United States District Court, D. Colorado
ROCKY MOUNTAIN WILD, a Colorado non-profit corporation, Plaintiffs,
v.
UNITED STATES BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, a federal agency, and UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, a federal agency, Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS
WILLIAM L MARTINEZ UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Plaintiff
Rocky Mountain Wild alleges that Defendants United States
Bureau of Land Management and United States Department of the
Interior (together, “BLM” or
“Defendants”) failed to respond properly to Rocky
Mountain Wild's October 2017 request for agency records
under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5
U.S.C. § 552. Rocky Mountain Wild further claims that
BLM's improper handling of the request is consistent with
alleged previous instances of mishandling FOIA requests,
particularly requests for records related to oil and gas
leasing decisions, which Rocky Mountain Wild frequently
submits. Rocky Mountain Wild thus seeks an injunction
remedying the alleged deficiencies in BLM's response to
the October 2017 request, as well as an injunction against
BLM's alleged pattern or practice of deficient FOIA
responses.
Currently
before the Court is BLM's Partial Motion to Dismiss. (ECF
No. 13.) BLM asks the Court to dismiss all claims except the
core claim regarding whether BLM properly responded to Rocky
Mountain Wild's October 2017 FOIA request. BLM argues
that Rocky Mountain Wild lacks standing to bring the
challenged claims, and further argues that Rocky Mountain
Wild has failed to state a claim for relief as to those
claims.
For the
reasons explained below, the Court agrees in part with
BLM's standing argument, and agrees that Rocky Mountain
Wild otherwise fails to state a claim. The Court will
therefore grant the motion.
I.
LEGAL STANDARD
A.
Rule 12(b)(1)
BLM's
standing argument falls under Rule 12(b)(1), which permits
challenges to subject matter jurisdiction. “[Federal]
[d]istrict courts have limited subject matter jurisdiction
and may [only] hear cases when empowered to do so by the
Constitution and by act of Congress.” Randil v.
Sanborn W. Camps, Inc., 384 F.3d 1220, 1225 (10th Cir.
2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A court
lacking jurisdiction cannot render judgment but must dismiss
the case at any stage of the proceedings in which it becomes
apparent that jurisdiction is lacking.” Basso v.
Utah Power & Light Co., 495 F.2d 906, 909 (10th Cir.
1974).
Rule
12(b)(1) motions generally take one of two forms: a facial
attack or a factual attack. Here, BLM attaches certain
extra-record documents and so brings, in part, a factual
attack. Given this, the Court has “wide discretion to
allow affidavits, other documents, and a limited evidentiary
hearing to resolve disputed jurisdictional facts.”
Holt v. United States, 46 F.3d 1000, 1002 (10th Cir.
1995). Furthermore, the Court's reference to evidence
beyond the pleadings will not convert the motion to one under
Rules 56 or 12(b)(6), unless the jurisdictional question is
intertwined with the merits of the case. Id. Here,
as will become clear below, the jurisdictional question is
independent from the merits.
B.
Rule 12(b)(6)
Under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may move to
dismiss a claim in a complaint for “failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.” The 12(b)(6)
standard requires the Court to “assume the truth of the
plaintiff's well-pleaded factual allegations and view
them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”
Ridge at Red Hawk, LLC v. Schneider, 493 F.3d 1174,
1177 (10th Cir. 2007). In ruling on such a motion, the
dispositive inquiry is “whether the complaint contains
‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.'” Id. (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). Granting a motion to dismiss “is a harsh
remedy which must be cautiously studied, not only to
effectuate the spirit of the liberal rules of pleading but
also to protect the interests of justice.” Dias v.
City & Cnty. of Denver, 567 F.3d 1169, 1178 (10th
Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Thus,
‘a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it
strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is
improbable, and that a recovery is very remote and
unlikely.'” Id. (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 556).
II.
BACKGROUND & STATUTORY STRUCTURE
A.
The FOIA Request
Rocky
Mountain Wild submitted a FOIA request to BLM on October 19,
2017, seeking “all agency records involving [BLM's]
proposed March 2018 oil and gas leasing” of specified
parcels. (ECF No. 1-1.) Under FOIA, Rocky Mountain Wild's
request triggered a 20-working-day clock during which BLM was
required to “determine . . . whether to comply with
such request, ” at which point BLM was further required
to “immediately notify [Rocky Mountain Wild] of such
determination and the reasons therefor.” 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(a)(6)(A)(i). However, a failure to make such a
determination within 20 working days may be “excused
for an additional 10 days” if “unusual
circumstances apply . . . and the agency provided a timely
written notice to the requester.” Id. §
552(a)(4)(A)(viii)(II)(aa); see also 43 C.F.R.
§ 2.19. The same day that BLM received Rocky Mountain
Wild's request, a BLM employee e-mailed Rocky Mountain
Wild to explain that it was invoking the 10-day extension
“because we need to search for and collect responsive
records from a field office separate from the office that is
processing your request.” (ECF No. 13-1 at 2.)
By
letter dated December 5, 2017 (the thirty-first working day
after Rocky Mountain Wild submitted its request), BLM
responded to Rocky Mountain Wild with what it characterized
as “installment 1 to your [FOIA] request.” (ECF
No. 1-2.) Installment 1 comprised 140 pages. (Id.)
BLM announced that it was “still reviewing additional
records that are responsive to your request and will follow
with further installments.” (Id.)
By
letter dated December 28, 2017, BLM transmitted
“installment 2, ” comprising 1, 595 pages. (ECF
No. 1-3.) BLM again announced that it was “still
reviewing additional records that are responsive to your
request and will follow with further installments.”
(Id.)
B.
The Original Complaint
Rocky
Mountain Wild filed this lawsuit on February 8, 2018. (ECF
No. 1.) In that original complaint, Rocky Mountain Wild
asserted three claims for relief.
The
first claim for relief alleged that BLM had violated FOIA
“by failing to provide a lawful determination and
response . . . within the statutory [20-day or 30-day]
period.” (Id. ¶ 33; see also id.
¶ 26.) The first claim for relief also pleaded that BLM
failed to conduct a lawful search for responsive records, and
that BLM continues to violate FOIA by withholding agency
records responsive to Rocky Mountain Wild's request and
not subject to any FOIA exemption. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶
34-35.)
Rocky
Mountain Wild's second claim for relief alleged that
BLM's conduct is such that it merits referral to special
counsel under 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(F) for investigation
into wrongdoing. (Id. ¶¶ 38-39.) The Court
will discuss this remedy further in Part III.B, below.
Rocky
Mountain Wild's third claim for relief alleged “a
pattern and [sic] practice of not complying with
FOIA's statutory requirements in a timely manner.”
(Id. ¶ 41.) Rocky Mountain Wild also alleged a
pattern or practice of withholding agency records through
intentional delay, and withholding records that are not
subject to any exemption. (Id. ¶¶ 42-43.)
C.
Final ...