Larimer County District Court No. 13CR335. Honorable Susan J.
Blanco, Judge.
COUNSEL:
Philip
J. Weiser, Attorney General, Marixa Frias, Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Megan
A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Lance Thibert,
Deputy State Public Defender, Fort Collins, Colorado, for
Defendant-Appellant.
Taubman
and Berger, JJ., concur.
OPINION
TOW,
JUDGE..
Page 680
[¶1]
Defendant, Billy Joe Knoeppchen, appeals the district
court's order denying his motion to vacate the
restitution order. His appeal requires us to determine
whether his challenge involves a claim that his sentence is
not authorized by law or is a challenge to the manner in
which sentence was imposed. Because we decide it is the
latter, and the challenge is untimely, we affirm.
I.
Background
[¶2] On August 22, 2013, Knoeppchen pleaded
no contest to third degree assault and was sentenced to
probation. As part of the plea agreement, Knoeppchen agreed
to pay restitution. However, because the prosecution did not
have complete information regarding
Page 681
restitution at the time, the district court reserved the
restitution determination for ninety days.[1]
[¶3] On November 29, 2013, 100 days later,
the prosecution moved for an order imposing restitution.
Knoeppchen did not file any response to the motion. The
district court adopted the proposed order filed by the
prosecution. This order noted, " [t]he above stated
amount is the current amount due, but not a final amount due.
The defendant is ordered to pay restitution covering the
actual costs of the ongoing or future treatment of [the
victim] for treatment to his mouth, teeth[,] and jaw."
The amount of restitution owed to the victim compensation
fund was also left to be determined. On May 21, 2014, the
prosecution moved to amend the restitution amount, reducing
the total amount due. Again, Knoeppchen filed no response.
The district court granted this motion as well.
[¶4] More than three years later, Knoeppchen
filed a motion to vacate the restitution order. Although he
did not explicitly refer to Crim. P. 35, or to any
other statute or rule under which he was proceeding, he
" attack[ed] the restitution order itself as a matter of
law," asserting that the proposed order was filed by the
prosecution and adopted by the district court after the
ninety-day deadline, and that the prosecution did not
establish good cause for its tardy request. The district
court denied the motion, finding that good cause existed for
filing the motion for restitution late, despite not having
made any express finding of good cause when it entered the
original order.
II.
Analysis
[¶5] Knoeppchen now appeals the district
court's order denying his motion to vacate the
restitution order. As a preliminary matter, the People argue
that (1) this court lacks jurisdiction to review the order
because it is not a final, appealable order denying
postconviction relief; and (2) even if the motion to vacate
the restitution order is a final, appealable order seeking
postconviction relief, the motion was time barred. Although
we disagree that this court lacks jurisdiction to review the
order, we agree that the motion was time barred. Thus, we
affirm the district court's order, but on grounds other
than those relied on by the district court.
A.
This Court Has Jurisdiction
[¶6] We first address, and reject, the
People's assertion that the district court's order is
not a final, appealable order. According to the People,
because Knoeppchen did not explicitly invoke Rule 35 or its
statutory counterpart, section 18-1-410, C.R.S. 2018, the
district court lacked authority to treat the matter as a
postconviction challenge. However, courts have long
considered the substantive issues raised in a motion, rather
than the label placed on such motion, to determine how the
matter should be characterized. SeeDodge v.
People,178 Colo. 71, 73, 495 P.2d 213, 214 (1972).
Knoeppchen's collateral attack on the three-year-old
restitution order clearly sought ...