United States District Court, D. Colorado
CARLOS INNISS, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff,
v.
ROCKY MOUNTAIN INVENTORY, INC., a Colorado corporation, BRIAN HUNGERFORD, an individual, JANINE HUNGERFORD, an individual, and LINDA HUNGERFORD, an individual, Defendants.
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS
William J. Martinez, United States District Judge.
Plaintiff
Carlos Inniss (“Inniss”) brings this action
against Rocky Mountain Inventory, Inc. (“RMI”),
Brian Hungerford, Janine Hungerford, and Linda Hungerford
(together, “Hungerfords”) (collectively,
“Defendants”) for alleged violations of the Fair
Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 201 et seq., and similar state laws.
(ECF No. 26.) Inniss claims he was an “Inventory
Auditor” for RMI, and that RMI's payment structure
for Inventory Auditors deprives them of FLSA-mandated
overtime pay and pay required under Colorado law.
Currently
before the Court is Defendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss
Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 40.) For the reasons explained
below, the Court will deny this motion.
I.
LEGAL STANDARD
Under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may move to
dismiss a claim in a complaint for “failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.” The 12(b)(6)
standard requires the Court to “assume the truth of the
plaintiff's well-pleaded factual allegations and view
them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”
Ridge at Red Hawk, LLC v. Schneider, 493 F.3d 1174,
1177 (10th Cir. 2007). In ruling on such a motion, the
dispositive inquiry is “whether the complaint contains
‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.'” Id. (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). Granting a motion to dismiss “is a harsh
remedy which must be cautiously studied, not only to
effectuate the spirit of the liberal rules of pleading but
also to protect the interests of justice.” Dias v.
City & Cnty. of Denver, 567 F.3d 1169, 1178 (10th
Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Thus,
‘a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it
strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is
improbable, and that a recovery is very remote and
unlikely.'” Id. (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 556).
II.
BACKGROUND
The
Court accepts the following as true for purposes of
Defendants' motion.
“The
job responsibilities of Inventory Auditors include traveling
to the site of RMI's customers (such as grocery stores)
and performing an inventory of goods on hand at the
stores.” (ECF No. 26 ¶ 27.) Sometimes the stores
are far away from the Inventory Auditors' homes, meaning
that Inventory Auditors travel long distances and, in some
circumstances, stay overnight in hotels. (Id. ¶
29.) RMI pays Inventory Auditors on a per-mile basis (after a
60-mile deductible) when traveling from home to a store and
back. (Id. ¶ 31(b).) If the Inventory Auditor
must travel from one store to another in the same area on the
same day, he or she is paid minimum wage for that travel
time. (Id. ¶ 31(c).) RMI does not factor travel
time into its calculations of whether it needs to pay
overtime. (Id. ¶ 33.)
In
addition to these pay practices, Inniss was required to
“undertake miscellaneous work off-the-clock for the
benefit of RMI to prepare for the following day's
assignments. For example, on Christmas Day, 2017, [Inniss]
was required to coordinate and carry out the handoff of
required equipment from another employee to allow [him] to
perform the duties required of him on December 26,
2017.” (Id. ¶ 38.)
Inniss
routinely worked more than 40 hours per week and 12 hours per
day, particularly when factoring in travel time.
(Id. ¶ 39.)
Beginning
in February 2018, Inniss complained “to RMI” or
to “each of the Hungerfords” about discrepancies
between hours he recorded in a system called
“Exaktime” and hours for which he was actually
paid. (Id. ¶¶ 65-66.) These complaints
continued “over the following months” but he
received no response. (Id. ¶¶ 66-67.) A
response finally came on June 6, 2018, when Janine Hungerford
explained “that RMI altered the hours reported by
Exaktime based on other data to which the employees were not
privy.” (Id. ¶ 68.) Two days later, RMI
terminated Inniss. (Id. ¶ 69.)
Inniss
now brings claims for failure to pay all amounts he should
have been paid under the FLSA (Count 1), failure to pay all
amounts he should have been paid under the Colorado Wage
Payment Act and Colorado Wage Order (Count 2), and
retaliation for asserting his FLSA rights (Count 3).
(Id. at 15-17.)
III.
ANALYSIS
A.
Hungerford Defendants' Potential Individual Liability for
...