United States District Court, D. Colorado
BORIS MOLKANDOW, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff,
MAURY COBB ATTORNEY AT LAW, LLC, Defendant.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON
William J. Martínez, United States District Judge.
dispute concerns whether a debt collection letter sent to
Plaintiff Boris Molkandow (“Plaintiff”) by
Defendant Maury Cobb Attorney at Law LLC
(“Defendant”) complied with § 1692g(a)(2) of
the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”),
15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. Before the Court are
Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
(“Motion”; ECF No. 18) and Defendant's
Unopposed Motion to Continue Pretrial Deadlines
(“Motion to Continue”; ECF No. 23). For the
reasons set forth below, the Court grants Defendant's
Motion, denies Defendant's Motion to Continue as moot,
and dismisses Plaintiff's Complaint with prejudice.
allegedly owed an outstanding balance to T-Mobile. (ECF No. 1
¶ 12.) T-Mobile hired Defendant to collect that debt.
(Id. ¶ 16.) In its efforts to collect,
Defendant sent Plaintiff a debt collection letter (the
“Letter”) dated May 4, 2017. (ECF No. 1-2 at 1.)
The Letter contained the following table in its top right
Our Account #
Letter also stated, in pertinent part, as follows:
Dear Boris Molkandow:
The account shown here is unpaid and has been placed with
this office for collection. . . .
MAURY COBB ATTORNEY AT LAW LLC is pleased to inform you that
we can offer you an opportunity to resolve your account with
T-MOBILE for the amount of $3, 479.81. . . .
This communication is from a debt collector. This is an
attempt to collect debt. Any information obtained will be
used for that purpose.
(Id. (emphasis removed).)
April 16, 2018, Plaintiff filed a class-action complaint
against Defendant, alleging that Defendant's Letter
violated the FDCPA because it failed to identify
Plaintiff's current creditor. (ECF No. 1.) See
also 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(2). The parties agree
that T-Mobile is the current creditor of the debt and that
the Letter was Defendant's first communication to
Plaintiff regarding the debt, but dispute whether the Letter
adequately identified T-Mobile as the current creditor. (ECF
No. 15 at 2-3.) Plaintiff contends that the FDCPA applies in
this context because he is a “consumer” who
received a “communication” from a “debt
collector” regarding a “debt, ” per the
definitions set out in the statute. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶
7, 10, 14, 19.) See also 15 U.S.C. § 1692a.
22, 2018, Defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings,
arguing that “Plaintiff's claim should be dismissed
because the name of the creditor was unequivocally contained
within the collection [L]etter, and when the [L]etter is read
in its entirety, [P]laintiff could not have been confused as
to whom the debt was owed.” (ECF No. 18 at 2.)
Plaintiff filed a Response to Defendant's Motion (ECF No.
21) and Defendant filed a Reply (ECF No. 22).
motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) is
treated as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).”
Cummings v. Dean, 2019 WL 303021, at *6 (10th Cir.
Jan. 24, 2019). Therefore, in ruling on a motion for judgment
on the pleadings, courts look to the specific allegations of
the complaint to determine whether they plausibly support a
legal claim for relief-that is, a complaint must include
“enough facts to state a claim for relief that is
plausible on its face.” TON Servs., Inc. v. Qwest
Corp., 493 F.3d 1225, 1236 (10th Cir. 2007);
Alvarado v. KOB-TV, LLC, 493 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10th
Cir. 2007). The Court accepts as true the well-pleaded