United States District Court, D. Colorado
RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE
JUDGE
KRISTEN L. MIX UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This
matter is before the Court on Defendant Sattinder
Rattan's (“Rattan”) Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment [#20][1] (the
“Motion”). Plaintiff, who proceeds in this matter
as a pro se litigant, [2] filed a Response [#24] in opposition to
the Motion. Defendant Rattan did not file a Reply. Pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and D.C.COLO.LCivR 72.1(c), the
Motion has been referred to the undersigned for a
recommendation regarding disposition. See [#21]. The
Court has reviewed the Motion, the Response, the entire case
file, and the applicable law, and is sufficiently advised in
the premises. For the reasons set forth below, the Court
respectfully RECOMMENDS that the Motion
[#20] be GRANTED.
I.
Summary of the Case
Plaintiff is a pro se inmate currently confined at the Bureau
of Prisons' (“BOP”) U.S. Penitentiary in
Florence, Colorado. Compl. [#1] at 1. On December
14, 2017, Plaintiff filed his Prisoner Complaint [#1] against
Defendant Sattinder Rattan in his individual and official
capacity as a prison healthcare provider, citing the Federal
Tort Claims Act (the “FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. §
1346(b), as the basis for this Court's jurisdiction.
Id. at 3, 4.
Plaintiff's
claims involve an ulcer or infection[3] of Plaintiff's big right
toe which was caused or aggravated by Plaintiff's Type II
diabetes and ultimately required amputation of the toe.
Id. at 3-5. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Rattan
acted negligently as Plaintiff's “custodial medical
caretaker” by failing to appropriately treat the ulcer
or infection prior to the amputation despite Plaintiff's
medical history, Plaintiff's repeated complaints, and the
obvious severity of Plaintiff's condition. Id.
at 4-5. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Rattan
wrongfully diagnosed the ulcer or infection as a foot fungus
and directed Plaintiff to treat the toe with a fungal cream
which was inadequate. Id. at 3-4. Plaintiff further
states that the surgeon who performed the amputation informed
Plaintiff “that the toe could have been saved had
Plaintiff received earlier treatment.” Id. at
5.
On the
face of the Complaint [#1], Plaintiff presents only one claim
for relief in which he states that Defendant Rattan
“unnecessarily created negligent acts with a reckless
disregard for medical needs, causing me to lose a limb[ ] (my
right big toe).” Id. At 4. Plaintiff also
states that Defendant Rattan acted with deliberate
indifference “to Plaintiff's medical [ ]needs, in
violation of the E[i]ghth Amendment under cruel and unusual
punishment.” Id. at 5. For relief, Plaintiff
seeks money damages from Defendant Rattan and an “order
granting an injunction in obtaining recordings of inmate
complaints lodged against” Defendant Rattan.
Id.
On
March 26, 2018, Defendant Rattan filed the instant Motion
[#20] and a Motion to Dismiss Medical Negligence Claim for
Failure to file a Certificate of Review [#19] (the
“Motion to Dismiss”). Taken together, the Motions
[#19 & #20] construe Plaintiff's Complaint [#1] as
asserting the following two claims: (1) an FTCA claim against
Defendant Rattan for medical negligence; and (2) a
Bivens[4] claim against Defendant Rattan for
deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff
filed a consolidated Response [#24] to both Motions [#19
& #20] on April 12, 2018, in which Plaintiff does not
appear to contest this construction. See generally
[#24]. Accordingly, and after careful review of the Complaint
[#1], the Court construes Plaintiff's Complaint as
asserting both an FTCA claim for medical negligence against
Defendant Rattan in his official capacity and an Eighth
Amendment Bivens claim for medical indifference
against Defendant Rattan in his individual capacity. The
instant Motion [#20] seeks summary judgment only on
Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment Bivens claim for
Plaintiff's failure to exhaust administrative remedies,
as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
Motion [#20] at 1, 3-4.[5]
On
April 2, 2018, the Court granted Plaintiff's request to
take judicial notice of a letter, dated October 12, 2017,
addressed to Plaintiff from the U.S. Department of Justice
(the “Denial Letter”). Minute Order
[#22]. According to the Denial Letter, it serves as
notification of the final denial of an unidentified federal
tort claim under 28 C.F.R. § 14.9. See Denial
Letter [#16] at 3. The Court took judicial notice of the
Denial Letter pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) to the extent
