United States District Court, D. Colorado
ORDER ON APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS
CHRISTINE M. ARGUELLO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Applicant
Christian Garcia Amaro has filed, through counsel, an
Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 by a Person in State Custody (Doc. # 1)
(“the Application”). He challenges the validity
of his criminal conviction in Pueblo County District Court
No. 04CR880. Having considered the Application,
Respondents' Answer (Doc. # 17) and the state court
record[3], the Court denies the Application.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A jury
convicted Mr. Garcia Amaro of first degree felony murder for
his alleged involvement in an attempted robbery resulting in
the death of Thomas Urlacher. (Doc. # 7-1 at 2-3.) The trial
court sentenced him to a mandatory prison term of life
without the possibility of parole. (Id.) Mr. Garcia
Amaro appealed the judgment of conviction. In People v.
Garcia-Amaro, No. 05CA2506 (Colo.App. Mar. 20, 2008)
(“Garcia-Amaro I”), the Colorado Court
of Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence. (Doc. #
7-9.) The Colorado Supreme Court denied his petition for writ
of certiorari. (Doc. # 7-1 at 2.)
Mr.
Garcia Amaro then filed pro se a motion for
postconviction relief under Colo. Crim. P. Rule 35(c). (Doc.
# 7-1 at 2-3.) The district court denied the motion without a
hearing. (Id.) In People v. Garcia-Amaro,
No. 10CA0982 (Colo.App. Mar. 22, 2012)
(“Garcia-Amaro II”), the Colorado Court
of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
for additional proceedings. (Doc. # 7-6.) Specifically, the
Colorado Court of Appeals remanded the case back to the
district court with directions to hold an evidentiary hearing
on several of the ineffective assistance of counsel claims
raised in the Rule 35(c) motion. (Id. at 10-14.)
Following the hearing, the district court denied the motion,
and Mr. Garcia Amaro appealed. (Doc. # 7-1 at 3.) In
People v. Garcia-Amaro, No. 15CA1694 (Colo.App. Aug.
17, 2017) (“Garcia-Amaro III”), the
Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. (Doc. #
7-1.) The Colorado Supreme Court denied his petition for writ
of certiorari. (Doc. # 7-2.)
In the
Application filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on August
6, 2018, Mr. Garcia Amaro asserts that (1) an
unconstitutional complicity instruction was given to the
jury; and (2) defense counsel was constitutionally
ineffective by failing (a) to properly advise him regarding
plea offers; (b) to properly investigate and cross-examine a
witness's drug use and criminal history; (c) to sequester
a potential witness; and (d) to request an accessory after
the fact instruction. (Doc. # 1 at 5-10, 15-35.)
Respondents
conceded in the Pre-Answer Response (Doc. # 7) that the
Application is timely under the one-year limitation period
set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), and that Mr. Garcia
Amaro exhausted state court remedies for the asserted claims.
(Id. at 4-9.)
On
September 17, 2018, the Court directed Respondents to file an
Answer that fully addressed the merits of the claims asserted
in the Application. (Doc. # 8.) Respondents submitted their
Answer (Doc. # 17) on January 11, 2019. Mr. Garcia Amaro did
not file a reply.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Title
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) of the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) provides that a writ
of habeas corpus may not be issued with respect to any claim
that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the
state court adjudication:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved
an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;
or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented
in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The applicant bears the burden of
proof under' 2254(d). See Woodford v.
Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 25 (2002) (per curiam).
A claim
may be adjudicated on the merits in state court even in the
absence of a statement of reasons by the state court for
rejecting the claim. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S.
86, 98-99 (2011). In particular, “determining whether a
state court's decision resulted from an unreasonable
legal or factual conclusion does not require that there be an
opinion from the state court explaining the state court's
reasoning.” Id. at 98. Thus, A[w]hen a federal
claim has been presented to a state court and the state court
has denied relief, it may be presumed that the state court
adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any
indication or state-law procedural principles to the
contrary.” Id. at 99. Even A[w]here a state
court's decision is unaccompanied by an explanation, the
habeas petitioner's burden still must be met by showing
there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny
relief.” Id. at 98. In other words, this Court
“owe[s] deference to the state court's result, even
if its reasoning is not expressly stated.” Aycox v.
