United States District Court, D. Colorado
GILBERT T. TSO, individually, and as the parent and on behalf of M.X.T., Plaintiff,
REBECCA MURRAY, individually; TANYA AKINS, individually and official capacities; SHERR PUTTMAN AKINS LAMB PC, a law firm; JEANNIE RIDINGS, individually and official capacities; KILILIS RIDINGS & VANAU PC, a law firm; RUSSELL M. MURRAY, individually; DENA MURRAY, individually; JOANNE JENSEN, individually; DAVID P. BRODSKY, individually and official capacities; ELIZABETH A. STARRS, individually and official capacities; CHARLES D. JOHNSON, individually and official capacities; ROSS B. H. BUCHANAN, individually and official capacities; DAVID H. GOLDBERG, individually and official capacities; THE COUNTY OF LAKE, ILLINOIS, and THE STATE OF ILLINOIS; MITCH MCKEE, official capacity; MONICA JACKSON, individually and official capacities; LARA DELKA, individually and official capacities; and THE CITY & COUNTY OF DENVER, COLORADO, & THE STATE OF COLORADO, Defendants.
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
William J. Martínez United States District Judge
Plaintiff Gilbert Tso's (“Plaintiff”) latest
iteration of litigation before this Court, Plaintiff moves to
set aside the March 5, 2018 Order Denying Pending Motions
(“Order”) (ECF No. 284) and the final judgment
issued that same day (ECF No. 285) (together, “Order
& Judgment”). (ECF No. 295.) While Plaintiff
focuses on the Order & Judgment (ECF Nos. 284 & 285),
he also seemingly seeks relief from “all orders”
entered by former U.S. Magistrate Judge Shaffer and the
undersigned. (ECF No. 295 at 10.) Plaintiff's
“Verified Motion for Relief from Orders, Final Order
and Judgment” (the “Motion”) contends that
Judge Shaffer's spouse had a “consulting and
advisory services whose clientele include[d] the City [&]
County of Denver, ” and thus a financial interest which
should have prevented Judge Shaffer from presiding in this
case. (Id. at 9.) Plaintiff also erroneously
contends that the undersigned's “impartiality for
the entirety of the above named action . . . may be
reasonably questioned” because the lawsuit originally
named Denver Human Services (“DHS”) as a
defendant “implicating Denver DHS'[s] executive
director Don Mares, who is related to Judge Martinez and, for
whom Judge Martinez sua sponte recused himself” in a
separate case. (Id. at 2.)
has not met the Rule 60 standard for relief from a judgment
or order. Moreover, several of Plaintiff's factual
contentions, and the assumptions drawn therefrom, are plainly
erroneous. For those reasons, as further explained below, the
Court denies the Motion.
case has a lengthy procedural history, with which the Court
presumes general familiarity. The Tenth Circuit recently set
forth a summary of the factual background of this case when
it affirmed this Court's denial of various motions and
dismissal of Plaintiff's claims. See Tso v.
Murray, 2019 WL 140992, at *1 (10th Cir. Jan. 9, 2019).
In brief, this lawsuit arises from Plaintiff's
“dissatisfaction with the child-support obligation
established in his Illinois divorce from his ex-wife.”
Id. Plaintiff brought claims against his ex-wife,
her relatives, her Colorado and Illinois legal counsel, a
court-appointed psychologist, and various Colorado and Denver
governmental entities, including-as relevant to the instant
Motion-the City & County of Denver and DHS. Id.
filed his Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 120) on June 9,
2017. On September 26, 2017, Judge Shaffer recommended
dismissing Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint (the
“Recommendation”). (ECF No. 237.) On February 28,
2018, this Court adopted the Recommendation over
Plaintiff's objection, granted Defendants' various
motions to dismiss, and denied as futile Plaintiff's
request for leave to supplement the complaint (“Order
Adopting Recommendation”). (ECF No. 282.)
Court subsequently entered the Order, in which it denied
Plaintiff's motion for leave to amend and motion to
consolidate with Tso v. Murray, No. 17-cv-2523 (D.
Colo., filed Oct. 20, 2017) pending before Judge Philip A.
Brimmer of this District, and directed entry of a final
judgment. (ECF Nos. 284 & 285.) The Tenth Circuit
affirmed this Court's Order Adopting Recommendation and
Order & Judgment. (ECF No. 306.)
motion for relief from a judgment under Rule 60(b) is
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.
Zimmerman v. Quinn, 744 F.2d 81, 82 (10th Cir.
1984); see also LeaseAmerica Corp. v. Eckel, 710
F.2d 1470, 1475 (10th Cir. 1983) (decision whether relief
should be granted under Rule 60(b) is discretionary and
should not be disturbed except for a manifest abuse of
discretion). Morever, the Court is “mindful that Rule
60(b) ‘relief is extraordinary and may only be granted
in exceptional circumstances.'” Beugler v.
Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 490 F.3d
1224, 1229 (10th Cir. 2007) (citing Amoco Oil Co. v.
EPA, 231 F.3d 694, 697 (10th Cir. 2000)).
Reconsideration under Rule 60(b) is not a tool to rehash
previously-presented arguments already considered and
rejected by the Court, nor is it a vehicle by which to
present new arguments based upon law or facts that existed at
the time of the original argument. FDIC v. United Pacific
Ins. Co., 152 F.3d 1266, 1272 (10th Cir. 1998); Van
Skiver v. United States, 952 F.2d 1241, 1243-44 (10th
60(b)(6) provides for relief from a judgment when there is
“any other reason that justifies relief.” While
relief under the five enumerated clauses of Rule 60(b)(1)-(5)
is “extraordinary and may only be granted in
exceptional circumstances, ” “Rule 60(b)(6)
relief is even more difficult to attain and is appropriate
only when it offends justice to deny such relief.”
Yapp v. Excel Corp., 186 F.3d 1222, 1231-32 (10th
proceeds pro se, and the Court must liberally
construe his pleadings. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519, 520-21 (1972). However, the Court cannot act as advocate
for a pro se litigant, who must comply with the
requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir.
argues that, due to supposed conflicts of interest which
undermine the impartiality of Judge Shaffer and the
undersigned, the orders entered in this case are void or
should be vacated in the interest of justice. (ECF No. 295 at
2, 10.) See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4), (6). Plaintiff
is factually and legally incorrect.