United States District Court, D. Colorado
Rodney Jaramillo, as personal representative of the estate of Joseph Jaramillo deceased, Plaintiff,
v.
Deputy Christian Crain, Deputy Nicholas Cardinal, and Sherry Baca, Defendants.
ORDER
RAYMOND P. MOORE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
This
survival action-brought by the brother of deceased inmate
Joseph Jaramillo- alleges violations of the Eighth Amendment
bar against cruel and unusual punishment. As alleged, on
February 23, 2016, Defendants Crain and Cardinal,
correctional officers at the Pueblo County Detention
Facility, assaulted Jaramillo in the shower until he became
unconscious. Jaramillo regained consciousness and requested
medical assistance for “unrelenting head pain.”
On February 24, 2016, Defendant Sherry Baca, an EMT, examined
him and noted symptoms consistent with a medical emergency,
but she limited treatment to ibuprofen. Later that day,
Jaramillo screamed for help, collapsed in his cell, and was
taken to the hospital. He never awoke and later died on
February 29, 2016. Jaramillo's estate filed on February
27, 2018, alleging excessive force and deliberate
indifference, and Defendants have moved to dismiss on statute
of limitation grounds. The only question for the Court is
when Jaramillo's causes of action accrued.
I.
BACKGROUND
A.
Allegations
On
February 23, 2016, inmate Joseph Jaramillo took a shower
despite several orders to return to his bunk. (Compl.
¶¶ 10-11, ECF No. 1.) In fact, he flipped off
prison guard Crain, causing guards Crain and Cardinal to
“take [ ] Jaramillo out . . . for his original refusal
of the first order to return to his bunk, and in retaliation
for flipping Deputy Crain off.” (Id.
¶¶ 11-12.) Even though Jaramillo had “stopped
the shower and began putting his clothes back on to comply,
” and had “begun to walk back to his bunk as
instructed, ” the guards “stormed the shower
area[, ] . . . grabbed [ ] Jaramillo aggressively and both
took him to the ceramic floor.” (Id.
¶¶ 11, 13.) Jaramillo's head hit the floor and
the concrete area of a nearby stall, and he lost
consciousness. (Id.) The guards then handcuffed
Jaramillo and, ignoring his complaints of head pain, escorted
him out of the dorm to an attorney room with no cameras.
(Id. ¶ 14.) Four hours later, Jaramillo
“requested assistance from medical for his unrelenting
head pain. . . . Jaramillo was adamant about the pain in his
head and informed the nurse it was affecting his
vision.” (Id. ¶ 15.)
Twelve
hours after that, “[d]espite [Jaramillo's]
complaint of severe head pain that had [by then] persisted
over 16 hours . . ., Defendant Baca did a cursory and
generally indifferent assessment.” (Id. ¶
16.) Jaramillo described his head pain as
“throbbing” and “not similar to any
headache [he had] ever had before.” (Id.) He
was not able to touch his chin to his chest-a common symptom
of a medical emergency such as swelling or bleeding in the
brain. (Id.) But Baca did nothing except give
Jaramillo ibuprofen and end the visit. (Id.)
Over
the next six hours, Jaramillo “continued complaining to
anyone who would listen.” (Id. ¶ 17.)
“He told his cell mate he worried he was dying and that
he couldn't see. At 4:45 am on February 24, he began
banging on his cell window screaming for help.”
(Id.) Baca and Crain were present but initially did
nothing. (Id.) “Ten minutes later, Jaramillo
collapsed in his cell. Ten minutes after that, Defendant Baca
entered the cell ‘to check his blood sugar.'
Jaramillo was unconscious, suffering respiratory failure, and
nonresponsive. He never regained consciousness.”
(Id.) On February 29, 2016, doctors removed
Jaramillo from life support, and he died of a subdural
hematoma and associated extensive untreated brain bleeding
and swelling. (Id. ¶ 18.)
B.
Procedural Posture and the Parties' Positions
Jaramillo's
estate filed this suit for relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 for alleged violations of his Eighth Amendment
rights. (See generally id.) In Claim One, he alleges
excessive force by Crain and Cardinal flowing from the shower
takedown. (Id. ¶¶ 19-24.) Claim Two
squares against Crain and Baca for their alleged deliberate
indifference to “critical and time-sensitive
life-saving medical treatment [that Jaramillo's] symptoms
clearly required.” (Id. ¶ 30.) Defendants
filed motions to dismiss solely on statute of limitation
grounds (ECF Nos. 26, 29, 41, 42), to which Jaramillo
responded (ECF Nos. 39, 40). Magistrate Judge Tafoya
recommended that the motions be granted. (ECF No. 59.)
