United States District Court, D. Colorado
A. BRIMMER, CHIEF JUDGE
Jason Vincent Bradley, has filed, pro se, a
“Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set
Aside, or Correct a Sentence By a Person in Federal
Custody” (“§ 2255 motion”) [Docket No.
58] and a motion entitled “Bill of Equity”
[Docket No. 76].
Court construes Mr. Bradley's filings liberally because
he is not represented by counsel. Hall v. Bellmon,
935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). However, the Court will
not act as his advocate. See Id. For the reasons
discussed below, Mr. Bradley's motions will be denied.
April 30, 2015, Mr. Bradley pled guilty to possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g) (Count 1); possession of a controlled substance
with the intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1) (Counts 2-3); and possession of a firearm
during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (Count 4). Docket
No. 1; Docket No. 41; Docket No. 42 at 1-2; Docket No. 57 at
1-2. The presentence report (“PSR”) found that
Mr. Bradley qualified as a career offender under U.S.S.G.
§ 4B1.1, which increased his advisory Guidelines range
from 77 to 96 months imprisonment to 262 to 327 months
imprisonment. See Docket No. 53 at 6-7,
August 28, 2015, the Court adopted the PSR without change,
but granted the parties' motions for a variant sentence.
Docket No. 56; Docket No. 57 at 8. The Court sentenced Mr.
Bradley to a 180-month term of imprisonment (120 months on
Counts 1-3, to be served concurrently, and 60 months on Count
4, to be served consecutively). Docket No. 56; Docket No. 57
at 3. Mr. Bradley did not file a direct appeal.
20, 2016, Mr. Bradley moved to vacate his sentence under
§ 2255 based on the Supreme Court's decision in
Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015).
Docket No. 58. The government filed a response to Mr.
Bradley's motion on March 22, 2017. Docket No. 75. On May
25, 2018, Mr. Bradley filed a motion entitled “Bill of
Equity, ” wherein he requests various forms of relief
related to certain property held in trust. See
Docket No. 76.
MOTION TO VACATE
motion to vacate under § 2255, Mr. Bradley contends that
his sentence violates the due process principles announced in
Johnson because it was enhanced under the residual
clause of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, U.S.S.G.
§ 4B1.2(a)(2). Docket No. 58 at 7. He further argues
that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because
his attorney failed to challenge the constitutionality of the
Guidelines' residual clause in order to negotiate a more
favorable plea agreement and sentence. Id.
Bradley's arguments do not demonstrate that he is
entitled to relief under § 2255. In Beckles v.
United States, 137 S.Ct. 886 (2017), the Supreme Court
held that the residual clause, § 4B1.2(a)(2), in the
advisory Sentencing Guidelines is not subject to vagueness
challenges under the Due Process Clause. Id. at 890.
Accordingly, Mr. Bradley's classification as a career
offender for purposes of sentencing did not violate the due
process principles announced in
counsel provide ineffective assistance by failing to raise
the Johnson issue during plea negotiations and
sentencing. Even assuming Beckles does not
automatically foreclose Mr. Bradley's ineffective
assistance claim, see Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (stating that “a court deciding an
actual ineffectiveness claim must judge the reasonableness of
counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of the
particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's
conduct”), there was no Tenth Circuit case law
extending Johnson to the Guidelines' residual
clause at the time of Mr. Bradley's
sentencing. Mr. Bradley cannot show that counsel's
performance was deficient merely because he failed to
anticipate a change in the law. See Battle v.
Workman, 353 Fed.Appx. 105, 110 (10th Cir. 2009)
(unpublished) (holding that “counsel's assistance
could not have been ineffective merely because he failed to
anticipate a change in the law before it occurred”);
United States v. Harms, 371 F.3d 1208, 1212 (10th
Cir. 2004) (“[C]ounsel's failure to raise or
recognize a potential legal argument does not automatically
render counsel's performance constitutionally
deficient.”). The Court will therefore deny Mr.
Bradley's motion to vacate his sentence under §
Rule 11(a) of the Section 2255 Rules, a “district court
must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it
enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” Under
28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), the Court may issue a
certificate of appealability “only if the applicant has
made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right.” Such a showing is made only when “a
prisoner demonstrates ‘that jurists of reason would
find it debatable' that a constitutional violation
occurred, and that the district court erred in its
resolution.” United States v. Pinson, 584 F.3d
972, 975 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)). In the present
case, the Court concludes that Mr. Bradley has not made a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.
Therefore, the Court will deny a certificate of
BILL OF EQUITY
“Bill of Equity, ” Mr. Bradley requests various
forms of relief, including an accounting of certain property
held in trust, on the ground that he is a “Private
Moorish American and foreign national” asserting
“cestuique rights.” Docket No. 76 at 1-2. The
Court finds Mr. Bradley's “Bill of Equity” to
be nonsensical and legally frivolous. See Mallett v.
United States, 721 Fed.Appx. 836, 836-37 (10th Cir.
2018) (unpublished) (affirming dismissal of § 2241
petition as legally frivolous where the petitioner claimed he
was entitled to immediate release from prison because,
“as a Moorish American, he had a divine inherent