United States District Court, D. Colorado
ORDER
KRISTEN L. MIX UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This
matter is before the Court on the Motion to
Dismiss [#115][1] (“Denver Motion”), filed by
Defendants Joseph Montoya (“Montoya”), Jodi Blair
(“Blair”), and Denis McCormick
(“McCormick”)[2] (collectively the “Denver
Defendants”); and on the Motion to Dismiss the
Complaint Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) [#117]
(“Crum's Motion”), filed by Defendant Peter
B. Crum, M.D. (“Crum”) (collectively, the
“Motions”).[3] Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se,
[4]
filed Responses [#126, #141], and Defendants filed Replies
[#128, #144]. The Court has reviewed the Motions, Responses,
Replies, the entire case file, and the applicable law and is
sufficiently advised in the premises. For the reasons set
forth below, the Motions [#115, #117] are
GRANTED.
I.
Summary of the Case
Plaintiff is currently an inmate with the Colorado Department
of Corrections, but throughout the period relevant to this
lawsuit he was a pretrial detainee at Van Cise-Simonet Denver
Detention Center (“DDC”) in the custody of the
Denver County Sheriff's Department (“DSD”).
See Notice of Pl.'s Address Change [#149];
Am. Compl. [#83] at 3; Denver Motion [#115]
at 6. Plaintiff brings this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 alleging that Defendants[5] failed to properly
investigate an assault he experienced while at DDC and that
they failed to provide him adequate medical care following
the assault. Am. Compl. [#83] at 2-6.
On
March 5, 2017, while a pretrial detainee at DDC, Plaintiff
alleges he was assaulted.[6] Id. at 4. As a result,
Plaintiff alleges he “openly requested [an]
invest[i]gation of [the] [a]ssault” and “filed
several [g]rievance and [i]nternal [a]ffairs”
complaints. Id. at 3. Although Plaintiff is not
exceedingly clear on this point, Plaintiff alleges the
assault was ignored or overlooked by either “[Denver]
[p]olice or [Denver] [s]heriff due to the lack of
investigation into it.” Id. After exhausting
his “[r]emed[ies] with [g]rievance[]s” asking DSD
to investigate the assault, Plaintiff alleges he received a
follow up investigation from Denver Police Sgt. Ryan McGinty
(“McGinty”) on May 12, 2017. Id. at 4.
During the follow up with Sgt. McGinty, Plaintiff was shown a
video of the assault depicting his attacker as an
unidentified inmate. Id. Plaintiff alleges the
purpose of the meeting with Sgt. McGinty was to show that the
department “did not violate [internal] pol[icy] [b]y
not p[u]rsu[]ing charges.” Id.
Defendant
Montoya, a Denver Police Department (“DPD”)
Internal affairs Commander, was allegedly alerted to the
assault by Plaintiff in May 19, 2017 correspondence.
Id. at 3. Defendant Montoya instructed Plaintiff to
follow up with the Office of the Independent Monitor
(“OIM”). Id. at 4. Plaintiff further
alleges he alerted Defendant McCormick, a Deputy at OIM, of
the assault on May 31, 2017. Id. As of November 22,
2017, the date Plaintiff signed his Amended Complaint [#83],
Plaintiff alleges the assault was still “not charged or
invest[i]gated.” Id.
On July
6, 2017, Plaintiff alleges he received a letter from
Defendant Blair, a DSD Internal Affairs Major, responding to
Plaintiff's assault inquiries. Id. at 5. The
letter, according to Plaintiff, concluded that DSD
“supported all action[s] [that] w[]ere taken to provide
[him] with [the] standard of care to address [his]
concerns.” Id. Plaintiff alleges the standard
of care followed by DSD was improper, because they failed to
“invest[i]gate, charge, or [d]o [m]edical.”
Id. Further, Plaintiff alleges the letter is
evidence of a “cover up” or “under cover
[p]olice or [s]heriff[s]” at work because he
“tried to address [this] issue via [g]rievance[]s and
complaint, and [he] was still not [e]ver
[q]uestion[ed].” Id.
