United States v. Poarch

          FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON THE ENTRY OF A PLEA OF GUILTY

          Robert E. Blackburn United States District Judge

         On March 20, 2019, I conducted a change of plea hearing during which (1) the defendant, her counsel, counsel for the government, and I formally reviewed and considered the plea agreement of the parties as stated in Court's Exhibits 1 and 2 ("plea agreement"); (2) I rearraigned the defendant under Fed. R. Crim. P. 10; and (3) I formally advised the defendant and conducted providency proceedings under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11.

         Based upon my exchange and colloquy with the defendant under oath in open court on the record; based upon the representations, remarks, and statements of counsel for the government and counsel for the defendant; based upon my review of the file and my review of the written plea agreement as stated in Court's Exhibits 1 and 2, I enter the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

         That the defendant appeared to be alert and not under the influence of or impaired by drugs, narcotics, marihuana, alcohol, medication, or intoxicants;

         That the defendant was competent and fully understood the nature, circumstances, and essential elements of the offense to which her plea of guilty was entered;

         That the defendant understands clearly that the government has the right in a prosecution for perjury or false statement to use against the defendant any statement that the defendant gives under oath;

         That the defendant understood the direct and collateral consequences that she may suffer or experience as a result of her participation in the plea agreement, her plea of guilty, and the resultant felony conviction and sentence;

         That the defendant's plea of guilty was made and entered voluntarily, knowingly, intelligently and intentionally, and was not the result of mistake; misunderstanding, fear, force, threats, coercion, or undue influence by anyone;

         That the defendant's plea of guilty was not the result of any promise or inducement made by anyone, including legal counsel, except as previously indicated on the record and included in the written plea agreement;

         That the defendant understood each of her legal rights, including the rights enumerated at Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(B) and (E), and her right to a trial by jury and her right to be represented throughout this criminal case by an attorney even if indigent; and that the defendant freely, voluntarily, knowingly, intelligently, and intentionally waived her rights and privileges, including the right to trial by jury, and, except as limited expressly by the plea agreement, her right to appeal or to collaterally attack the prosecution, conviction, and/or sentence; however, the defendant did not waive her right to be represented throughout this criminal case by an attorney even if indigent;

         That the defendant understood the maximum possible penalties, including imprisonment, fine, and term of supervised release;

         That the defendant understood that in imposing sentence, I must consult and consider the purposes and goals of sentencing as prescribed by Congress, the relevant provisions of the advisory United States Sentencing Guidelines, any motion for a sentence departure or variance, and the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (a)(1)-(7); and the defendant clearly understood that regardless of the sentence I impose, she may not withdraw her plea of guilty on that basis;

         That the defendant understood that the court will not be bound by any representations by anyone concerning the penalty to be imposed;

         That a factual basis existed to support and sustain the plea agreement and the defendant's plea of guilty; That the defendant has been represented at the change of plea hearing and throughout this case by effective and competent counsel ...