United States District Court, D. Colorado
RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE
JUDGE
Nina
Y. Wang Magistrate Judge
This
matter comes before the court pursuant to the Order to Show
Cause dated April 5, 2019 [#5] and Plaintiffs Nagwa Selim and
Saad Ally's (collectively, “Plaintiffs”)
Response to the Order to Show Cause [#7]. The undersigned
considers these matters pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)
and the Order Referring Case dated April 22, 2019 [#9]. For
the following reasons, this court respectfully
RECOMMENDS that Plaintiffs' Complaint
[#1] and claim(s) be DISMISSED without
prejudice for want of subject matter jurisdiction.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs
initiated this action by filing their pro se
Complaint on March 28, 2019. [#1]. As Defendant in this
action, Plaintiffs name the Denver County District Court.
[Id.]. To date, no summons has been issued and it
does not appear that Plaintiffs have served Defendant. Though
this action was directly assigned to the undersigned
Magistrate Judge, it has since been redrawn to the Honorable
Raymond Moore given Plaintiffs' filing of Nonconsent to
the Jurisdiction of a Magistrate Judge. See [#6;
#8].
Plaintiffs'
Civil Cover Sheet indicates that Plaintiffs base this
court's jurisdiction on the “U.S. Government
Defendant, ” and suggests that Plaintiffs assert a
claim or claims for fraud. See [#1-1]. Upon review
of Plaintiffs' Complaint, the basis for Plaintiffs'
claims appears to be their grievances with the Denver County
District Court's handling, and ultimate dismissal, of
their “Complaint for Judicial Review Pursuant to §
24-4-106, C.R.S. and Request for Stay and Designation of
Record” (the “Underlying Action”). See
generally [#1]. It appears to this court that the
Underlying Action dealt with Plaintiffs' appeal of the
State of Colorado Department of Human Services Office of
Appeals' Final Agency Action that found Plaintiffs liable
for a $2, 025 overpayment of Old Age Pension benefits to
Plaintiff Ally; the overpayment was deducted from Plaintiff
Selim's Aid to the Needy Disabled benefits. See
[id. at 4-10]. Plaintiffs seek damages in the amount
of $750, 000 and ask this court to order the Denver County
District Court to reopen the Underlying Action. See
[id. at 1].[1]
Because
this court could not discern the basis for federal subject
matter jurisdiction, the undersigned issued an Order to Show
Cause, returnable by Plaintiffs on or before May 3, 2019,
directing Plaintiffs to respond with an articulable basis for
federal subject matter jurisdiction. See [#5]. On
April 19, 2019, Plaintiffs filed their Response to the Order
to Show Case. See [#7].
LEGAL
STANDARD
Federal
courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and, as such,
“are duty bound to examine facts and law in every
lawsuit before them to ensure that they possess subject
matter jurisdiction.” The Wilderness Soc. v. Kane
Cty., Utah, 632 F.3d 1162, 1179 n.3 (10th Cir. 2011)
(Gorsuch, J., concurring). Indeed, courts have an independent
obligation to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction
exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party.
Image Software, Inc. v. Reynolds & Reynolds,
Co., 459 F.3d 1044, 1048 (10th Cir. 2006) (citing
Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006)). To
invoke federal question jurisdiction, Plaintiffs'
well-pleaded complaint must establish either “that
federal law creates the cause of action or that the
plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on
resolution of a substantial question of federal law.”
Nicodemus v. Union Pac. Corp., 440 F.3d 1227, 1232
(10th Cir. 2006) (internal quotations and citation omitted).
ANALYSIS
In
their Response to the Order to Show Cause, Plaintiffs
represent that they will serve Defendant pursuant to Rule 4;
that the “indispensable elements of a [sic] such cause
of action [exist] (1) a judgment which ought not in good
conscience to [sic] be enforced. (2) a good defense to the
alleged cause of action. (3) fraud, accident or mistake
exhibit 1, 2. (4) the absence of fault against the defendant
in case No 18 cv 596. (5) the absence of any adequate remedy
at law exhibit 3”; that the “power of the federal
courts appears to expressly recognized [sic] in rule 60 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure”; that the
“case needs to be reopened to become removable to
federal court as result [sic] of fraud”; that the court
has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4); and
that “defendant should not be a decision maker of the
subject and matter.” [#7 at 1]. Based on the foregoing,
this court concludes that Plaintiffs have failed to
articulate a basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction.
To
start, this court concludes that Plaintiffs fails to
establish jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4), the
Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), which confers
subject matter jurisdiction in federal district courts for
“class actions involving [1] at least 100 members and
[2] over $5 million in controversy when [3] minimal diversity
is met (between at least one defendant and one
plaintiff-class member).” Dutcher v. Matheson,
840 F.3d 1183, 1190 (10th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Plaintiffs' Complaint and Response do not
satisfy these three elements. Thus, jurisdiction under CAFA
does not appear appropriate.
Nor
does the court find persuasive Plaintiffs' arguments that
the Underlying Action must be reopened to allow for removal
to this District based on fraud or that Defendant should not
be permitted to determine subject matter jurisdiction.
Neither of these arguments suggest that subject matter
jurisdiction in this District is appropriate.
Next,
this court interprets Plaintiffs' Response as asserting
that the elements of Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure are satisfied such that this court should grant
Plaintiffs relief from the judgment entered in the Underlying
Action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).[2] But the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure do not confer federal subject matter
on federal courts; rather they are procedural devices used
once a case is properly brought in federal court. See
Amoco Prod. Co. v. Aspen Grp., 8 F.Supp.2d 1249, 1252
(D. Colo. 1998); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 82
(“These rules do not extend or limit the jurisdiction
of the district courts or the venue of actions in those
courts.”).
In
addition, federal district courts may not “exercise
appellate jurisdiction over state-court judgments[]”
pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See
Campbell v. City of Spencer, 682 F.3d 1278, 1281 (10th
Cir. 2012). That is, the doctrine “precludes a losing
party in state court who complains of injury caused by the
state-court judgment from bringing a case seeking review and
rejection of that judgment in federal court.”
Miller v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. (In re
Miller), 666 F.3d 1255, 1261 (10th Cir. 2012). Here, it
appears that Plaintiffs seek appellate-like review of the
Underlying Action. Indeed, it appears that Plaintiffs seek
relief from the Final Judgment entered in the Underlying
Action under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Typically, courts lack subject matter jurisdiction
under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to entertain such
claims. See Alfaro v. County of Arapahoe, ___
Fed.Appx. ___, 2019 WL 1387800, at **2-3 (10th Cir. March 27,
2019) (“Indeed, . . . reviewing the merits of final
state-court orders is precisely the type of claim encompassed
by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)); accord Chadee v. Kaufman,
No. 12-cv-3098 (RRM)(LB), 2012 WL ...