Regarding
his medical care, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Crum of DSD
Primary Care lied about “follow up at [the] [h]ospital
[that was] not [d]one, [a]nd [there was] [n]o MRI [done] for
[his] spine.” Id. at 6. Additionally,
Plaintiff alleges Defendant Crum overcharged him by
“$14.00 for follow-up for [h]earing [l]oss and [b]ack
[p]ain.” Id. at 6. Plaintiff also asserts he
filed a “ton of [g]rievances to try to get proper
medical care for [b]ack [p]ain.” Id.
Plaintiff
asserts three claims against the remaining Defendants for
“[f]ailure to [i]nvest[i]gate [the] [a]ssault, ”
“[f]ailure to [r]elease [i]nfo to [the] courts, ”
and “[l]ack of [m]edical.” Id. at 4-6.
Liberally construed, Plaintiff claims, pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, that each of the Denver Defendants, in their
individual and official capacities, [7] were deliberately
indifferent to his health and safety in violation of
Plaintiff's rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution.[8] See Id. at 3-6.
Additionally, Plaintiff claims that each of the Denver
Defendants violated his due process rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment in failing to investigate his grievances
regarding his assault and denying him access to court.
See Id. at 4-5. Plaintiff also claims that Defendant
Crum acted with deliberate indifference to his medical needs,
violating his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 6. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief for an
“MRI & [m]edical, ” and “PTSD
therapy.”[9] Id. at 8. Additionally, Plaintiff
seeks $310, 433.40 in compensatory damages for “[l]ife
long hearing loss [a]nd new[ly] increased [s]tress.”
Id.
II.
Standard of Review
The
purpose of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is
to test “the sufficiency of the allegations within the
four corners of the complaint after taking those allegations
as true.” Mobley v. McCormick, 40 F.3d 337,
340 (10th Cir. 1994) To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion,
“[t]he complaint must plead sufficient facts, taken as
true, to provide ‘plausible grounds' that discovery
will reveal evidence to support the plaintiff's
allegations.” Shero v.City of Grove, Okla.,
510 F.3d 1196, 1200 (10th Cir. 2007). “The court's
function on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is not to weigh potential
evidence that the parties might present at trial, but to
assess whether the plaintiff's complaint alone is legally
sufficient to state a claim for which relief may be
granted.” Sutton v. Utah State Sch. for the Deaf
& Blind, 173 F.3d 1226, 1236 (10th Cir. 1999)
(citation omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). “A pleading
that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation
of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Nor does a
complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of
further factual enhancement.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
The
factual allegations in the complaint “must be enough to
raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”
Christy Sports, LLC v. Deer Valley Resort Co., 555
F.3d 1188, 1191 (10th Cir. 2009). “[W]here the
well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than
the mere possibility of misconduct, ” a factual
allegation has been stated, “but it has not shown that
the pleader is entitled to relief, ” as required by
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950
(quotation marks and citation omitted).
III.
Analysis
Plaintiff
asserts that Defendants violated his rights under what the
Court construes to be the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution. Am. Compl. [#83] at 3-6.
Defendant Crum argues the Court should analyze
Plaintiff's claims under the Eighth Amendment.
Crum's Motion [#117] at 4. However, as stated by
the Denver Defendants, Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee at
the time of the events underlying this lawsuit, and pretrial
detainees are protected under the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause rather than the Eighth Amendment's
proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. Berry
v. City of Muskogee, 900 F.2d 1489, 1493 (10th Cir.
1990); see also Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S.Ct.
2466 (2015); Denver's Motion [#115] at 6.
“In determining whether [a pretrial detainee's]
rights were violated, however, we apply an analysis identical
to that applied in Eighth Amendment cases brought pursuant to
§ 1983.” Perry v. Durborow, 892 F.3d
1116, 1121 (10th Cir. 2018) (quoting Lopez v.
LeMaster, 172 F.3d 756, 759 n.2 (10th Cir. 1999) (citing
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16
(1979)).[10]
A.