Ly tle, 196 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 1999). Therefore,
the Court “must uphold the state court's summary
decision unless [the Court's] independent review of the
record and pertinent federal law persuades [the Court] that
its result contravenes or unreasonably applies clearly
established federal law, or is based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented.” Id. at 1178. “[T]his
'independent review' should be distinguished from a
full de novo review of the petitioner's claims.”
Id.
The
Court reviews claims of legal error and mixed questions of
law and fact pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). See
Cook v. McKune, 323 F.3d 825, 830 (10th Cir. 2003). The
threshold question the Court must answer under'
2254(d)(1) is whether the applicant seeks to apply a rule of
law that was clearly established by the Supreme Court at the
time of the relevant state court decision. See Greene v.
Fisher, 565 U.S. 34 (2011). Clearly established federal
law Arefers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the
Supreme] Court's decisions as of the time of the relevant
state-court decision. Id. at 412. Furthermore,
clearly established law consists of Supreme Court holdings in
cases where the facts are at least closely-related or similar
to the case sub judice. Although the legal rule at
issue need not have had its genesis in the closely-related or
similar factual context, the Supreme Court must have
expressly extended the legal rule to that context.
House v. Hatch, 527 F.3d 1010, 1016 (10th Cir.
2008). If there is no clearly established federal law, that
is the end of the Court's inquiry pursuant to'
2254(d)(1). See id. at 1018.
If a
clearly established rule of federal law is implicated, the
Court must determine whether the state court's decision
was contrary to or an unreasonable application of that
clearly established rule of federal law. See Williams v.
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404-05 (2000).
A state-court decision is contrary to clearly established
federal law if: (a) the state court applies a rule that
contradicts the governing law set forth in Supreme Court
cases or (b) the state court confronts a set of facts that
are materially indistinguishable from a decision of the
Supreme Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different
from [that] precedent. Maynard [v. Boone], 468 F.3d
[665], 669 [(10th Cir. 2006)] (internal quotation
marks and brackets omitted) (quoting Williams, 529
U.S. at 405). "The word 'contrary' is commonly
understood to mean 'diametrically different,'
'opposite in character or nature,' or 'mutually
opposed.'" Williams, 529 U.S. at 405
(citation omitted).
A state court decision involves an unreasonable application
of clearly established federal law when it identifies the
correct governing legal rule from Supreme Court cases, but
unreasonably applies it to the facts. Id. at 407-08.
Additionally, we have recognized that an unreasonable
application may occur if the state court either unreasonably
extends, or unreasonably refuses to extend, a legal principle
from Supreme Court precedent to a new context where it should
apply.
House, 527 F.3d at 1018.
The
Court's inquiry pursuant to the "unreasonable
application" clause is an objective inquiry. See
Williams, 529 U.S. at 409-10. "[A] federal habeas
court may not issue the writ simply because that court
concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant
state-court decision applied clearly established federal law
erroneously or incorrectly. Rather that application must also
be unreasonable." Id. at 411. "[A]
decision is 'objectively unreasonable' when most
reasonable jurists exercising their independent judgment
would conclude the state court misapplied Supreme Court
law." Maynard, 468 F.3d at 671. In addition,
evaluating whether a rule application was unreasonable
requires considering the rule's specificity. The more
general the rule, the more leeway courts have in reaching
outcomes in case-by-case determinations. [I]t is not an
unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law
for a state court to decline to apply a specific legal rule
that has not been squarely established by [the Supreme]
Court.
Harrington, 562 U.S. at 101 (internal quotation
marks omitted). In conducting this analysis, the Court
“must determine what arguments or theories supported or
. . . could have supported[ ] the state court's decision
and then ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could
disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent
with the holding in a prior decision of [the Supreme]
Court.” Id.
Under
this standard, “only the most serious misapplications
of Supreme Court precedent will be a basis for relief
under' 2254.” Maynard, 468 F.3d at 671;
see also Harrington, 562 U.S. at 88
(stating that “even a strong case for relief does not
mean the state court's contrary conclusion was
unreasonable”).
As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal
court, a state prisoner must show that the state court's
ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so
lacking in justification that there was an error well
understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any
possibility for fairminded disagreement.
Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102.
“[R]eview
under' 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was
before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the
merits.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170,
181 (2011).
