United States District Court, D. Colorado
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
A. Brimmer, Chief United States District Judge.
Court takes up this matter sua sponte on
defendants' Notice of Removal [Docket No. 1]. Defendants
state that this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332. Docket No. 1 at 2, ¶ 5.
every case and at every stage of the proceeding, a federal
court must satisfy itself as to its own jurisdiction, even if
doing so requires sua sponte action. See
Citizens Concerned for Separation of Church & State v.
City & County of Denver, 628 F.2d 1289, 1297 (10th
Cir. 1980). Absent an assurance that jurisdiction exists, a
court may not proceed in a case. See Cunningham v. BHP
Petroleum Great Britain PLC, 427 F.3d 1238, 1245 (10th
Cir. 2005). Courts are well-advised to raise the issue of
jurisdiction on their own, regardless of parties'
apparent acquiescence. First, it is the Court's duty to
do so. Tuck v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 859
F.2d 842, 844 (10th Cir. 1988). Second, regarding subject
matter jurisdiction, “the consent of the parties is
irrelevant, principles of estoppel do not apply, and a party
does not waive the requirement by failing to challenge
jurisdiction.” Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie
des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982)
(internal citations omitted). Finally, delay in addressing
the issue only compounds the problem if, despite much time
and expense having been dedicated to the case, a lack of
jurisdiction causes it to be dismissed. See U.S. Fire
Ins. Co. v. Pinkard Constr. Co., No.
09-cv-00491-PAB-MJW, 2009 WL 2338116, at *3 (D. Colo. July
party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of
establishing such jurisdiction as a threshold matter.”
Radil v. Sanborn W. Camps, Inc., 384 F.3d 1220, 1224
(10th Cir. 2004). Defendants assert that this Court has
diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Pursuant
to that section, “district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in
controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75, 000, exclusive
of interest and costs, and is between . . . citizens of
different States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). The facts
presently alleged are insufficient to establish the
their Notice of Removal, defendants state that plaintiff
“is a resident and citizen of Jefferson County,
Colorado” and defendant Joseph Carsner is a resident of
Texas. Docket No. 1 at 2, ¶¶ 6, 8. However, mere
residency in a state without an intent to remain is not
determinative of a party's citizenship for purposes of
diversity jurisdiction. See Middleton v. Stephenson,
749 F.3d 1197, 1200 (10th Cir. 2014) (“[A] person
acquires domicile in a state when the person resides there
and intends to remain there indefinitely.”);
Whitelock v. Leatherman, 460 F.2d 507, 514 (10th
Cir. 1972) (“[A]llegations of mere
‘residence' may not be equated with
‘citizenship' for the purposes of establishing
diversity.”); see also Mississippi Band of Choctaw
Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 48 (1989)
(“‘Domicile' is not necessarily synonymous
with ‘residence,' and one can reside in one place
but be domiciled in another.” (citations omitted)).
While defendants assert that plaintiff is a citizen of
Colorado, this allegation is not supported by the cited
paragraph of the complaint, which alleges only that plaintiff
is a “resident of the State of Colorado.” Docket
No. 1-1 at 2, ¶ 1.
defendants' allegations are presently insufficient to
allow the Court to determine the citizenship of plaintiff and
defendant Carsner or whether the Court has jurisdiction,
see United States ex rel. General Rock & Sand Corp.
v. Chuska Dev. Corp., 55 F.3d 1491, 1495 (10th Cir.
1995) (“The party seeking the exercise of jurisdiction
in his favor must allege in his pleading the facts essential
to show jurisdiction.”) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted), it is
that, on or before 5:00 p.m. on
March 13, 2019, defendants shall show cause
why this case should not be remanded to state court due to