that it had any impact on the adjudication of the Court's
subject matter jurisdiction over this action. Minute
Order [#22] (citing Pringle v. United States,
208 F.3d 1220, 1222 (10th Cir. 2000)).
On June
11, 2018, the United States filed a Notice of Substitution
[#29] certifying that Defendant Rattan was acting within the
scope of his federal employment with the BOP at all times
material to the allegations in the Complaint [#1]. [#29] at
1. As such, the United States was substituted for Defendant
Rattan on Plaintiff's FTCA claim of medical negligence,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1). [#29]. Defendant
Rattan remains named in his individual capacity with respect
to Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment Bivens claim for
purposes of the instant Motion [#20].
II.
Standard of Review
The
purpose of a motion for summary judgment pursuant to
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 is to assess whether trial is necessary.
See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323
(1986). Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), summary judgment shall be
granted if “the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure
materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” An issue is
genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
resolve the issue in favor of the nonmoving party.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986). A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of
the case under the governing substantive law. Id.
The
burden is on the movant to show the absence of a genuine
issue of material fact. Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 670-71 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323). When the movant does not
bear the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial, the
“movant may make its prima facie demonstration [of the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact] simply by
pointing out to the [C]ourt a lack of evidence for the
nonmovant on an essential element of the nonmovant's
claim.” Id. at 671. If the movant carries the
initial burden of making a prima facie showing of a lack of
evidence, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to put forth
sufficient evidence for each essential element of his claim
such that a reasonable jury could find in his favor. See
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Simms v. Okla. ex rel.
Dep't of Mental Health & Substance Abuse Servs.,
165 F.3d 1321, 1326 (10th Cir. 1999). The nonmovant must go
beyond the allegations and denials of his pleadings and
provide admissible evidence, which the Court views in the
light most favorable to him. Adickes v. S.H. Kress &
Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970); Panis v. Mission
Hills Bank, N.A., 60 F.3d 1486, 1490 (10th Cir. 1995)
(citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324). Conclusory
statements based merely on conjecture, speculation, or
subjective belief are not competent summary judgment
evidence. Bones v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 366
F.3d 869, 875 (10th Cir. 2004). The nonmoving party's
evidence must be more than “mere reargument of [his]
case or a denial of an opponent's allegation” or it
will be disregarded. See 10B Charles Alan Wright, et
al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2738 at 356 (3d
ed. 1998).
In
addition, the Court “must accord substantial deference
to the professional judgment of prison administrators, who
bear a significant responsibility for defining the legitimate
goals of a corrections system and for determining the most
appropriate means to accomplish them.” Overton v.
Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003). To this end, the
Court notes the well-established law that prison management
functions should be left to the broad discretion of prison
administrators to enable them to manage prisons safely and
effectively. See, e.g., Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S.
215 (1976). Accordingly, courts should interfere with the
management of prisons only under exceptional and compelling
circumstances. Taylor v. Freeman, 34 F.3d at 266,
268-70 (4th Cir. 1994). Indeed, the Tenth Circuit has stated
that it “abhor[s] any situation or circumstance
requiring the intervention of the federal courts in matters
involving the administration, control and maintenance by the
sovereign states of their penal systems. It is a delicate
role assigned to the federal courts to display that restraint
so necessary 'in the maintenance of proper federal-state
relations.'” Battle v. Anderson, 564 F.2d
388, 392 (10th Cir. 1977) (citation omitted). As such,
“sweeping intervention in the management of state
prisons is rarely appropriate when exercising the equitable
powers of the federal courts.” Taylor, 34 F.3d
at 269 (citations omitted).
III.
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