United States District Court, D. Colorado
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
A. BRIMMER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Anthony Michael Salazar, has filed pro se a Motion
to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence Pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2255 (§ 2255 Motion) [Docket No.
42].The Court must construe the motion
liberally because Mr. Salazar is representing himself.
See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972);
Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir.
1991). However, the Court should not be the pro se
litigant's advocate. See Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110.
For the reasons stated below, Movant will be ordered to show
cause why his claims should not be dismissed.
March 16, 2015, Movant was placed on supervision by the
United States District Court for the District of Utah. Docket
No. 22. Following a conviction for Failure to Register as a
Sex Offender, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a),
Movant was sentenced to a 12-month term of imprisonment
followed by five years of supervised release. Docket No. 1-2.
Supervision commenced in the District of Utah on July 22,
2015 and was transferred to the District of Colorado on
January 15, 2016. Docket No. I. On September 20, 2016, a
United States Probation Officer filed a Superseding Petition
Due to Violations of Supervision (“Petition”).
Docket No. 22. The Petition alleged five violations,
including, inter alia, Violation of Law, a Grade B
violation of supervised release under United States
Sentencing Guidelines Section 7. Id. at 3. The
Violation of Law was “Certain Activities Relating to
Material Constituting or Containing Child Pornography in
violation of 18 U.S.C § 2252A.” Id.
Movant admitted to the alleged Violation of Law. Docket Nos.
38, 40. On March 6, 2017, he was sentenced to a 60-month term
of imprisonment, to be followed by a five-year term of
supervised release. Docket No. 40. Movant did not file a
filed his § 2255 Motion on January 15, 2019. Docket No.
42. In the Motion, he asks the Court to vacate the period of
supervised release on the basis that the Court had no
jurisdiction to impose it. Id. at 3. Specifically,
Movant asserts that “[t]he revocation of [his]
supervised release was a continuation of the original
criminal action, not a separate proceeding” and,
therefore, “the court could not impose another five
years supervised release after imposing a five year sentence
after revoking his supervised release.” Id. at
9. In the alternative, Movant argues that his conditions of
supervised release must be modified. Id. at 10-23.
to 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f), a one-year limitation period
applies to motions to vacate, set aside, or correct a federal
limitation period shall run from the latest of B
(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes
(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion
created by governmental action in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the
movant was prevented from making a motion by such
(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially
recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly
recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively
applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or
claims presented could have been discovered through the