Jaramillo timely objected (ECF No. 60), and Defendants
responded (ECF No. 61).
In
their briefing on the motions and objection, the parties
vehemently disagree on the date Jaramillo's causes of
action accrued. Defendants' positions are
straightforward: Because “Jaramillo had imputed
knowledge sufficient to trigger accrual at the time his
physical injury became more severe between February 23 and
24, 2016” and “deliberate indifference to his
requests for critical medical assistance” occurred
during the same timeframe (ECF No. 26, at 8; ECF No. 42, at
5), Defendants maintain that the very latest timely day for
filing would have been February 26, 2018.[1] Jaramillo's
theories are more complicated. On Claim One, despite his
allegations that he consciously and repeatedly requested
medical attention for the extraordinary symptoms he endured
following the shower assault, Jaramillo stresses that he lost
consciousness, was disoriented, and-until the moment of his
death-was not “aware that the guards had caused him a
[non-de minimis] head injury.” (ECF No. 60, at
6-7.) On Claim Two, Jaramillo asserts that no one knew the
cause of his death-or that Baca and Crain's denial of
care contributed to it- until his autopsy. (Id. at
9-10.)[2] Put another way, before he fell
unconscious for the final time, he alleges that he had no
information that brought into focus the constitutional
inadequacy of Baca's and Crain's lack of treatment.
(Id. at 11-16.)
II.
ANALYSIS
The
Court reviews timely objections to a magistrate judge's
recommendation de novo. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(3). The
legal standard applicable here is established. “To
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). Plausibility means that the plaintiff pled facts
which allow “the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. When considering whether an
action is time-barred, “[i]f the answer is apparent on
the face of the complaint, this issue may be resolved on a
motion to dismiss.” Dummar v. Lummis, 543 F.3d
614, 619 (10th Cir. 2008); see also Aldrich v. McCulloch
Properties, Inc., 627 F.2d 1036, 1041 n.4 (10th Cir.
1980) (“While the statute of limitations is an
affirmative defense, when the dates given in the complaint
make clear that the right sued upon has been extinguished,
the plaintiff has the burden of establishing a factual basis
for tolling the statute.”).
This
survival[3] action alleges constitutional violations
and seeks redress under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which includes
no limitations period. Therefore, while the characterization
of the type of claim at issue for limitations purposes
remains a federal question, state law governs the relevant
suit-barring deadline. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S.
261, 268-69 (1985). Colorado has filled in this gap:
“All actions upon liability created by a federal
statute where no period of limitation is provided in said
federal statute . . . must be commenced within two years
after the cause of action accrues, and not thereafter.”
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-80-102(1)(g) (language
rearranged). “Section 1983 claims accrue, for the
purpose of the statute of limitations, when the plaintiff
knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis
for the action.” Hunt v. Bennett, 17 F.3d
1263, 1266 (10th Cir. 1994); see also Johnson v. Johnson
County Comm'n Bd., 925 F.2d 1299, 1301 (10th Cir.
1991) (identical language). Under this test, “a
plaintiff need not understand the legal basis of his claim
before the statute of limitations will begin to run.”
Coleman v. Morall, 64 Fed.Appx. 116, 119 (10th Cir.
2003) Nor must he “know the full extent of his
injuries.” Indus Constructors Corp. v. U.S. Bureau
of Reclamation, 15 F.3d 963, 969 (10th Cir. 1994).
Rather, “a civil rights action accrues when
facts that would support a cause of action are or
should be apparent.” Fratus v. DeLand, 49 F.3d
673, 675 (10th Cir. 1995) (emphasis supplied; internal
quotations omitted). In survival actions, courts test accrual
as if the deceased had survived. See Colo. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 13-20-101(2); see also, e.g.,
Sager v. City of Woodland Park, 543 F.Supp. 282, 288
(D. Colo. 1982) (“[A] § 1983 survival action,
relying on the incorporation of state survival law through
[42 U.S.C.] § 1988, is essentially the assertion of the
cause of action the deceased would have had if he lived,
requesting damages for violation of the decedent's
rights.”). The claims at issue here sound in two
separate Eighth Amendment theories-excessive force and
deliberate indifference-and the Court addresses whether
Jaramillo knew or had reason to know of the facts that form
the basis for each.
A.
Claim One (for the shower ...