sedan owned by his romantic partner,
non-party Toni Wagner, at the time of the crash and collided
with a semi-truck driven by an uninsured motorist.
(Id. at 2.) Plaintiff alleges that he suffered
significant injuries, including “a posterior wall
fracture of the right acetabulum, ”[1] and required
surgery as a result of the accident. (Id.) Plaintiff
maintained an automobile insurance policy with non-party
Dairyland Insurance and made a claim for his injuries. (Doc.
# 25 at 1.) Dairyland Insurance paid Plaintiff $25, 000 in
uninsured motorist (“UM”) coverage.
(Id.)
On the
date of the collision, Toni Wagner, Plaintiff's romantic
partner and the owner of the car he was driving, carried an
automobile insurance policy with Defendant, Policy No.
1741-9737-02-89-FPPA-CO (the “Policy”). The
Policy provided, in relevant part:
1. We will pay compensatory damages for bodily
injuries which an insured person is
legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an
uninsured motor vehicle . . .
2. The bodily injury must:
a. be sustained by an insured person;
b. be caused by an accident; and
c. arise out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of an
uninsured motor vehicle or an underinsured motor vehicle.
(Doc. # 25-13 at 14.) The Policy defined an “[i]nsured
person” as: “a. you or a
relative; b. anyone else occupying or using
your insured car; [and] c. anyone entitled to recover damages
due to bodily injury to you, a relative, or another occupant
of your insured car.” (Id. at 13.)
“[Y]ou” meant “the policyholder shown in
the Declarations and spouse, if living in
the same house.” (Id. at 6) (emphasis added).
A “relative” was defined as “a person who,
at the time of the accident, is related by blood,
marriage, or adoption to the named insured
or resident spouse and who resides in the named insured's
household, even if temporarily living elsewhere.”
(Id.) (emphasis added). The Policy's UM coverage
for bodily injury was limited to $100, 000 per person and
$300, 000 per accident. (Id. at 2.)
On
August 22, 2016, Plaintiff, through his counsel, notified
Defendant that he was making a claim under the Policy's
UM coverage. (Doc. # 25-12.) Plaintiff asserts that he was an
“insured person” under the terms of the Policy
and thus entitled to its UM coverage because he was Toni
Wagner's common law spouse at the time of the collision.
(Doc. # 6 at 2-4.) According to Plaintiff, Defendant issued a
reservation of rights letter on March 20, 2017,
“questioning [Plaintiff's and Toni Wagner's]
common law marriage, ” and “requested
‘objective proof' of their common law marriage in
order to determine that [Plaintiff's] claim was not based
‘solely to gain an economic advantage.'”
(Id.) He alleges that he cooperated with
Defendant-specifically, that he “provided documentation
. . . showing that he has incurred $732, 049.00 in damages to
date, ” “provided a recorded statement, ”
and “provided additional documentation regarding his
marriage to [Toni] Wagner, ” such as “affidavits
from coworkers, friends, and family members as objective
proof of their common law marriage.” (Id. at
3.)
Defendant
denied Plaintiff's claim for UM coverage under Toni
Wagner's Policy on May 30, 2017, purportedly “based
upon statements made by Plaintiff and [Toni] Wagner and based
upon the fact that documents that were provided indicated
that Plaintiff was single and not married to [Toni] Wagner at
the time of the [motor vehicle accident]” on July 1,
2015. (Doc. # 25 at 1-2.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant
has continued to insist that he and Toni Wagner were and
“are not common-law married” and to “deny
coverage despite additional information being
provided.” (Doc. # 6 at 3-4.)
Plaintiff
initiated this action against Defendant on February 20, 2018,
and asserts three claims for relief: (1) a claim of breach of
contract for UM benefits, (2) a claim of unreasonable delay
or denial of benefits under Colo. Rev. Stat. §§
10-3-1115 and -1116, and (3) a common law bad faith
claim.[2] (Id. at 4-6.)
Defendant
filed the Motion for Summary Judgment presently before the
Court on December 18, 2018. (Doc. # 25.) Plaintiff responded
on January 8, 2019 (Doc. # 30), to which Defendant replied on
January 22, 2019 (Doc. # 34).
II.
APPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES A. SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
Summary
judgment is warranted when “the movant shows that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if it is
essential to the proper disposition of the claim under the
relevant substantive law. Wright v. Abbott Labs.,
Inc., 259 F.3d 1226, 1231-32 (10th Cir. 2001). A dispute
is “genuine” if the evidence is such that it
might lead a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the
nonmoving party. Allen v. Muskogee, Okl., 119 F.3d
837, 839 (10th Cir. 1997). When reviewing a motion for
summary judgment, a court must view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party-in the matter
presently before the Court, in the light most favorable to
Plaintiff. See Id. ...