Individual Capacity: Denver Defendants
The
Denver Defendants assert an entitlement to qualified immunity
in their Motion, and thus the Court first examines
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint [#83] pursuant to
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). [#115] at 4; Butler v. Rio Rancho
Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 341 F.3d 1197, 1200 (10th Cir.
2003) (“Since the [Defendant] raised the defense of
qualified immunity in its motion to dismiss, we first examine
whether [Plaintiff] asserted a violation of federal law in
their complaint.”). Qualified immunity, in certain
circumstances, protects government officials from litigation
when they are sued in their individual capacities. See,
e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,
814-18 (1982). “[G]overnment officials . . . generally
are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as
their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory
or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known.” Id. at 818. In their Motion, the
Denver Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not sufficiently
alleged a plausible violation of his constitutional rights.
See [#115] at 6.
A
government official is entitled to qualified immunity from
liability for civil damages in his or her individual capacity
when his or her allegedly unlawful conduct did not violate
any of the plaintiff's statutory or constitutional rights
that (1) were “clearly established” at the time
of the conduct, and (2) would have been known to a reasonable
person in the official's position. Harlow, 457
U.S. at 818 (stating that “government officials
performing discretionary functions generally are shielded
from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct
does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known”); see also Pearson v. Callahan, 555
U.S. 223, 236 (2009) (holding that although qualified
immunity determination involves a two-part inquiry, if the
plaintiff fails either inquiry reviewed in any order, no
further analysis need be undertaken and qualified immunity is
appropriate). The Supreme Court has stated that “[f]or
executive officials in general . . . our cases make plain
that qualified immunity represents the norm.”
Id. at 807. Thus, a government official is entitled
to qualified immunity in “[a]ll but the most
exceptional cases.” Harris v. Bd. of Educ. of
Atlanta, 105 F.3d 591, 595 (11th Cir. 1997).
As
further explained below, the Court concludes that Plaintiff
fails to state a cognizable constitutional violation against
Defendants Blair, Montoya, or McCormick. Therefore, they are
entitled to qualified immunity.
1.
Deliberate Indifference
Pretrial
detainees are protected under the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause. Berry, 900 F.2d at 1493. The Court
liberally construes Plaintiff's Amended Complaint to
assert deliberate indifference claims against the Denver
Defendants. [#83] at 4-5. Prison officials must provide
“humane conditions of confinement, including adequate
food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and
reasonable safety from serious bodily harm.” Tafoya
v. Salazar, 516 F.3d 912, 916 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994)). Prison
officials also have a duty “to protect prisoners from
violence at the hands of other prisoners.”
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833. However, this standard
“does not impose constitutional liability on prison
officials for every injury suffered by an inmate.”
Id. Plaintiffs must allege facts demonstrating both
the objective and subjective prongs of deliberate
indifference to bring a valid deliberate indifference.
Callahan v. Poppell, 471 F.3d 1155, 1159 (10th Cir.
2006).
Under
the objective prong, a prisoner must establish that the
alleged injury or deprivation is, objectively,
“sufficiently serious.” Tafoya, 516 F.3d
at 916 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). The prison
official's act or omission must result in the denial of
“the minimal civilized measure of life's
necessities.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. A
medical need is sufficiently serious if “it is one that
has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or
one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily
recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.”
Sealock v. Colorado, 218 F.3d 1205, 1209 (10th Cir.
2000). “[I]t is the harm claimed by the prisoner that
must be sufficiently serious to satisfy the objective
component, and not solely ‘the symptoms presented at
the time the prison employee had contact with the
prisoner.'” Martinez v. Beggs, 563 F.3d
1082, 1088 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting Mata v. Saiz,
427 F.3d 745, 752-53 (10th Cir. 2005)).
Turning
to the subjective prong, a prisoner must establish that the
defendant prison official acted with a “sufficiently
culpable state of mind” to violate the constitutional
standard. Tafoya, 516 F.3d at 916. The prison
official must “know[ ] of and disregard[ ] an excessive
risk to inmate health or safety . . . .”
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. The standard is subjective
in that it requires that the prison official actually be
“aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn
that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must
also draw the inference.” Id. This prong is
equivalent to “criminal recklessness, which makes ...