The
Court reviews claims asserting factual errors pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). See Romano v. Gibson, 278
F.3d 1145, 1154 n. 4 (10th Cir. 2002). Section 2254(d)(2)
allows the federal court to grant a writ of habeas corpus
only if the relevant state court decision was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented to the state court.
Pursuant
to' 2254(e)(1), the Court must presume that the state
court's factual determinations are correct and the
petitioner bears the burden of rebutting the presumption by
clear and convincing evidence. “The standard is
demanding but not insatiable . . . [because] '[d]eference
does not by definition preclude relief.'”
Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240 (2005)
(quoting Miller- El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340
(2003)).
The
federal habeas court applies a de novo standard of
review to constitutional claims that were not reviewed on the
merits by the state courts. See Mitchell v. Gibson,
262 F.3d 1036, 1045 (10th Cir. 2001).
III.
ANALYSIS OF CLAIMS
A.
CLAIM ONE: COMPLICITY INSTRUCTION
Mr.
Garcia Amaro first contends that the “complicity
instruction invited the jury to convict [him] of
felony-murder without ever finding that he was guilty of
having committed the named predicate felonies of robbery or
attempted robbery.” (Doc. # 1 at 15.) He asserts that
this error violated his due process rights to be found guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt for every element of the charged
offense. (Id.)
The Due
Process Clause requires the prosecution to prove every
element of a charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). To
demonstrate a constitutional error from a jury instruction in
a state criminal trial, a habeas petitioner must show (1) an
“ambiguity, inconsistency, or deficiency” in the
instruction, and, (2) a “reasonable likelihood”
that the jury applied the instruction in a way that relieved
the State of its burden of proving every element of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt. Waddington v. Sarausad,
555 U.S. 179, 190-91 (2009) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). See also Victor v. Nebraska, 511
U.S. 1, 6 (1994) (explaining that the constitutional inquiry
is “whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the
jury understood the instructions to allow conviction based on
proof insufficient to meet the Winship
standard.”). However, “not every ambiguity,
inconsistency, or deficiency in a jury instruction rises to
the level of a due process violation." Middleton v.
McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 437 (2004).
In
making this determination, the jury instruction
“‘may not be judged in artificial isolation,'
but must be considered in the context of the instructions as
a whole and the trial record.” Estelle v.
McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991) (quoting Cupp v.
Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973)). A “slight
possibility” that the jury misapplied the jury
instruction is not enough. See Weeks v. Angelone,
528 U.S. 225, 236 (2000). "[A]s a general rule, errors
in jury instructions in a state criminal trial are not
reviewable in federal habeas corpus proceedings, unless they
are so fundamentally unfair as to deprive a petitioner of a
fair trial and . . . due process of law." Patton v.
Mullin, 425 F.3d 788, 807 (10th Cir. 2005) (quotation
omitted); see also Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145,
154 (1977) (holding that in considering a habeas claim based
on an improper jury instruction, the court must ask
"whether the ailing instruction by itself so infected
the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due
process, not merely whether the instruction is undesirable
[or] erroneous") (quotations omitted)). In short, the
pertinent question “is ‘whether the ailing
instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the
resulting conviction violates due process.'”
Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72 (quoting Cupp, 414
U.S. at 147). As such, "[a] § 2254 petitioner has a
heavy burden in attempting to set aside a state conviction
based on an erroneous jury instruction." Nguyen v.
Reynolds, 131 F.3d 1340, 1357 (10th Cir. 1997).
1.
State court proceedings
The
trial court provided the jury with the following relevant
instructions.
Instruction
No. 13
The
elements of the crime of Murder in the First Degree-Felony
Murder are:
1. That the defendant,
2. in the State of Colorado, at or about the date and place
charged
3. acting with one or more persons,
4. committed or attempted to commit robbery and
5. in the course of or in furtherance of committing or
attempting to commit robbery, or in the immediate flight
therefrom,
6. the death of a person, other than one of the participants,
was caused by anyone.
Instruction No. 14
The elements of the crime of Robbery are:
1. That the defendant,
2. in the State of Colorado, at or about the date and place
charged,
3. knowingly,
4. took anything of value,
5. from the person or presence of another,
6. by use of force, threats, or intimidation.
Instruction No. 15
The elements of the crime of Criminal Attempt to commit
Robbery are:
1. That the defendant,
2. in the State of Colorado, at or about the date and place
...